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## THE REFORM OF THE *COMITIA CENTURIATA*.

This paper aims at showing that a view such as Mommsen held in his later works on the third-century reform of the *comitia centuriata* is most in accordance with present evidence.<sup>1</sup> A fresh statement of this position has become necessary since the publication of important articles by E. S. Staveley in 1952 and by E. Schönauer in 1953.<sup>2</sup>

Much discussion of the reform has arisen from a consideration of the implications of the *tabula Hebana*.<sup>3</sup> The exact status of the electoral body described in this inscription is by no means clear, but fortunately we do not need to settle this question

<sup>1</sup> The writer is indebted to Dr. A. H. McDonald of Clare College, Cambridge, and to Dr. J. H. Oliver, The Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, for valuable criticism and suggestions.

<sup>2</sup> A list of references to previous discussions of the subject will be found in Mr. Staveley's article, "The Reform of the Comitia Centuriata," *A.J.P.*, LXXIV (1953), pp. 1 ff. To the articles cited by Staveley now add: Aldo dell'Oro, "Rogatio e Riforma dei Comizi Centuriati," *Parola del Passato*, XIV (1950), pp. 138 ff.; E. Schönauer, "Die römische Centurien-Verfassung in neuer Quellenschau," *Historia*, II (1953), Heft 1, pp. 21 ff.; Filippo Gallo, "La riforma dei comizi centuriati," *Studia et Documenta Historiae et Iuris*, XVIII (1952), pp. 125 ff. I am substantially in agreement with the conclusions of Gallo although I differ from him on the interpretation of Livy, I, 43, 12. See also G. Tibiletti, *Principe e Magistrati Repubblicani, Studi Pubblicati dall' Istituto per la Storia Antica*, IX (1953).

<sup>3</sup> Complete text and very full bibliography in James H. Oliver and Robert E. Palmer, "Text of the Tabula Hebana," *A.J.P.*, LXXV (1954), pp. 225 ff.

before considering what light the new inscription may throw on the working of the reformed Republican centuriate assembly. For this purpose we need only understand the system of voting described in the tablet and see what reasonable inferences may be drawn from it. It must be made clear at the outset that the *tabula Hebana* makes no explicit reference to the *comitia centuriata*. When one argues from the tablet back to the conditions of the full assembly the argument must be inferential and analogical. It is not, however, for this reason devoid of all force. It becomes the more cogent (though never conclusive) the more clearly we are able to show (i) that Augustus could have established this electoral body in other, more simple, ways if he had not been preserving here a genuine feature of the *comitia centuriata*, and (ii) that the supposition of a similarity between the provisions of the inscription and the working of the *comitia centuriata* not only accords with the other evidence on the reform but even helps to settle difficulties in that evidence.

The *tabula Hebana* is in form a *rogatio* providing honours for the dead Germanicus (d. A.D. 19). There are some minor honours but the greater part of the inscription is given over to a detailed description of a voting assembly in which there are fifteen "centuries," ten of them called "centuries of C. and L. Caesar" and five called "centuries of Germanicus Caesar." The ten centuries of C. and L. Caesar are said to have been created by a law of the consuls L. Valerius Messalla Volesus and Cn. Cornelius Cinna Magnus, that is in the year A.D. 5 and so in the time of Augustus. The five centuries in honour of Germanicus are added in A.D. 19 or 20.

The voting assembly here described, said to be *destinationis facienda causa*, contained senators and the equites of all the decuriae set up *iudiciorum publicorum causa*. It is likely that this group of senators and knights numbered from three to four thousand. On the day of an election the presiding magistrate assembled the voters and set up before them fifteen large urns (*cistae vimineae*) numbered I, II, III, IV . . . XV. The magistrate provided also voting tablets (*tabulae ceratae*) and boards showing clearly the names of the candidates. In the next stage account is taken of the *tribes* of the voters. Into a revolving urn (*urna versatilis*) the presiding official put thirty-three round balls, each one marked with a tribe name. Of the thirty-

five tribes two, *Suburana* and *Esquilina*, were omitted. The magistrate next drew the balls one by one from the urn and the voting went on *pari passu* with the sortition. Individual members of the first two tribes drawn cast their votes into urn I; then the next two tribes voted into urn II, two more into urn III, two more into urn IV and then three tribes voted into urn V. Of the thirty-three tribes eleven, a third of the total, will by now have voted into the first five urns and their vote is called the vote of five centuries. Voting into urns VI to X follows the same pattern: two tribes vote into each of urns VI, VII, VIII, and VIII while three tribes vote into urn X. At this point the *centuriae Caesarum* have completed the vote. Then the pattern is repeated with the *centuriae Germanici Caesaris*: urns XI-XIV receive the votes of two tribes each and urn XV the votes of three tribes. As each tribe is called to the vote the senators vote first and are followed by the knights. Each of the fifteen urns at the end of the voting contains the votes of individual members of two or three tribes, and the majority of these votes decides the vote of the century. It will be seen that the "centuries" of this organisation are formed artificially by combining sections of tribes (i.e. the senatorial and part of the equestrian complement of them) into voting-centuries by lot.

Tibiletti's view<sup>4</sup> is that the details of this voting assembly confirm and give weight to the theory which Mommsen was the first to put forward on the organisation of the centuries in the reformed comitia.<sup>5</sup> Mommsen considered that the co-ordination of centuries and tribes which is mentioned in Livy, I, 43 extended even to the fifth class, so that there were in all 373 centuries (of a special kind) in the assembly. Of these 350 would be centuries of *pedites*. He accepted as well the evidence of Cicero (*De Re Publica*, II, 22, 39) that there were only 193 century-votes cast and that the first class cast 70 of them. This involved, for Mommsen, when the eighteen centuries of knights and the five supernumerary centuries were subtracted, the com-

<sup>4</sup> G. Tibiletti, "Il funzionamento dei comizi centuriati alla luce della tavola Hebana," *Athenaeum*, N. S., XXVII (1949), pp. 201 ff.

<sup>5</sup> *Römisches Staatsrecht*, III<sup>a</sup>, pp. 270 ff. Criticism of Mommsen and a clear account of some other views will be found in G. de Sanctis, *Storia dei Romani*, III, 1, pp. 353 ff.

bination, within classes two to five, of 280 of his first sort of century into 100 voting centuries. Mommsen suggested, long before the *tabula Hebana* was known, that the combination was probably by lot.

When this view was first put forward it found few supporters. De Sanctis (*loc. cit.* in note 5) and most others criticised the voting system Mommsen envisaged as unlikely and over-complicated: scholars objected, too, to the use of the word *centuria* in two senses. To the objections of de Sanctis the *tabula Hebana* gives an adequate answer: here is such a complicated system in regular use. And Mommsen himself, as will be emphasized later, provides other evidence for the use of *centuria* in two senses.

In the course of his argument Tibiletti combines two well-known passages (*Res Gestae*, 8, 5: *multa exempla maiorum exolescentia iam ex nostro saeculo reduxi*; and Suetonius, *Divus Augustus*, 40, 2: *comitiorum quoque pristinum ius reduxit*). These point to an important feature of Augustan policy in matters of constitutional form—his traditionalism. Now, can these passages be applied to our present problem? Not directly. On the face of it they refer merely to the more regular working of the comitia after the revolutionary period. Further, the assembly of the tablet shows many departures from “*pristinum ius*.” It contains no division into seniors and juniors, no separate equestrian centuries, no *centuria praerogativa*, no division into classes (as all the voters presumably belonged to the first class or to the centuries of knights).

Still, the assembly is obviously centuriate and the description of it uses terms and refers to institutions of the full assembly. It might well be the case, then, that Augustus did in fact derive this system of voting from the arrangements of the reformed *comitia centuriata*. It is one thing to drop features and quite another thing to invent new features for an institution with so long a tradition. If Augustus devised this system on no pattern, then he invented a further use for the word *centuria* and broke the rule of traditionalism. If he used a traditional pattern, then it could hardly have been anything but the reformed centuriate assembly.

That the analogical connection is likely has been accepted by a number of writers. Others have rejected the connection. Nessel-

hauf<sup>6</sup> rejects it flatly, but without argument. Schönauer (*op. cit.*, p. 34) says that the inscription shows *only* that there could be a number of separate *vocationes* within a century! Staveley (pp. 10 ff.), while agreeing that Augustus was preserving some Republican forms, rejects with detailed argument the view that the form he was preserving was a system of forming voting-centuries by combining class-sections of half-tribes into artificial units (voting-centuries) by lot.

The details of Staveley's rejection will have to be considered. He takes the matter up from two sides. He considers first Augustus' problem and suggests that the arrangement of the tablet was the natural solution to that problem. If this were so it would suggest that there is no need to look for any analogy with the workings of any other assembly. Secondly (pp. 14 ff.), Staveley looks at the possible aims of the third century innovators and tries to show that the grouping of tribes into centuries by lot could have served no purpose of theirs. On this second point it can be said at once that we have very little knowledge of the purposes of the third century innovators. Staveley may have given a correct account of some of these purposes, but it must be admitted that there might well have been other purposes. The position is that we can rely on little more than the evidence provided by the details for the reform to argue back to the purposes of the reform. If, on other grounds, we are led to adopt Mommsen's view, or a modification of it, then we might guess that the reformers had other purposes, such as reducing the effectiveness of influence and bribery, giving the assembly at least a more democratic appearance, etc. Let us turn, then, to Staveley's first point, the position of Augustus. He writes (p. 12):

He (i. e. Augustus) had brought into being a picked body of senators and *equites* who were to play a decisive part in the consular and praetorian elections. How were they to record their vote? There were two alternative solutions to that which was in fact adopted. Augustus, had he wished, could have allowed the tribe to be the unit of vote. As 33 tribes were represented in the body there would have been 33 votes recorded.

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<sup>6</sup> "Die neue Germanicus-Inschrift von Magliano," *Historia*, I (1950), p. 112. Gallo, *op. cit.*, pp. 144 ff., accepts the connection.

The objection which Staveley makes to the vote with the tribe as unit is that it would have meant too large a number of votes for so small an assembly: that it would have put "too much power into the hands of individuals or cliques." It is difficult to assess the real strength of this objection. In an electorate of about three thousand there would have been close to a hundred votes in each section and this seems large enough to have made the operation of cliques difficult, even if, in this assembly, Augustus envisaged the operation of cliques other than his own. Again, even though a clique or an individual might find it easier to exert influence within such a group, there would have been, with a tribal vote system, more groups to be influenced. Augustus' main objection to such a system must have been simply that it would look too much like electing the higher magistrates by the tribal assembly and that it would have been too little like the centuriate assembly. Staveley presents the second alternative solution in this way (p. 12): "the body could have been divided into a smaller number of clearly defined permanent groups without reference to the tribes to which each member belonged." This, of course, Augustus could have done, but, as Staveley points out, this solution was to be rejected because Augustus wished to preserve from the centuriate assembly the reference to both centuries and tribes.

Nevertheless, supposing that this was Augustus' aim, it would have been a much simpler solution than the one adopted, and one much more in keeping with what most scholars admit to be the position of the first class in the *comitia centuriata*, to have kept the division into 70 centuries, 35 of seniors and 35 of juniors, which that class contained. It seems clear that all the voters of the tablet belonged to the first class; and even if such a system left some centuries unmanned, the Romans had regular machinery for dealing with such a situation.

It is wrong to say that there were only *two* other possibilities: it is wrong, for example, to say that "Augustus was presented (my italics) with 33 (units) which he had to group into 10" (p. 14). The units and the groups were apparently of Augustus' own choosing, if he were not taking over some feature of another assembly. He need not have excluded the tribes Suburana and Esquilina. The provisions of the tablet show that there might have been members of these tribes present at the election, as

arrangements are made for them to vote with another tribe. The view of de Visscher<sup>7</sup> that these tribes were "trop peu considérées" to be included in the voting is unsatisfactory, not to say uncomplimentary to those members of the senate and decurries who happened to belong to those tribes. It is probably true that there were fewer senators in these tribes than in most other tribes, and that if Augustus had another motive for excluding two tribes, then these two would be excluded. We have no knowledge of senators from the *Esquilina*; we know of only one senator from the *Suburana*.<sup>8</sup> Still, we do not know the tribes of enough senators of the period to make these figures significant. In any case it is reasonable to assume that there were more members of the decurries in the urban tribes. It is too readily assumed that all men of rank and distinction avoided the urban tribes. An Aemilius is found in the *Palatina* (*I. L. S.*, 949) and in this same tribe appears a Manlius Severus, magistrate of *Bovillae* (*I. L. S.*, 4942). It seems likely that Augustus would not willingly have given offence by excluding these two tribes from the sortition simply because they were socially inferior. The elimination of these tribes in the arrangements of the *tabula Hebana* has the effect of leaving a number of tribes which is exactly divisible by three. It is probable that it is an organisational reason, and therefore, a reason imposed on the creator of the system by his own choice, that leads to the exclusion of the tribes.

It cannot be said, further, that Augustus *was presented* with the number ten for the centuries, unless he was following some tradition. Tibiletti's view is that Augustus could have fixed any number he liked—eleven centuries, for example, of three tribes each. This view involves the rejection of Coli's statement that the ten centuries of the Caesars were arranged in two groups of five, a group for each of the two Caesars. Certainly each of these ten centuries is called in the *tabula* a "century of Gaius and Lucius Caesar." This may mean no more than that Tiberius wished to say that *singly* these two were less distinguished than Germanicus. If the arrangement into groups of five were not original it is difficult to see why Tiberius added five centuries

<sup>7</sup> F. de Visscher, "Destinatio," *Parola del Passato*, XIV (1950), pp. 118 ff.

<sup>8</sup> *C. I. L.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 709 with an addition on p. 714.

to honour Germanicus. He could easily have called the existing ten centuries "centuries of C. and L. and Germanicus Caesar," and saved a deal of trouble. Some reason for the arrangement by fives will be suggested later.

It is hard, then, to avoid the conclusion that Augustus could quite easily have devised some other system, without resorting to the curious device of amalgamating tribes into centuries by lot. On Staveley's view of the matter Augustus is devising not only the solution, but the problem as well. There is no problem until Augustus has himself settled on the form of his assembly. Once it is recognised that the problem was one set by tradition, it is more plausible to take the solution as traditional too.

To the final objection raised by Staveley, that the men voting in the assembly of the tablet were men who "on any view of the third century reform, would never have been so grouped in the *comitia centuriata*" the reply can be made that Augustus could not have grouped these men in the way in which they were grouped in the full assembly (that is in half tribes) because such a grouping would not have been sufficiently characteristic of the centuriate assembly and would have pointed too sharply to the narrow basis (the first class only)<sup>9</sup> of this electoral body. What Augustus reproduces here are the voting conditions of the bulk of citizens, the middle and lower classes.

Let us turn now to those passages in ancient literature which appear to throw light on the reform. These passages have been examined many times in the past: the only excuse for dealing with them again is a belief that some of them have been misinterpreted and that at least one other passage contains a clue of importance. The conclusion I will be wanting to draw is Mommsen's: that Livy's evidence suggests that there were more

<sup>9</sup> G. Tibiletti, *Principe e Magistrati Repubblicani*, pp. 62 ff., considers that the class system was absent from the restored centuriate assembly of Augustus. There is, however, no evidence for this violent breach of tradition. Admittedly there had been no censors for many years, but the rolls probably still existed and there would be little sense in claiming to have restored the centuriate assembly if its most essential feature were absent. Dionysius (IV, 21, 3) and Livy (I, 43, 12) both refer to the restored assembly as Tibiletti shows. But neither of them mentions the disappearance of the classes. Tibiletti's own reasoning on the point is not conclusive and takes no account of Livy's language in I, 43, 12. Livy speaks of *hunc ordinem qui nunc est . . .* and the *ordinem* is certainly an arrangement of centuries into classes.

than 193 of some sort of century in the organisation, while Cicero's evidence suggests that the total of votes cast was 193. Finally, I will claim that it is reasonable to hold that the *tabula Hebana* offers the clue for the solution of this puzzle.

There are three main passages to be considered. These are Livy, I, 43, 12, Cicero, *De Re Publica*, II, 22, 39 and Dionysius, *Ant. Rom.*, IV, 21, 3. One must agree with Staveley<sup>10</sup> that Appian, *Bell. Civ.*, I, 59 is to be rejected as direct evidence for the reform. Eduard Meyer<sup>11</sup> has shown quite clearly that Appian here refers simply to Sulla's decision to use the centuriate rather than the tribal assembly for legislative purposes. Yet two observations may be made on Appian's language. The phrase *κατὰ λόχους, ὡς Τύλλιος βασιλεὺς ἔταξε* does not imply that the original Servian centuries were used, but rather that the system of voting by centuries, which was Servius' invention, was resorted to. Again, I think this passage makes it clear that in Sulla's time the senatorial interest could expect more success in the centuriate than in the tribal assembly. This was certainly even more true of the assemblies of the third century. Any account of the reform will have to take account of this fact, that it does not abandon the timocratic principle.

A text which has been taken as showing that the Servian centuries were in existence in the first century B.C. proves inconclusive and unusable. I refer to *Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, XVII, 2088. This document is very fragmentary, restorations are quite uncertain, and a close examination of the fragment reproduced on plate III of the volume will show how very uncertain are the letters marked in the printed text as doubtful. Understanding of the fragment is made even more difficult by the fact that the original length of the lines is not known. There seems, however, to be a clear reference in lines 5-7 to the creation of centuries by Servius.<sup>12</sup> The important word here

<sup>10</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 3, end of note 8.

<sup>11</sup> "Die angebliche Centurionenreform Sullas," *Hermes*, XXXIII (1898), pp. 652 ff.

<sup>12</sup> The lines read:

- 5.            hae et ceterae cent[uria]e
- 6. quae] nunc sunt omnes Servi Tulli [
- 7. qui pri]mus omnino centurias fecit

In line 7 the correct reading is clearly *omnino* and not *omnes* as Staveley prints it on p. 8, note 28.

is *omnino*. The use of this word implies that *others* apart from Servius created centuries, though the reference may be simply to Romulus. From the rest of the text no conclusions may be drawn.

It is less easy to follow Staveley in rejecting the passage of Dionysius, who, after describing the Servian constitution, goes on to say: *οὗτος ὁ κόσμος τοῦ πολιτεύματος ἐπὶ πολλὰς δέμεινε γενεὰς φυλαττόμενος ὑπὸ Ρωμαίων· ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς κεκίνηται χρόνοις καὶ μεταβέβληκεν εἰς τὸ δημοτικώτερον . . . οὐ τῶν λόχων καταλυθέντων, ἀλλὰ τῆς κλήσεως (v. l. κρίσεως) αὐτῶν οὐκέτι τὴν ἀρχαίαν ἀκρίβειαν φυλαττούσης. . . .*

Staveley comments on this passage on p. 2 (note 8) of his article. Admittedly the words *ἐν δὲ τοῖς καθ' ἡμᾶς χρόνοις* cannot refer to the third century. But, as Mommsen says,<sup>13</sup> “er (Dionysius) schildert in seinen Perfecten nur den derzeitigen Zustand.” The perfect tenses here indicate a *state of affairs* which Dionysius observed in his own time; they say nothing about the date at which the change took place. Staveley's view is that Dionysius is referring here to some change which took place in the first century, such as might be caused by the suspension of the censorship. I think, however, that the run of the language is against this. Dionysius does not speak of census conditions. It is *οὗτος ὁ κόσμος τοῦ πολιτεύματος* that is changed. An example of Dionysius' earlier use of these words (e.g. IV, 16) shows that he uses *πολιτεύμα* of the whole Servian system. The addition of *κόσμος* shows more clearly that it is a complicated arrangement of elements (Cicero's *ordo*) that he has in mind here. When this point is taken with what will later be said on the genitive absolutes in this passage it becomes clear that a fundamental change in the whole system is envisaged in this text.

Consider now these three passages in some detail. The text of *De Re Publica*, II, 22, 39 usually printed is this:

. . . deinde equitum magno numero ex omni populi summa separato reliquum populum distribuit (*scil.* Servius) in quinque classes senioresque a iunioribus divisit easque ita disparavit ut suffragia non in multitudinis sed in locupletiū potestate essent, curavitque, quod semper in re publica tenendum est, ne plurimum valeant plurimi. Quae dis-

<sup>13</sup> *Staatsrecht*, III<sup>8</sup>, p. 270, note 1 *ad fin.*

criptio si esset ignota vobis, explicaretur a me; nunc rationem videtis esse talem, ut equitum centuriae cum sex suffragiis et prima classis, addita centuria quae ad summum usum urbis fabris tignariis est data, LXXXVIII centurias habeat; quibus ex centum quattuor centuriis (tot enim reliquae sunt) octo solae si accesserunt, confecta est vis populi universa, relicuaque multo maior multitudo sex et nonaginta centuriarum neque excluderetur suffragiis, ne superbum esset, nec valeret nimis, ne esset periculosem. . . . Illarum autem sex et nonaginta centuriarum in una centuria tum quidem plures censemabantur quam paene in prima classe tota.

If this text stands, and I think it does, the conclusion to be drawn from it is that the reformed centuriate assembly contained 193 centuries: and that 70 of these were in the first class, since this class together with the 18 centuries of knights and the *fabri tignarii* made up a total of 89 centuries. We must first, however, take account of some attempts to dispute this interpretation. Two main attempts have been made to show that the passage refers not to the reformed, but to the Servian system.

The earlier of these attempts, that of de Sanctis, is well answered by Staveley (pp. 5-6), following Fraccaro. The second attempt has been made more recently by dell' Oro.<sup>14</sup> His argument is that Cicero's total of 89 centuries is made up of the 80 centuries of *pedites* and 2 centuries of *fabri* of Livy's account of the Servian arrangements; together with the single century of *fabri tignarii* and the six centuries of knights known as the *sex suffragia*.

This interpretation is to be rejected for the following reasons. *Equitum centuriae cum sex suffragiis* is possible Latin for "the centuries of knights with six votes," but it would be a curious way to refer to this group, usually known as *sex suffragia*, especially in a passage where numerical precision seems important and ambiguity to be avoided. It would be strange, too, to find Cicero mentioning by name the *fabri tignarii* while including in the number for the first class proper the *duae fabrum centuriae* of Livy (I, 43, 2). The decisive objection, however, is that Cicero, in a passage dealing with the timocratic nature of

<sup>14</sup> "Rogatio e Riforma dei Comizi Centuriati," *Parola del Passato*, XIV (1950), pp. 138 ff.

the assembly, would not have excluded from what we might call the upper-class vote the other twelve centuries of knights. Cicero's words here must refer to the whole 18 centuries of knights, made up of the *equitum centuriae* and the *sex suffragia*. The division of the knights into two groups is a reflection of the practice whereby the *sex suffragia* voted not with the 12 *equitum centuriae*, but separately after the votes of the first class had been announced.<sup>15</sup>

E. Schönbauer<sup>16</sup> has recently made a much more serious attack on the traditional view of the passage. His hypothesis is that in the centuriate assembly after the reform there were only 89 centuries in all: 70 formed by dividing the 35 tribes into juniors and seniors, 18 centuries of knights and one of *fabri tignarii*. Whereas Niebuhr had assumed that the class divisions were abolished in the reformed assembly, in Schönbauer's account the voters in each century were arranged in classes and voted in the order of classes within their century: he supposes that the class division had no significance as far as the numbers of votes was concerned, taking it to be a division of prestige which gave the higher classes no advantage beyond the power to set an example to those who followed them to the vote. This modification of Niebuhr's view, already suggested by Madvig, is introduced to account for the numerous passages which point to a vote in order of classes. It must be said at the outset, however, that Schönbauer's view does not account for the language of Livy, XLIII, 16, 14: *cum ex XII centuriis equitum VIII censorem condemnassent multaeque aliae primae classis. . .* On Schönbauer's view there could not be specific centuries of the first class, and the Livy passage obviously refers to the *comitia centuriata*, and to centuries of the first class in that assembly.

On this point dell'Oro makes a curious statement.<sup>17</sup> He says: "che comunque nei *concilia plebis tributa* si avessero le *centuriæ* e provato da Livio, XLIII, 16." Now it is very likely

<sup>15</sup> Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 82; cf. Livy, XLIII, 16, 14.

<sup>16</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 35 ff. His view is an extension of Madvig's version of the theory held by B. G. Niebuhr: *Vorträge über römische Altertümer* (1858), pp. 114 ff. Cf. Madvig, *Die Verfassung und Verwaltung des römischen Staates* (1881), I, pp. 119 ff.

<sup>17</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 145.

that *perduellio* and other capital charges could come before the tribes after the *lex Sempronia* of 123 B. C.<sup>18</sup> But Livy is here talking about 169 B. C. and in an earlier sentence uses the words *diemque comitiis a C. Sulpicio praetore urbano petit* of the tribune arranging this prosecution. This is characteristic of actions before the *comitia centuriata*.<sup>19</sup> Until he has accounted for this passage grave doubts must attach to Schönauer's theory, and these doubts will affect the plausibility of his remarks on the other texts involved, for in the interests of his theory, he makes what appear to be arbitrary emendations to several passages in Cicero and Livy.

I consider his handling of the passage from the *De Re Publica* first. As is well known, our knowledge of this work rests on a single manuscript and that a palimpsest. In 1820 Mai found a considerable portion of the work under a text of St. Augustine's commentary on the Psalms. The codex (Vat. 5757) is dated by various authorities from the fourth to the sixth centuries. It is written on costly paper and in unusually short lines, but despite the costly materials and method it is written very carelessly by the writer of the first hand (V<sup>1</sup>). Throughout the work are corrections of a second hand (V<sup>2</sup>). It is now generally agreed that this corrector was a careful worker and that he had a text before him, so that his corrections are not emendations of a conjectural sort but attempts to restore the reading which was before V<sup>1</sup>.<sup>20</sup> Schönauer agrees with the view that the corrections have a manuscript basis.

The text I have printed above is, except for punctuation, that of Mai's first edition (1823). It accepts as a principle that, in general, the corrections of V<sup>2</sup> are to be taken as right. This text has won general acceptance with scholars. The sense of the passage seems clear. Scipio in the dialogue is emphasizing the timocratic nature of the centuriate assembly, both in the Servian and in the reformed system. He passes over the details of the Servian system as well known and shows himself more concerned with the system of his own time. In this system, Scipio

<sup>18</sup> A. H. J. Greenidge, *The Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time*, pp. 323 ff.

<sup>19</sup> See J. L. Strachan-Davidson, *Problems of the Roman Criminal Law*, I, p. 157 and the passages quoted in note 3 on this page.

<sup>20</sup> See de Sanctis, *op. cit.*, p. 353.

says, the first class, the knights and a century of *fabri* had 89 votes. This left 104 centuries and of these the upper-class vote (for want of a better phrase) had to attract only eight votes for a majority: this majority could be reached even though the other 96 centuries contained a greater number of individual voters. Thus the timocratic principle was preserved.

On pages 35-7 of his article Schönauer attempts to break down the traditional text and the traditional interpretation of it, but his attempt must, at least in its present form, be considered unsuccessful. It is, all the same, difficult to criticise his view in detail because he gives little idea of the text he would print, little idea of the reasons for some of his conclusions, so that his statements seem at times bafflingly arbitrary. To bring this point out clearly it is necessary to print the lines of the codex which Schönauer discusses, showing V<sup>1</sup> in large capitals with the corrections of V<sup>2</sup> in ordinary type above.

- en
1. EQUITUMCER  
urie
  2. TAMINECUM  
sex
  3. ETSUFFRAGIIS  
(several lines not reproduced)  
a lxxx habeat quibus e cent. quattor centuriis tot
  4. DATA VIII CEN
  5. TURIAS TOT  
e i qu ae
  6. NIMRELICU
  7. AE SUNT

Consider some of Schönauer's statements on the passage. On page 36 he says:

Die erste Handschrift bringt die Zahl: 9 Centurien. Da später 104 als Rest hervorgehoben werden, würde sich eine Summe von 113 ergeben, die überhaupt keinerlei Anknüpfungspunkt böte. Deshalb übernehmen die Herausgeber die Zahl 89 von der zweiten. Mit den restlichen 104 kommt man dann tatsächlich zu der überlieferten servianischen Gesamtzahl von 193 Centurien.

This is correct except for one small point. Editors do not take the number 89 from V<sup>2</sup>. They find in the manuscript VIII

with LXXX written above it. Their choice is, if a correction is necessary, between reading LXXX or LXXXVIII. The latter is chosen because it fits in with the arithmetic of the passage. It is hard to follow him from this point:

Aber man versteht dann nicht, warum gerade eine Rechnung mit 89 und 104 angestellt wird, wenn nicht eine dieser Zahlen eine—veränderte—Bedeutung in der neuen Ordnung hatte. Denn Cicero kann doch nicht eine beliebige Zahl herausgreifen und jene dazuzählen, die nötig ist für eine knappe Mehrheit; es würde ja sonst nur die banale Rechnung herauskommen  $89 + 8$  ist mehr als 96. Die Mehrheit von 193 Centurien würde sich genau so ergeben, wenn er irgendwelche andere Klassen-Summanden nähme, die zusammen 97 ergäben. Sinnvoll wird erst der Passus, wenn wir annehmen, dass das System der neuen Ordnung 89 Stimm-Centurien zeigte.

Clearly this criticism is not valid if Cicero is here referring throughout to the conditions of the reformed assembly. For, in Cicero's account, the number 89 has a special meaning in the new arrangement; it is the total of what might be called the first class vote. It is *because* he is discussing the timocratic nature of the assembly that Scipio speaks of this group as a unity and considers the conditions under which its will becomes the *vis populi*. The reason why 89 is not a "beliebige Zahl" is that it is an essential part of the exposition of the timocratic nature of the assembly. But Schönauer is not, it appears, taking the arithmetic here to refer only to the reformed assembly. He thinks that Cicero here is combining figures appropriate some to the new and some to the old assembly, and that the number 89 represents the total of centuries in the whole of the reformed assembly. He supports this view with a suggested emendation which is based on the view that both V<sup>1</sup> and V<sup>2</sup> have failed to bring through to us the proper connections (*Zusammenhang*) of the various sections of the sentence.

In line 4 of the codex passage printed above a letter "a" will be seen before the number LXXX in the correction. Schönauer says of this letter that it seems to imply that the preceding line in the "Vorlage" ended with an "e" and that the "a" is the end of *ea*. He then reads the sentence as: *nunc rationem videtis esse talem ut ea LXXXVIII habeat centurias*. But this is completely arbitrary. The "a" can be explained in

simpler ways, perhaps as locating the insertion of the numeral, but much more probably, I would say even certainly, as a clarification of the last "a" of *data*.<sup>21</sup> Schönbauer's emendation takes this earlier line to be that ending with *talem ut*. Even if further examination should show signs of the letter "e" after *ut*, this letter would even then be more probably explained as an anticipation of the "e" of *equitum* which does in fact follow in the codex. Before such a radical change can be accepted much more will have to be said to support the destructive criticism of the passage as it stands and to support the changes suggested in this part of the sentence. No decisive criticism can be made on grounds of grammar or of sense.

Let us consider further Schönbauer's view that Scipio is using numbers which are appropriate in two different systems. If this were so, Scipio is bringing out the aristocratic nature of the old order in a very peculiar way. He would, on this theory of the passage, be saying: "Today the total of centuries is 89. But earlier, in the old system, one had to add to this number at least 8 centuries to gain a majority of 97 out of 193 votes; and, in fact, the first class, the knights and the *fabri* had more than 97 votes." How does this reference to the supposed total of 89 centuries in the reformed organisation bring out the aristocratic nature of the old? If one is going to object to a "banale Rechnung" then surely this is the time to object. There is no true contrast (*Gegensatz*) between the two organisations: such a contrast would require some reference to the conditions for a majority in each assembly, not simply to the total votes in one assembly and to the conditions for a majority in the other.

Finally, Schönbauer's criticism of the number 96 of centuries in the text is based on a false notion of Scipio's line of thought. Scipio says that when the  $89 + 8$  centuries have secured the majority, then the other 96 centuries, which contain a greater number of individuals, are neither excluded from the *ius suffragii* nor have an excessive power. Schönbauer's observation is that this characterisation is only appropriate when the first class and the knights of the Servian system, to whom he gives 99 votes<sup>22</sup> are compared with the remaining 94. For in this case

<sup>21</sup> See F. Ritschl, *Rh. Mus.*, N.F. VIII (1853), p. 405, where his reproduction of the codex passage shows that he held this view.

<sup>22</sup> It would be rather 100 if Livy's account is followed.

there is no need of supplementary votes from the lower classes and no chance of the century which Cicero mentions as having more individuals almost than the whole first class being included in the eight and so falsifying the statement about *multo maior multitudo*. Two points may be made in reply. First, the number 96 stands in two places in the codex: to correct it to 94 or to treat it as a gloss are both unsatisfactory. It is not corrected by V<sup>2</sup>. Secondly, what Schönbauer suggests is, as he says, a theoretical possibility, but very unlikely indeed. As a matter of practice rather than of theory, Scipio may be reasonably taken as assuming that the 8 centuries would come from the second class and would hardly ever include the *capite censi*. If on a few occasions this large century was among the eight, even this would not invalidate Scipio's *general* characterisation of the system. For the knights and the first class would in the vast majority of cases be supported by elements of the second rather than of the fifth class.

Despite some grammatical awkwardness, so long as one accepts the principle that V<sup>2</sup> had a manuscript before him from which to make corrections, one must accept the traditional text as it stands. Attempts to emend the "Vorlage" are futile, and emendation to V<sup>1</sup> must always take account of the fact that the text has been compared by V<sup>2</sup> with an original. The result of this, for an investigation of the reform is that two points are established, (i) that the first class contained 70 centuries of *pedites* and (ii) that there were 193 centuries in all in the assembly. As it is agreed that the reform was essentially some sort of co-ordination of tribes with centuries and as we read in Livy<sup>23</sup> of such units in the first class as *Voturia iuniorum*, *Voturia seniorum*, etc., it can be seen that the 70 centuries of *pedites* consisted of 35 centuries of the juniors and 35 of the seniors of each tribe in the first class.

Consider next the important passage in Livy (I, 43, 12-13). It runs:

Nec mirari oportet hunc ordinem qui nunc est post expletas quinque et triginta tribus duplicato earum numero centuriis iuniorum seniorumque ad institutam ab Servio Tullio summam non convenire. Quadrifariam enim urbe divisa

<sup>23</sup> Livy, XXVI, 22, 7-11. Cf. XXVII, 6, 3 and XXIV, 7, 12.

collibus qui habitabantur, partes eas tribus appellavit, ut ego arbitror, ab tributo; nam eius quoque aequaliter ex censu conferendi ab eodem inita ratio est; neque eae tribus ad centuriarum distributionem numerumque quicquam pertinuere.

The passage has been taken in a number of ways and has given rise to theories which place the numbers of centuries after the reform at 89 or 193 or 373. In the face of this variety it would seem rash to aim at an accurate interpretation. Yet, up to a point, an accurate and precise interpretation is quite possible: at least I think that by taking the various possibilities which Livy's language suggests and testing them against the other evidence we can limit the possibilities to two. Of these two, one is more strongly supported by circumstantial evidence than the other. To support my position I shall have to show that the Livy passage has been generally misunderstood, and this because it has mostly been examined minutely itself without proper attention to its context.

First let me offer what I think is a fair translation of the text:

There is no call for astonishment at the fact that this system (the Servian system)—which still exists now that the number of tribes has been fixed at 35 and this number is found doubled in the centuries of seniors and juniors—is not related to the number (of tribes) established by Servius. For he divided the city into four regions according to the settlements on the hills, and called these regions tribes . . . and these tribes had nothing at all to do with the number and distribution of the centuries.

The features of the context of which this version takes account—and of which standard renderings do not take account—are the presence of the phrase *nec mirari oportet*, the indicative mood of *qui nunc est* and the fact that the second of the two sentences begins with *enim*. I take it that in the passage Livy is referring only in passing to the system of his own day. The language in which he makes this passing reference is important to us, but the logical subject of these two sentences is the likelihood of a connection between the centuries and tribes of the *Servian system*. Consider the matter in more detail. To what does *hunc ordinem qui nunc est* refer? It has commonly been taken as standing for the reformed assembly, and *summa* is

usually read as the total of centuries in the Servian scheme. Such a view, with its suggestion that the number of centuries in the new assembly was different from that in the old, led to the adoption by some scholars of the hypothesis of Pantagathus, that the number of centuries after the reform was five times 70. Against this it may be said that *hunc ordinem* here cannot refer to the system of Livy's own day. If *hunc ordinem qui nunc est* means simply "the present system" we would expect *sit*; the indicative makes it clear that the clause *qui nunc est* is parenthetical, that it adds some fresh information thrown in by Livy and is *not part of the wonderment*.

This point is clear and in this way we avoid taking Livy's words as tautologous. To what, then, does *hunc ordinem* refer? Clearly to the Servian system, the system of his present discussion. *Ordo* in Livy's vocabulary has, in such contexts, two meanings: he uses it for the usual distinction between senators and knights, and to denote the system or principle of organisation of the assembly. It is, in this sense, the equivalent of *descriptio* in Cicero and *κόσμος* in Dionysius. See, for an example of some importance, Livy I, 42, 5: *tum classes centuriasque et hunc ordinem ex censu descripsit, vel paci decorum vel bello.* *Ordinem* here refers to the arrangement of the centuries into classes and corresponds exactly to the *centuriarum distributionem numerumque* of our passage. I think it is clear, then, that *hunc ordinem* in the context of I, 43 must be taken as Livy defines it: it is the Servian system of arranging centuries into classes.

Now the parenthetical phrase *qui nunc . . . seniorumque* shows that in the system of Livy's time, i. e. in the reformed system, a relationship<sup>24</sup> between centuries of juniors and seniors and tribes was a distinctive feature. The situation of Livy's non-antiquarian readers, that is of the large mass of his readers, is that for them the *comitia centuriata* is characterised by such a relationship. Yet Livy's description of the Servian scheme has shown no such connection. It is this that causes surprise. If Livy had been saying simply that the number of centuries in his own day differed from the Servian total, or if he had been

<sup>24</sup> Gallo, *op. cit.*, p. 132, rightly insists that his relationship is "rad-doppiamento" and not just "collegamento."

saying that there was no clear-cut numerical relationship between the reformed organisation and the Servian total of 193 centuries (Tibiletti's opinion), then neither of these statements could have caused the sort of surprise that could be removed by a sentence (*Quadrifariam enim*, etc.) which explained that Servius also established four tribes and that these were not supposed to stand in any relation to the Servian centuries. Livy's readers would *expect* a connection between centuries and tribes: Livy explains why this expectation is groundless. His phrase *neque eae tribus ad centuriarum distributionem numerumque quicquam pertinuere* is an expansion of *hunc ordinem . . . ad institutam ab Servio Tullio summam non convenire*.

For these reasons I take *summam* in this passage to refer to a number of tribes. It is so used without qualification because the logical subject of the sentences, what Livy is thinking about, is in fact the possibility of a connection between the Servian order of centuries and the Servian tribes. It might be objected that this is a strange use of *summa*: that one would expect this word to refer to a larger number than four and especially that one would expect it to refer to just such a sum of constituent parts as the centuries of the centuriate system. I feel sure that it is such a feeling about *summa* that has maintained the current view of its reference here to centuries in face of the clear intention of the second of the two sentences in the passage. Yet a glance at Seneca, *Epistulae Morales*, 84, 7 will show that *summa* may be used as a mere variant of *numerus*: *ut unum quiddam fiat ex multis, sicut unus numerus fit ex singulis, cum minores summas et dissidentes computatio una comprehendit*. Here *summa* clearly refers to a small number which is being considered not as a total, but as a part of a total.

If my view of this passage is accepted, then that part of the sentence which has so far been discussed provides no evidence for the reform beyond the suggestion that Livy's readers naturally *expected* a connection between tribes and centuries in a centuriate assembly. My chief concern with the indirect statement in Livy, I, 43 has been to show that it does not say that the reformed assembly contained a number of centuries different from that of the Servian system. Livy does, however, make a direct reference to the reform in the parenthetical clause: *qui nunc est . . . seniorumque*. I propose now to examine the vari-

ous meanings that have been or may be given to this part of the sentence. Consider first the view of dell'Oro.<sup>25</sup>

He takes the words *centuriis iuniorum seniorumque* with *convenire* and translates: "Né bisogna stupirsi que questo ordine . . . non corrisponda per quanta riguarda le centurie di iuniori e di seniori all'ordinamento stabilito da Servio Tullio." Dell'Oro holds that the reform had two essential features: (1) that the distinction between juniors and seniors, as a method of distinguishing centuries, was abandoned and (2) that the doubling of the number of tribes referred simply to the fact that 35 is roughly twice 17 and that 17 was, in some sense, the original number of tribes. This dell'Oro derives from the fact that certain priests were elected by an assembly of seventeen tribes. The final number of 35 is seventeen doubled with one tribe added to provide a majority. On this view, each class contained 35 centuries, each century consisting of the individual members of a tribe in that class. The writer connects this arrangement with the fact that if the centuries of knights are subtracted from the Servian total of 193, the remainder (175) is the product of 5 (the number of classes) and 35 (the number of tribes). Dell'Oro's opinion is that, at the most, there was a purely formal division into juniors and seniors within each century.

This view is for many reasons attractive, but it must fall once the weakness of dell'Oro's handling of the *De Re Publica* text is seen. Reasons have already been given for rejecting his view on this passage. Dell'Oro can, on his assumptions, give only a very unnatural account of such passages as Cicero, *In Verrem*, V, 15, 38: *Praeco te toties seniorum iuniorumque centuriis illo honore affici pronuntiavit*. Further, his theory involves a very serious breach of the timocratic principle in that a majority would not be reached until the third class had voted. Against this counts Cicero, *Phil.*, II, 82 which in spite of Schönauer's desire to emend by the elimination of the second *renuntiatur*, must stand unaltered and as evidence that the majority was reached (*confecto negotio*) when the second class had voted.

Dell'Oro's view of *duplicato earum numero* is curious. The number seventeen is only roughly doubled and there seems no reason why Livy should have dragged in a reference here to

<sup>25</sup> *Op. cit.*, pp. 137 ff. See Gallo, *op. cit.*, pp. 135 f., for a similar criticism.

what is no more than a near mathematical curiosity. It would be a different matter if the number of thirty-five tribes had been reached by a single measure which in fact doubled an earlier seventeen and added one to make a majority possible. But this is not the case. Further, if the seventeen tribes which elected priests were in any sense original, one would expect the right of election to be reserved to the actual individual tribes. The electorate is, however, selected by lot; the purpose of this seems to have been to give the gods a decisive say in the choice.

For these reasons I think that this account of the reform must be rejected. We must, as a consequence, consider only those versions which assume that the number of tribes was doubled in the centuries of seniors and juniors at some time after the number of tribes was made final in 241 B.C. Notice that Livy is not merely talking about a *co-ordination* of centuries and tribes. The systems which Staveley suggests (pp. 20-3) contain 70 centuries in the first class and 35 in the second or in the second and third classes. Livy's language does not warrant such a solution. It is not a matter of mere co-ordination, but of the doubling of the number of tribes in some unspecified centuries of juniors and seniors.

What can this phrase mean? Of course, it is easy to say what it meant for the first class. From this text of Livy, from the passage in the *De Re Publica* and from the existence of such phrases as *Voturia iuniorum*, etc., it is clear that the 70 centuries of the first class consisted of 35 of each age-group. But after this we meet problems. How far was the doubling process carried?

Rosenberg and Fraccaro<sup>26</sup> held that the doubling held only in the first class. Livy's words give no indication of this limitation: it has already been shown that neither *summam* nor *ordinem* can be taken as referring to a class of centuries. Again, this view fails to account for the passages in which a vote in a later class is called *tribus*.<sup>27</sup> Cavaignac<sup>28</sup> extends the process to

<sup>26</sup> Rosenberg, "Untersuchungen zur römischen Centurienverfassung" (1911); P. Fraccaro, "La riforma dell' ordinamento centuriato," *Studi in onore di P. Bonfante* (1929), I, pp. 105 ff.

<sup>27</sup> Cicero, *De Lege Agraria*, II, 4: *Phil.*, XI, 18; Livy, *Epit.*, 49; Polybius, VI, 14, 7.

<sup>28</sup> "L'as et les comices par centuries," *Journal des Savants*, nouvelle sér. IX (1911), pp. 347 ff.

the second class and gives 70 centuries to this group. Here again Livy's words give no hint. Further, de Sanctis' criticism of this view<sup>29</sup> stands. One cannot accept the great increase it makes in the numbers of the second class.

Livy's language is, in my opinion, consistent with only three views on this question:

- (1) that the total of centuries of *pedites* after the reform was 70.
- (2) that the doubling was carried out in classes I-III.
- (3) that is extended even to the fifth class.

Consider these views in order. The first will not detain us long. It has already been considered in discussing the views of Schönbauer and reasons for its rejection have been given. Nothing in the evidence warrants the belief that the division into classes ceased to be fundamental and the clear reference of Livy, XLIII, 16 to centuries of the first class is decisive.

The second view has, as far as I know, been held by no writer to date. Yet it has some merit. Livy does not talk about doubling generally, but specifies it by adding the limiting phrase *centuriis iuniorum seniorumque*. In Livy's account of the census arrangements it is only the first three classes which are divided into juniors and seniors. It is possible that Livy is here inexact, and certainly Dionysius differs from him on this point (IV, 16 ff.). But in Dionysius there is confusion indeed! He divides the *inermes* into age groups and speaks of six classes, taking the *capite censi* as the sixth. It would not be hard to prefer Livy if one had other reasons to limit the co-ordination to classes I-III. There are, in fact, considerations of an independent nature, which suggest that the first three classes were different from the later two in an important military respect.<sup>30</sup> Classes I-III bear very similar arms, whereas classes IV and V show a marked reduction in armament. It is likely that legionary troops were taken originally from classes I-III and light-armed troops from the last two classes; and a division between troops of the line and reserves (juniors and seniors) is natural with legionaries, while not so necessary with light-armed troops. If Livy

<sup>29</sup> *Op. cit.*, III, 1, p. 357.

<sup>30</sup> See Last, "The Servian Reform," *J. R. S.*, XXXV (1945), p. 43.

is to be taken strictly in this way then he is talking of a system in which the first three classes *at some stage or in some sense* contained 210 centuries. Obviously this number has to be reduced in some way in view of the clear evidence that there were only 193 votes in the assembly.

The third possibility is that which Mommsen held in the *Staatsrecht*. If the doubling process is extended to the fifth class, then classes II-V contain 280 "centuries" at some stage or of some kind. Notice that we have come to consider this possibility from Livy's language, even though reasons have been given to show that Mommsen misinterpreted the passage.

In view of the considerations so far advanced I would claim that there are only two ways in which the Livy passage may reasonably be taken: each possibility involves at some point considering a number of centuries greater than 193. In either case, as the first class together with the knights and the five centuries of *inermes* together had 93 votes, we are faced with the problem of seeing how some number greater than 100 was reduced to 100 in classes II-V. On two questions, then, we must make further enquiry: (1) was the doubling in fact carried to the fifth class and (2) was the reduction of what we might call census-centuries to voting centuries effected by lot. Let us consider the first of these problems.

Perhaps when Livy reports the age division of only the first three classes he is merely careless, or not interested in elaborating the situation of the lower classes. Certainly there is no real evidence that this division was not fundamental and pervasive. It is *a priori* unlikely that the lower classes would be arranged on a principle different from that of the higher classes. No reason for such a distinction could be readily suggested, whereas one might suggest a good reason for the co-ordination of centuries and tribes throughout the whole system of classes. The reason I would suggest is bound up with a view on the date and purpose of the reform, a question which must be examined at this stage.<sup>31</sup>

The evidence here is largely of a negative sort, but forceful for all that. It is clear, in the first place, that the reform was in no sense a revolutionary measure. Schönauer attributes it

<sup>31</sup> See Gallo, *op. cit.*, pp. 151 ff.

to C. Flaminius and calls him a "Bauern-Demokrat." Schönauer says: "Wir verstehen aber meines Erachtens den Hass des senatorischen Adels nur dann, wenn wir in Flaminius und seinem Kreise auch die Urheber der Centurien-Reform sehen."<sup>32</sup> Surely this "nur" is too strong! The passages in ancient literature which list the wickednesses of Flaminius do not mention the reform. Flouting of the Senate's will was surely enough to earn their hatred, even if we can be sure that this hatred was very extensive in Flaminius' own time. Against Schönauer and de Sanctis Staveley's criticism holds: an examination of the *fasti* shows no change in the type of candidate elected. Further, we hear of no opposition to the reform, no suggestion of a repeal or an abandonment of the arrangement.

Against Staveley (pp. 26 ff.) it can be argued that he has not shown that in the middle of the third century, "Their (i.e. the urban dwellers') interests were in many cases opposed to those of the *nobilitas*: they no doubt had little respect for tradition." These propositions I should regard as at any rate needing close proof. Here too the *fasti* do not support the view that the control of the *nobiles* was in any respect insecure before the reform.

I take the question of the publicity of the reform to be important. It has not been shown to have had any serious revolutionary intent; and the Roman sources are singularly quiet about it. I suggest that the reason for this is that the reform was purely an administrative reform, and that it did not seriously alter the voting powers of the classes in the assembly. I would not agree with Schönauer when he treats the reduction of the votes of the first class as a political suicide. As a matter of practice it seems clear that the first class would have been supported on all issues of a class-character by the bulk of the second class at least. I consider that the most likely date for the reform is the censorship of C. Aurelius Cotta and M. Fabius Buteo in 241 B.C. It is in this censorship that the last two tribes were added and Livy's language suggests an administrative decision to go no further in the creation of tribes: *post expletas quinque et triginta tribus*. It is reasonable to assume that the doubling of the tribes in the centuries went on at the same time.

<sup>32</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 31.

Of this we cannot be sure, and the date is not important. But it is easy to see an inducement to carry out such a reform. Consider the complex task of keeping two large citizen rolls, a task made much more difficult in the years of reconstruction after the first Punic War. Under the Servian system there were two rolls needed: one of citizens in their tribes for the tribal assembly, and a second, for the centuriate assembly, in which the same individuals were arranged in classes, age-groups and centuries. Under the new system, if the doubling process went as far as the fifth class, one set of rolls would do both jobs; tribal rolls, with the *tribules* divided into seniors and juniors, and with the census-classes of members noted, would serve all purposes.

Consistent with such a view of the reform is the fact that whereas in the Roman political vocabulary *tribulus* is a frequent and important word, *centurialis* hardly occurs in a political sense. This may be taken to indicate, for the bulk of citizens, no fixed membership in a century, at least no such membership that was not also membership of a tribe. Two passages have been taken as counting against this assumption. Festus,<sup>33</sup> commenting on the so-called *ni quis scivit* century, writes: *sed in ea centuria neque censemur quisquam neque centurio praeficitur neque centurialis potest esse, quia nemo certus est eius centuriae.* This is, however, not enough to compel belief in fixed centuries of the Servian sort in the reformed assembly. Apart from the possibility that Festus, or his source, is here talking about the Servian system, and apart from the unlikelihood of the *ni quis scivit* century, there is evidence of a normal use of *centuria* quite different from that of the Servian arrangement. The second of the passages I refer to is in the *Commentariolum Petitionis*, 18: *qui abs te tribum aut centuriam aut aliquid beneficium aut habent aut sperant.* Professor L. R. Taylor<sup>34</sup> considers that this refers to securing the enrolment of a friend in some desired tribe or century. But it seems more likely, in view of the sentences preceding these words, that the common practice of influencing the vote of one of these units is involved. Even if we assume that centuries are made up of tribe-sections put

<sup>33</sup> *Glossaria Latina*, IV, p. 292.

<sup>34</sup> *Party Politics in the Age of Caesar*, p. 53.

together by lot, such influence is still possible before and during the taking of the vote, and at any time before the vote in the first class and the centuries of knights.

There is, then, no clear evidence of the existence, after the reform, of centuries of the Servian sort for *pedites*. Further, there is an interesting confusion between the words *tribus* and *centuria* in the terminology of the assembly. Votes in the *comitia centuriata* are referred to as both *tribus* and *centuriae*. It is certain here that *tribus* does not mean what it means in the *comitia tributa*: it means rather a vote of a unit which is in some way connected with a tribe—a part of a tribe or a collection of parts of a tribe. To take the word as referring to the vote of a unit made up of parts of a tribe is no more strange than the situation shown in the *tabula Hebana*, where *centuria* is so used. The spread into the vocabulary of the *comitia centuriata* of a word so characteristic of the tribal assemblies is best explained on the assumption that the connection of the centuries with tribes was pervasive. It must be admitted that such an assumption suits the many stray allusions to tribes in electoral matters, e. g., Tacitus, *Annals*, I, 15, *studii tribuum*, where consular elections are certainly involved.

On this point reference must be made to the series of Imperial inscriptions which show the tribes divided into *corpora* of juniors and seniors, the *corpora* being further divided into centuries.<sup>35</sup> This division was used for the purpose of the distribution of *frumentum publicum* and also in the organisation of freedmen. Most of the evidence is about urban tribes, but *I. L. S.*, 6046 shows that the distribution was not limited to those tribes: Mommsen (*loc. cit.*, note 3) has shown that the system extended to the rustic tribes. There is no need to go over the details. They are made clear in Mommsen's account and the evidence may be conveniently read in the set of inscriptions in *I. L. S.* beginning with number 6045. The evidence shows that in what were beyond doubt public lists of citizens, these citizens are divided into sections of juniors and seniors within the tribes, and that these sections are further divided into centuries. Mommsen gives good reasons for believing that this was a survival of Republican practice, and that there were

<sup>35</sup> Mommsen, *Staatsrecht*, III, 1, pp. 276 ff. See also *R.-E.*, III, col. 1960, *s. v. centuria*.

five centuries to each *corpus* and so 350 centuries in the whole citizen body. Here then is a good and regular use of the word *centuria* to refer to a group which is certainly not a century of the Servian sort. This is, for Mommsen's view, a strong answer to those who have criticised it on the ground that he was "inventing" census-centuries. It may be inferred that, as the members of these Imperial lists were mostly from the lower orders, the division into juniors and seniors along the lines Mommsen suggested pervaded the whole assembly.

All of these considerations make the third of the possibilities arising from Livy, I, 43 most likely. There remains the second of the questions raised above. How were the 280 census-centuries arranged to form 100 voting centuries? Here the sources are not explicit. Nowhere do we find a clear statement, but I suggest that the following considerations are in favour of Mommsen's view that the reduction was done by lot.

There is, first of all, the peculiar language used by Dionysius in the passage quoted above. Reasons have already been given for believing that this passage refers to the reform rather than to minor changes in Dionysius' own time. Consider the genitive absolutes in the passage (IV, 21, 3). Why does Dionysius, writing near the end of the first century B. C. to explain Rome to the Greeks, take the trouble to say that the centuries were not abolished? Surely because something that looked like the abolition of the (Servian) centuries had occurred. The second absolute phrase gives some idea of what happened. The *κλῆσις* of the centuries was no longer accurate, clear, and precise. *Κλῆσις* here means the calling of the centuries to the vote. The word is never used by Dionysius or any other writer in the sense of *classis* despite the ninth edition of Liddell and Scott. The passage from Dionysius (IV, 18) which the Lexicon quotes to support this meaning shows clearly, in fact, that *κλῆσις* is not *classis*. There is a variant reading to *κλήσεως*: this is *κρίσεως* which is supported by all the manuscripts except Urbinas 105, a manuscript which has no outstanding authority. I think that editors have commonly preferred *κλήσεως* because *κρίσεως* could not be understood. But, on a view such as Mommsen's, *κρίσεως*, which is to be preferred as far as manuscript authority goes, makes good sense. The sentence may be taken as implying that

there were no fixed centuries (*κρίσις* = "choice" or "selection").<sup>36</sup>

Further the analogy of the *tabula Hebana* is and must remain a strong argument for Mommsen's view. Those who accept the force of the analogy are not merely relying on an intuition: their reasons are more than subjective. As I have argued above, it is not merely Augustus' solution, but also the details of his problem that have to be accounted for. To show how close the analogy is let us see how the 70 centuries in each of the lower classes could be reduced to 25 voting units. One assumption seems likely: that the units would be as much alike as possible, that is, the difference in number of constituent units would be no greater than one (as it is in the inscription). The arrangement that suits these conditions best is one in which there are 20 centuries with three half-tribes in each and 5 with two half-tribes in each. Now it can be seen how closely such an arrangement would match the conditions of the *tabula Hebana*. In the inscription the arrangement

(2) (2) (2) (2) (3)

occurs twice, and later three times. In the assembly, on Mommsen's view, the arrangement

(3) (3) (3) (3) (2)

would occur five times in each of classes II-V.

Let me state in conclusion the elements of the position I have tried to establish. The reform is best understood as an administrative one: our sources do not include it amongst the many attacks on the privileges of the *nobilitas* which they deplore. The *fasti* indicate clearly that the voting powers of groups were not changed, and the *fasti* indicate no danger to the position of the nobles before the reform. This being the case, we are helped in deciding the nature of the reform by only one consideration external to the evidence on details. This consideration is the evidence which suggests that the tribal rolls were the only rolls, and suggests that these rolls took account of age-groups.

Turning to the details of the reform, I maintain that Cicero in the *De Re Publica* is saying what he is commonly taken to be saying: that there were in the reformed assembly 193 voting

<sup>36</sup> See note 9 for some comments on Tibiletti's view of this passage.

centuries, and that the first class contained 70 of these. Livy, I, 43 then becomes important, for it shows how the seventy centuries of the classes were made up, and, rightly interpreted, shows that the doubling of the number of tribes in the centuries extended to either the third or the fifth class. There is a preponderance of evidence in favour of the latter view, even though this involves the reduction of 280 "census-centuries" to 100 voting units. Finally, I have maintained that the analogy of the *tabula Hebana*, which has been seen to be exceptionally close if Mommsen's view is adopted, explains how the reduction was carried out. It is easy to dismiss the analogy of the inscription *only* if one believes that Augustus faced some problem which was not created for him by the traditions of the assembly. I think I have given sound reasons for believing that this is not the case: Augustus' problem was not in any political situation, but in some pre-existing electoral tradition which must have been a tradition of the *comitia centuriata*.

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## A FRESH APPROACH TO HORACE.

### II, 20.

The last poem of the second book of the *Odes* has commonly been taken to be an epilogue and it has often been supposed that Horace originally intended this poem to serve as the epilogue to the completed volume of his lyric works but that it was supplanted before publication by the artistically superior *Exegi monumentum aere perennius*. Whether or not this is the correct interpretation of the poem appears to have interested scholars less than the question whether or not Horace should be censured for what is often regarded as the offensive realism of this poem. It will be recalled that this is the poem in which the author is discovered to be having intimations of immortality, the external symptoms of which are an appalling case of goose flesh, the sprouting of a heavy plumage, and the beginning of the complete transformation of the poet into the swan of Apollo. In this feathered state the poet promises to glide through the ether more successfully than Icarus and to become renowned throughout the whole Roman world. He is not to die and, like Ennius, scorns meaningless honors to the dead.

This ode has been deplored, denounced, and defended, but I shall not undertake to review the considerable literature dealing with it, because it is not my intention to join forces with any of the parties to this controversy.<sup>1</sup> In my opinion, both the unfavorable critics of the poem and its defenders, while concentrating their attention upon the question of the poet's offenses against good taste, have neglected to examine fully the nature and style of the poem itself and have failed to consider the poem in relation to its context. The present paper is a modest attempt to make up for some of this neglect by inviting attention to the essential character of the poem, the rhetorical mould in which it is cast, and its relationship to poems that precede and follow it. Specifically this essay propounds the following thesis: that II, 20 in both content and style is not, except in a

<sup>1</sup> The most important recent discussion of Horace, II, 20 is that of G. L. Hendrickson in *C. P.*, XLIV (1949), pp. 30 ff.

limited and superficial way, an epilogue at all but a prologue or rather part of an elaborate overture to the "Roman Odes."

Many students of Horace must have been troubled by the question that has disturbed me since the first days of my teaching: Why should Horace have published *two* "last poems," two epilogues to his lyric works, and have placed one (III, 30) at the veritable end of the collection and the other (II, 20) at the end of a book, it is true, but actually in the very heart of the volume, before his tale is half told, really before he has done enough to warrant his assumption of the title of *vates*? True enough, there were three great "Roman" poems in Book I, but for the most part in the first two books of the *Odes* Horace has struck, as it were, only glancing blows at the most pressing of Roman themes, namely that of the Augustan achievement. He has paid his tribute in disavowals and coy expressions of doubt of his ability ever to undertake such mighty work. He has borne out what he wrote to Agrippa. Varius and not Horace must be looked to for the Augustan epic. Varius is the *ales Maeonii carminis* (I, 6), whereas

nos, Agrippa, neque haec dicere nec gravem  
Pelidae stomachum cedere nescii  
nec cursus duplicitis per mare Ulysei  
nec saevam Pelopis domum

conamur, tenues grandia, dum pudor  
imbellisque lyrae Musa potens vetat  
laudes egregii Caesaris et tuas  
culpa deterere ingenii . . .

Horace must remain the minstrel and, if he sings of battles, they must be *proelia virginum sectis in iuvenes unguibus acrium*. The refusal is repeated, less obviously but quite definitely at the beginning of Book II (II, 1, 37 ff.) and explicitly in II, 12.

It does seem incongruous for a poet abruptly to lay claim to immortal fame before he has earned it and especially so after a series of refusals to attempt the only theme that can bring such fame; if that is what Horace has done in II, 20, then that is a worse offense against good taste than the much discussed objectionable realism of the poem's metamorphosis. But Horace is not guilty. If read aright (*sc. secundum interpretationem nostram*), the poem's message is quite different. To begin with,

its tone is strikingly different from that of the generally admired and undoubted epilogue III, 30 :

Exegi monumentum aere perennius  
regalique situ pyramidum altius,  
quod non imber edax, non aquilo impotens  
possit diruere aut innumerabilis  
annorum series et fuga temporum.  
non omnis moriar multaque pars mei  
vitabit Libitinam ; usque ego postera  
crescam laude recens, dum Capitolium  
scandet cum tacita virgine pontifex :  
dicar, qua violens obstrepit Aufidus  
et qua pauper aquae Daunus agrestium  
regnavit populorum, ex humili potens  
princeps Aeolium carmen ad Italos  
deduxisse modos. sume superbiam  
quaesitam meritis et mihi Delphica  
lauro cinge volens, Melpomene, comam.

The poet has built him a monument beyond the reach of storm and change, beyond what men call time and death, the peasant has become coeternal with eternal Rome. The poem expresses a serene pride in transcendent achievement. Ambition and mortal struggle are remembered but as battles long ago. The reader is invited to marvel at an ever fresh but completed work.

When one turns from the vast contemplative reaches of this epilogue to the allegorical melodrama of the swan-poem, he finds it difficult to believe that Horace could ever have intended the latter to stand at the end of his complete lyric works. Where is the Olympian detachment and what has become of those cosmic "images of rest"? This is a tense deathbed scene; Maecenas and anxious friends bend over the poet and call his name in farewell, as the poet himself, in seeming delirium, feels the beginning of a great change in his being; feverishly he prepares to soar into a bright new world, leaving his friends for comfort a paraphrase of Ennius' epitaph. Whether the much discussed scene of metamorphosis is to be thought of as enacted before the eyes of Maecenas and the reader or, as the dean of American Horatian scholars has recently suggested, "off-stage,"<sup>2</sup> it is a harrowing picture with which to close a volume. All in all II, 20 contains too much struggle and movement for an epilogue, which one expects to possess a tone of abiding peace.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 31 f.

There is, however, a more significant difference between II, 20 and III, 30 than that of mere tone or mood. Unlike III, 30, the swan-poem does not celebrate achievement. On the contrary, it is entirely forward-looking, it is vibrant with aspiration, promise, and audacious prediction. The poet takes little account of the past except to assert that the future shall be different from the past. The reader is made to expect a sensational change in the poet's character; and his words will no longer be addressed to a small group of intimates but to the whole Roman world. This is not the stuff of epilogue but of prophecy and not primarily a prediction of fame to come but of some act about to be performed by the poet which will result in his eternal fame.

What is it that the poet is going to do that will insure his lasting renown? The opening lines of the poem,

Non usitata nec tenui ferar  
penna biformis per liquidum aethera  
vates neque in terris morabor  
longius, invidiaque maior  
urbis relinquam . . .

say plainly, it seems to me, that the poet is on the point of abandoning (at least for the present) his accustomed literary genre for a different and more exalted one. The new field will not be epic (*nec usitata penna*) nor will it be merely some new development in the domain of familiar Horatian lyric (*nec tenui penna*), for Horatian *pudor* has done a thorough job of associating the concept contained in the word *tenuis* with the poet's ordinary minstrelsy. The precise nature, however, of the great transformation is not as important to this discussion for the moment as the fact that it is to occur. II, 20 is thus in tone and content entirely a poem of prophecy not retrospect, a prologue rather than an epilogue.

That II, 20 is a prologue or, at least, part of a poetic sequence prefatory to the "Roman Odes" is placed almost beyond doubt when one examines the rhetorical character of the poem and makes comparisons with other odes in which the poet makes use of similar literary formulas. It is difficult to believe that no scholar has pointed out the fact that II, 20, in which the poet for once faces up boldly and even boastfully to a heroic

task and announces as clearly as the ambiguous language of a *vates* will permit that he is at length about to treat a subject of the greatest importance, is rhetorically the exact opposite of Horace's customary formula of *recusatio*. It would not be pertinent to the present inquiry to examine all the instances in which Horace subtly varies the *recusatio* formula which permits him to win an artistic victory like the retreating Parthian without the necessity of making a frontal assault upon his subject. Two instances, however, are definitely to our purpose. In both these poems, the great poet, who can do what Horace professes that he cannot, is likened to a bird. In I, 6 Horace tells Agrippa that Varius is the *ales Maeonii carminis* and in IV, 2 great Pindar is the swan of Thebes, *cycnus Dircaeus*, while Horace is the humble bee. The *recusatio* of IV, 2 must be scrutinized closely, for it provides the real clue to the meaning of II, 20. This poem is ostensibly a reply to Jullus Antonius, who had apparently invited Horace to write something in Pindaric vein to help celebrate Augustus' victory over the Sygambri. This characteristic Horatian *recusatio*, in its oblique way, complements Jullus, honors the victory of Augustus, and pays eloquent tribute to Pindar the mountain torrent of Greek lyric, the swan of Thebes. Who can rival him? Least of all Horace (the humble bee). The swan's flight in *altos nubium tractus* (which recalls *per liquidum aethera*) is an effortless one, unlike the laborious buzzing, petty journeys of the bee. This is the wistful language of one who has tried before this to produce poetry in Pindaric vein; the intimation that he has failed in his attempt is required by the conventional hypocrisy of the *recusatio*—Horace's real opinion of his Pindaric efforts is probably concealed in III, 30. The second ode of book IV is the sort of poem one might have expected Horace to write instead of II, 20, for in place of II, 20's audacity is familiar Horatian *pudor*. The luckless imitator of Pindar will discover that he has been trusting only to his art, to wings of wax and borrowed plumage, wherefore he must fall like Icarus:

Pindarum quisquis studet aemulari,  
Iulle, ceratis ope Daedalea  
nititur pennis, vitreo daturus  
nomina ponto.

It would seem to be unnecessary to pursue the analysis of IV, 2 any further in order to demonstrate that in II, 20 the poet has exactly reversed the *recusatio* pattern of IV, 2. In place of wistfulness is dynamic self-assurance, to put it mildly. There is no *apis Matina* here but a creature that soars as effortlessly as the Theban swan; and his plumage is his own, to the horror of later critics sprouting convincingly from the poet's person. He cannot fail:

Iam Daedaleo notior Icaro  
Visam gementis litora Bosphori . . .

The citing of Icarus makes the inverse correspondence of II, 20 to IV, 2 precise. It is almost like documentary proof that Horace in II, 20 is turning the *recusatio* formula inside out. He is deserting his accustomed literary genre and boldly adopting a new one: not *Pindarum aemulatus* but *iam iam futurus Pindarus*.

Without laboring the point further, I submit that II, 20 has the character of prologue rather than of epilogue and must have been composed intentionally to serve as part of an introduction to the "Roman Odes." The hard-bitten proponents of the epilogue theory will doubtless point to the paraphrase of Ennius in support of their view: these words have much of the finality of *sume superbiam/ quae sitam meritis*. In my opinion, however, these words would have the reader look forwards rather than backward. They have the effect of a last solemn notice to the reader that what is to follow will be of great moment, indeed: when he unrolls the next column of his *libellus*, he will find not just another *carmen*, not an epic, but *carmina non prius audita*, the essence of Roman epic in the idiom of Greek lyric.

When all is said and done, it is not a very revolutionary proposition that II, 20 has more the character of prologue than epilogue, for it is reasonable enough to suppose that Horace should have wished to effect a *calida iunctura* of Books I and II. We have here, perhaps, a spectacular example of what Horace has elsewhere done in the case of two individual poems.<sup>3</sup> Yet

<sup>3</sup> I, 34 and I, 35 (cf. Heinze, *Oden und Epoden* [1930], p. 142). The parallel is interesting. I, 34 records a conversion, a complete religious and spiritual revolution in the mind of the poet as the result of a supernatural experience. This poem serves as the preface to the hymn

strangely enough II, 20, which according to my theory is intended to effect the smooth transition, is itself startlingly abrupt. With the very first line the poet is discovered to be having a wild fantasy. Dramatically he is in the midst of a crisis, but how he came to have such an experience is not explained. In the case of the two poems just referred to, a violent spiritual upheaval is made to serve as the preface to a prayer for the safety of the State; it is notable, however, that the circumstances of the spiritual crisis are clearly explained.

The natural place to look for the dramatic motivation of II, 20 is the Alcaic hymn to Bacchus which immediately precedes it (II, 19). Investigation of the relationship between II, 19 and II, 20 is not a new inquiry. It has been pointed out that the two poems complement each other in presenting different aspects of the poet's immortality. Recent writers have noted also that, whereas the first seventeen poems of book II are largely concerned with various aspects of death, particularly the vanity of human wishes in the face of inevitable death, the last three poems of the book celebrate triumph over death: the triumph of the poet's immortal soul.<sup>4</sup> But no one, so far as I know, has drawn attention to what I regard as the most striking feature of the last three poems: they are arranged in an ascending scale: II, 20 is the climax of the series. What is of most importance to the present discussion, however, is the fact that II, 20 can most satisfactorily be explained as the sequel to II, 19.

I look upon the poetic fantasy of II, 20 as the continuation of (or, at any rate, the not illogical consequence of) the Dionysiac ecstasy that begins in II, 19. What could be more poetically logical than that one who "has seen the god" of poetry in one poem should be still under the spell in the following poem? Bacchic inspiration comes suddenly:

Bacchum in remotis carmina rupibus  
Vidi docentem, credite posteri

---

to Fortune (I, 35) which follows. It is probably pushing the parallel too far to note that II, 20 (as a preface to the "Roman Odes") would, in effect, serve to join what is commonly regarded as a prevailingly "Epicurean" Book II and a definitely (certainly at the beginning) Stoic Book III.

<sup>4</sup> Walther Wili, *Horaz* (Basel, 1947), pp. 233 ff.

the hymn begins. He has seen the god in the act of teaching poetry! Could the *Musarum sacerdos* have found himself a more authoritative mentor? With the blow of the thyrsus comes strange terror but also the vision and new power. One stanza addressed to the god surely contains a thinly veiled reference to the poet himself:

quamquam choreis aptior et iocis  
ludoque dictus non sat idoneus  
pugnae ferebaris; sed idem  
pacis eras mediusque belli.<sup>5</sup>

There is the gentle and the warlike Bacchus, for the god had his share in Juppiter's triumph over the Giants; he had been metamorphosed into a lion expressly for that purpose. Why should not the *apis Matina* on occasion become a swan? *Bacchi plenus* Horace can strike a heroic lyre. This hymn to Bacchus, which resembles and is probably intended to foreshadow III, 4 in being part fantasy, part prayer, and part mystical autobiography, is the beginning of the prophetic spell which, I feel sure, we are expected to think of as possessing the poet for an unparalleled series of eight successive Alcaic poems! II, 20, then, is not abrupt or indecorously fantastic but an appropriate member and integral part of a great cycle of Horace's most ambitious works. In view of these considerations II, 20 may not appear less grotesque or repulsive to many readers, but it should fall into perspective as the finale, as it were, of a Bacchic overture to the "Roman Odes." This is, perhaps, the place to add a postscript to Professor Hendrickson's suggestion that the repulsive scene of metamorphosis is to be thought of as occurring "off-stage." Poems II, 20 and II, 19, as has been noted, balance each other artistically in a number of ways. Why should the reader be expected dramatically to witness the metamorphosis any more than the poet's meeting with Bacchus? Both are incidents in the mystical private life of the poet and neither is for the public view. *Procul este profani!*

The question may still be asked: Why should Horace have chosen to cast the prologue to the Roman Odes in the form of a Dionysiac ecstasy? One could think of a number of answers, although the ultimate explanation of Horace's choice of this

<sup>5</sup> Lines 25-8.

formula is naturally beyond our reach. Bacchus was an important member of the Roman pantheon. The Dionysiac ecstasy offers an attractive literary formula on account of the relative brevity of its duration: it permits the lyric poet to make short excursions into the domain of heroic poetry without incurring the long-term responsibility of the epic poet. What may have been more important than all other considerations is the irresistible quality of the power of Bacchus, who can arrest the course of rivers, sway the hearts of men, and, above all, sweep the most diffident of poets to the height of a great argument from which when uninspired and uncoerced by the god he would modestly retreat. All these considerations may have influenced Horace's original choice of this device.

A more immediate and practical answer, however, must be offered to those who may be sceptical of my theory of the "Bacchic overture." This is quite simple: Horace had employed this literary device for a precisely similar purpose in his earlier work, presumably some time before either the "Roman Odes" or the "prologue" had begun to take shape in the poet's mind. In this early experiment (as I regard it), namely in Book III, 25, the Bacchic enthusiasm is presented as an apologetic or explicatory epilogue to the long poem (III, 24) which, as scholars have noted, anticipates themes of the "Roman Odes."<sup>6</sup> The "epilogue" is explicit in language, whereas the "prologue" is appropriately ambiguous, but the rhetorical principle involved is the same in both instances. Only in the grip of the Dionysiac enthusiasm would your lyric poet be able to presume to treat of the one great "epic" theme of the age: the glorious achievements of Augustus.

It is beyond the scope of this essay to explore further the relationship of the "overture" to the "Roman Odes" themselves. It is likely that a detailed analysis of the poems would reveal that the poet's *calida iunctura* of the second and third books of the *Odes* is a piece of artistry whose subtlety is scarcely indicated by the broad strokes of the sketch contained in this paper.

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<sup>6</sup> Cf. Heinze, *op. cit.*, p. 358; F. Solmsen, "The First Roman Ode," *A. J. P.*, LXVIII (1947), pp. 337-52.

## SOME FRIENDS OF THE CAESARS.

When the last of the dynasts won sole power in the world, he had no choice but to enlist his adherents in the management of it. They were already there—senators, knights, and freedmen. The personal friends of Caesar Augustus take in a wide range, from the men of consular rank, the “principes civitatis,” to common soldiers—and foreigners will not be excluded, the kings and tetrarchs. It was expedient for a Princeps to be *civilis*; an *imperator* took pride in knowing his “commilitones” by name and exploit; and the Caesars from the beginning showed themselves wondrously accessible to the claims of clients and petitioners. Various anecdotes exemplify. Augustus defended Scutarius, one of his *evocati*, in a court of law; and he intervened to rescue Castricius, who had given him information about the conspiracy of Varro Murena.<sup>1</sup> Again, when Augustus was present at a *hospitalis cena* at Bononia and the talk fell on loot and sacrilege, his host, an Antonian veteran, speaking as one who knew, told him that the golden dish from which he was eating was the leg of the goddess Anaitis;<sup>2</sup> and as “hospes” the Princeps learned from the centenarian Romilius Pollio the famous recipe for health and a long life—*intus mulsum, foris oleum*.<sup>3</sup>

The monarch has a court from the outset. Not so much the ceremonial (which both Augustus and Tiberius eschewed) as the habits, and the appendages—doctors and magicians, philosophers and buffoons. There would be no point, for example, in cataloguing the “convictores Graeculi” of Tiberius Caesar,<sup>4</sup> but his entourage on the island in the last days mattered very much. Tiberius was a convinced believer in the science of the stars. Other ages and the recent time (despotisms or constitutional monarchies) exhibit the secret power wielded by the astrologer, by the court physician, or by some casual but devious confidant.

The term “amicus” is nothing if not comprehensive. It

<sup>1</sup> Suetonius, *Divus Aug.*, 56, 4.

<sup>2</sup> Pliny, *N. H.*, XXXIII, 83.

<sup>3</sup> *Ib.*, XXII, 114.

<sup>4</sup> Cf. Suetonius, *Tib.*, 56 f.

quickly becomes definite, and can be employed like a title. Categories develop among the friends of Caesar. Thus Seneca can mention the "cohors primae admissionis."<sup>5</sup> Moreover, provincial governors are designated as "amici" of the ruler. The first instance is the letter of Caesar Augustus to the city of Cnidus, thus styling Asinius Gallus (*cos. 8 B. C.*), proconsul of Asia in 6/5 B. C.<sup>6</sup> Furthermore, Gallus is one of a group who have their names and portraits on coins in Asia and in Africa. Some of those proconsuls, but not all, are related in various ways to the ruling house. It is therefore not unreasonable to describe them as "amici principis."<sup>7</sup> The date and period at which the honour of coin portraits was permitted would be worth knowing, for its political relevance. The limits are fairly narrow. Six of the seven proconsuls in question cannot be proved earlier than 10 B. C. or later than 4 B. C.<sup>8</sup> The seventh, however, L. Passienus Rufus (*cos. 4 B. C.*), seems eccentric, and no stretch of argument could bring him into relationship with the dynasty.<sup>9</sup> Usage seems sporadic, as well as the evidence.<sup>10</sup> Several eminent personages of the period lack the honour, notably Iullus Antonius (*cos. 10 B. C.*), proconsul of Asia and husband of the elder Marcella.<sup>11</sup>

There are also "comites." By its nature, that is an exact term. A certain Cn. Pullius Pollio may have been a "comes" of Augustus in Gaul (i. e., in 16-13 B. C.)—it depends on the supplement believed best for a mutilated inscription.<sup>12</sup> The first

<sup>5</sup> *De Clem.*, I, 10, 1.

<sup>6</sup> *S.I.G.<sup>3</sup>*, 780.

<sup>7</sup> M. Grant, *From "Imperium" to "Auctoritas"* (1946), pp. 228 ff., cf. 387 ff.; *Aspects of the Principate of Tiberius* (1950), p. 52.

<sup>8</sup> Not all of the individual datings suggested by Grant are plausible, e. g. 5/4 B. C. for Paullus Fabius Maximus, consul in 11 B. C. (*From "Imperium,"* p. 387). The whole question deserves to be looked into again.

<sup>9</sup> For the coin, struck when he was proconsul of Africa, M. Grant, *ibid.*, pp. 139 f. His governorship falls sensibly later than those of the other six proconsuls.

<sup>10</sup> Cf. the early and isolated phrase *ἀνὴρ ἐπιφανέστατος* used by Augustus of a proconsul (*S.I.G.<sup>3</sup>*, 785: Chios). Presumably a Greek equivalent of "vir clarissimus." For the history of the latter title see M. Bang in Friedländer's *Sittengeschichte Roms*<sup>9</sup>, IV (1921), pp. 77 ff.

<sup>11</sup> *P. I. R.<sup>2</sup>*, A 800.

<sup>12</sup> *I. L. S.*, 916 = *C. I. L.*, XI, 7553 (Forum Clodii).

clear epigraphic instance of the word itself comes a little later—that L. Licinius who was “comes da[tus] . . . a divo Aug. C. [Caesari].”<sup>13</sup> Then, beyond cavil, Sex. Palpellius Hister, “comiti/ Ti. Caesaris Aug. dato ab divo Aug.”<sup>14</sup>

Not all the large and motley company that benefit from the friendship and favours of an emperor can be deemed to carry weight in counsel and policy. Contrariwise, the men who exercise a genuine and pervasive influence must often be guessed or postulated—rank and honours, office or employments. Thus iterated consulates or the post of *praefectus urbi*. It is therefore difficult to register the friends and counsellors of the Caesar in a manner that shall satisfy all criteria, and all critics. Better, perhaps, to include too many than too few.

The latest list to be produced adds up to nearly four hundred names.<sup>15</sup> It suggests certain observations by the way, and brief *addenda*.

First of all, personal friends of some rulers. A number of nonentities have to be admitted, such as the knights Baebius Longus and Calenus, said to be friends of M. Aurelius.<sup>16</sup> Also the poet Voconius, whoever he be, who enjoyed the amity of Hadrian.<sup>17</sup> Therefore, if Voconius, why not Florus, commemorated by a famous and familiar interchange of verses with the same emperor?<sup>18</sup> Or indeed, Q. Horatius Flaccus? Augustus offered him a secretarial post, and letters are cited.<sup>19</sup>

Next, “comites.” Horace in the *Epistulae* furnishes useful evidences about the “cohors” of Tiberius in the eastern lands in 20 B. C.—and the word “cohors” is twice employed.<sup>20</sup> Notable among its members are Julius Florus and Albinovanus

<sup>13</sup> *C. I. L.*, VI, 1442. Cf. also 1515 (a lost inser. and a bad copy): “[comiti] / L. Caes. Augusti [f.]”. The person is a Ti. Sempronius Ti. f. Gracchus.

<sup>14</sup> *I. L. S.*, 946.

<sup>15</sup> In J. Crook, *Consilium Principis* (1955), pp. 148-90.

<sup>16</sup> *S. H. A.*, *Marcus*, 3, 8.

<sup>17</sup> Apuleius, *Apol.*, 11. Crook (*op. cit.*, p. 190) suggests that he may be Pliny’s literary friend Voconius Romanus (*P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, L 144)—who, however, is not attested as a poet. Perhaps the Voconius Victor in Martial (*P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, V 613).

<sup>18</sup> *S. H. A.*, *Hadr.*, 16, 3 f. Cf. *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup> A 650.

<sup>19</sup> Suetonius, ed. Roth, p. 297.

<sup>20</sup> *Epp.*, I, 3, 6; 8, 14.

Celsus, the latter designated as "comes" and "scriba."<sup>21</sup> One or other of them might have survived into the principate of Tiberius Caesar. That ruler, though distrustful in his nature, and capricious, exhibited an attachment to old friends, as witness that Lucilius Longus (*suff.* A. D. 7) who had been with him on Rhodes.<sup>22</sup> By contrast, the treatment of Palpellius Hister, whom Augustus had planted on the retinue of Tiberius on one occasion.<sup>23</sup> A chill seems to have supervened.<sup>24</sup> Palpellius received no marks of esteem. He came to the consulate late in life, under another emperor, in the year 43.

Time and season have to be watched. The list claims Barea Soranus (*suff.* 52) and Thrasea Paetus (*suff.* 56) as friends of Vespasian. Those items derive from a speech of Helvidius Priscus in Tacitus.<sup>25</sup> Whatever be the validity of the statement, both men were dead before Vespasian came to the power. They should be left out—as in fact is the Batavian Julius Civilis, who, taking up arms in 69, appealed to the "amicitia" that bound him to Vespasian.<sup>26</sup>

Then there is another category: personages whose rank as "amici" or "comites" happens to lack precise attestation. The list appears to take in almost all the known holders of iterated consulates in the first two centuries of the Empire. Four are missing, viz. Q. Sanquinius Maximus, C. Antistius Vetus, M. Pompeius Silvanus, and A. Lappius Maximus (with second tenures respectively in 39, 50, 75, and 95).

Similarly, the Prefects of the City. One looks for three of the four attested holders of the post between 32 and the early years of Claudius: L. Aelius Lamia, L. Piso, and Q. Sanquinius Maximus.<sup>27</sup> If other *praefecti* are admitted, for example Q. Baebius Macer (*suff.* 103), who was in office in 117 (no

<sup>21</sup> Julius Florus receives *Epp.*, I, 3, also II, 2, which addresses him as *bono clarioque fidelis amice Neroni*. Celsus is the dedicant of I, 8 (and mentioned in 3, 15). Note also Septimius (I, 19).

<sup>22</sup> Tacitus, *Ann.*, IV, 15, 1.

<sup>23</sup> *I. L. S.*, 946.

<sup>24</sup> Like Julius Montanus, *tolerabilis poeta et amicitia Tiberii notus et frigore* (Seneca, *Epp.*, 122, 11).

<sup>25</sup> Tacitus, *Hist.*, IV, 7, 2.

<sup>26</sup> *Ib.*, 13, 2.

<sup>27</sup> Viz., in the interval between L. Piso (*cos.* 15 B. C.) and L. Volusius Saturninus (*cos.* A. D. 3.).

precise evidence states that he was an "amicus" of Trajan),<sup>28</sup> these three ought not to be denied an entry. L. Aelius Lamia (*cos. 3*), consular legate long ago *in Germania Illyricoque*,<sup>29</sup> surely falls within the ambit of Tiberius' close friends: dying after a brief tenure (32/33), he was accorded the honour of a public funeral.<sup>30</sup> L. Piso (*cos. 27*) is none other than the elder son (he changed his *praenomen*) of Cn. Piso, the ill-starred governor of Syria, the friend whom Tiberius had been compelled to disown. As for Q. Sanquinius Maximus, that mysterious character (consul in an unattested year under Tiberius), one fact speaks volumes—a second consulate in 39, with no precedent since T. Statilius Taurus in 26 B. C.

And finally, persons of consequence among the agents and helpers of the Caesars who do not happen to be certified by the label of an iterated consulate. If the chief credit for Vespasian's policy in the East is to be assigned to Licinius Mucianus and Eprius Marcellus, men of craft and experience,<sup>31</sup> others should not be lost to view. Vespasian early in his reign sent L. Caesen-nius Paetus (*cos. 61*) to be governor of Syria.<sup>32</sup> He had been in the East before (not to his credit). He was married to a Flavia Sabina.<sup>33</sup> Then there is M. Ulpianus Traianus (*suff. ?70*), who had commanded a legion under Vespasian in Judaea, and was to hold Syria from 74 to 79.<sup>34</sup> The son of that Traianus (*cos. 91*) was presumably an "amicus" of Domitian—as is not stated in the *Panegyricus* of Pliny. Also Cn. Julius Agricola (*suff. 77*): Tacitus cannot suppress the fact that the Emperor was named in Agricola's will.<sup>35</sup>

Two entries among the consular governors might be called into question. D. Terentius Scaurianus (*suff. ca. 104*), Trajan's first legate of the newly conquered Dacia, is clearly an impor-

<sup>28</sup> *S. H. A., Hadr.*, 5, 5.

<sup>29</sup> Velleius, II, 116, 3.

<sup>30</sup> *Ann.*, VI, 27, 2.

<sup>31</sup> J. Crook, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

<sup>32</sup> For the evidence, *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, C 173.

<sup>33</sup> *I. L. S.*, 995.

<sup>34</sup> *P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, V 574, cf. *I. L. S.*, 8970 (Miletus). An inser. from Antioch reported by L. Robert (*C. R. A. I.*, 1951, p. 255) puts him in Syria already in 74.

<sup>35</sup> *Agr.*, 43, 4.

tant person.<sup>36</sup> He is not expressly attested as an "amicus" of that emperor. Nor has the younger L. Minicius Natalis a strong claim.<sup>37</sup> If he enjoyed the favour of Hadrian at early stages in his career, he could not keep it, or profit by it. Quaestor ca. 122 (and legate, in the same year, of his parent the proconsul of Africa), he was kept out of the consulate, which he did not reach until Hadrian was dead, in 139.<sup>38</sup> There would have been better warrant for admitting his father (*suff.* 106), who held Pannonia in the critical year of Trajan's death, or Q. Pompeius Falco (*suff.* 108), whom Hadrian transferred from Lower Moesia to Britain.<sup>39</sup> Several of Hadrian's allies were already ensconced in the great commands by 117.

The foregoing examples will suffice to demonstrate how difficult it is to draw the line.<sup>40</sup> At the same time, apart from those examples, twenty names might be adduced in the period from Augustus to Hadrian, heterogeneous and on various criteria, both attested personal friends of the rulers and men of weight whose claims can be urged without scandal or sophistry.<sup>41</sup>

**ALEXANDER THE ALABARCH** (*P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, A 510). Said by Josephus to have been a friend of Claudius Caesar before his accession (*A.J.*, XIX, 276). Worth noting in view of the resplendent career of his son, Ti. Julius Alexander, who, procurator of Judaea under Claudius, became Prefect of Egypt towards the end of Nero's reign, and rose yet higher: see now E. G. Turner, *J. R. S.*, XLIV (1954), pp. 54 ff., discussing, among other things, *P. Hibeh* 215.

**ASCONIUS LABEO.** Voted the *ornamenta consularia* at the same time as Nero's father was honoured with a posthumous statue (*Ann.*, XIII, 10, 1). Labeo had been Nero's legal guardian after the death of Passienus Crispus (*cos.* II, 44), his step-father, which (it can be inferred) occurred at some time between 44 and the early months of 47. The Asconii come from Patavium, as is patent: " ]Asconius Q. f. Labeo " a local priest

<sup>36</sup> Cf. E. Groag, *R.-E.*, V A, cols. 669 ff.; A. Stein, *Die Reichsbeamten von Dazien* (1944), pp. 9 f.

<sup>37</sup> *I. L. S.*, 1061, cf. 1029.

<sup>38</sup> His consulate is disclosed by a new diploma, *C. I. L.*, XVI (Suppl.), 175.

<sup>39</sup> *I. L. S.*, 1029 (Natalis); 1035 f. (Falco).

<sup>40</sup> Cf. Mr. Crook's own remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 25).

<sup>41</sup> Not included among the twenty are certain "comites" referred to above, pp. 266-7.

(*C. I. L.*, V, 2848) could have been cited under *P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, A 1205. Observe the great scholar Asconius Pedianus; and "Asconius" figures in the full nomenclature of Silius Italicus (*cos.* 68), as is revealed by his edict at Aphrodisias in Caria (*C. R.*, XLIX [1935], pp. 216 f.).

**C. ATEIUS CAPITO** (*suff.* 5). The great lawyer, *humani divinitque iuris sciens* (*Ann.*, III, 70, 3). Of no small value as a sacerdotal expert—he interpreted the Sibylline Oracle on which were based the *Ludi Saeculares* of 17 B.C. (*Zosimus*, II, 4). The obituary notice (*Ann.*, III, 75) is notable on several counts. Augustus, so the historian asserts, speeded Capito's career to the consulate in order to give him primacy before his rival Antistius Labeo, who was Republican by family and sentiment, whereas *Capitonis obsequium dominantibus magis probabatur*.

**C. CAECINA TUSCUS.** The son of Nero's foster-mother (*Suetonius, Nero*, 35). There are no grounds for calling him "Graeco-Oriental" (as A. Momigliano in *C. A. H.*, X, p. 727). In a sudden but transient crisis of 55 Nero wished to remove Afranius Burrus from his command of the Guard, and, according to the historian Fabius Rusticus, had actually sent *codicilli* to Tuscus, giving him the appointment (*Ann.*, XIII, 20, 2). Tuscus was later Prefect of Egypt, from 64 to 66, preceding Tiberius Alexander (cf. A. Stein, *Die Präfekten von Ägypten* [1950], pp. 35 ff.).

**C. CILNIUS PROCULUS** (*suff.* 87). In the fragmentary inscription from Arretium (*C. I. L.*, XI, 1833, cf. *Not. Scavi*, 1925, p. 224), E. Groag (*P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, C 732) plausibly restores one of his posts as "[comiti Imp. Caes. Traiani] Hadriani A[ug.]".

**TI. CLAUDIOUS ATTICUS HERODES** (*cos.* 143). The Athenian sophist and millionaire. A Latin inscription in Sweden (provenance unknown), cited in the notes to *S. I. G.*<sup>3</sup>, 863, describes him as "q. imp. Caesaris/ Hadriani Aug. inter ami/cos, trib. pleb., praetorem."

**EPICTETUS.** The ex-slave. Cf. *S. H. A.*, *Hadr.*, 16, 10: *in summa familiaritate Epictetum et Heliodorum philosophos . . . habuit*. Not unimportant, for Hadrian detested pomposity and class distinctions.

**CN. HOSIDIUS GETA** (*suff.* ?45). An acephalous inscription (*I. L. S.*, 971), at Histonium, the home-town of this family, could be supplemented to yield "[comiti divi]/ Claudi in Britannia." Cn. Hosidius Geta had been active in Mauretania in 42 (*Dio*, LX, 9, 1), and is generally identified with the (praetorian) legate in Britain Γάϊος Οσίδιος Γέτας (*ib.*, 20, 4, where Reimarus' emendation to Γνάϊος is standard). Groag, however, suggests that the latter might be a distinct person, hence possibly the subject of *I. L. S.*, 971 (*R.-E.*, VIII, col. 2490).

**C. LITERNIUS FRONTO.** According to Josephus a certain Fronto, one of the friends of Titus, was empowered to decide the fate of the captives after the fall of Jerusalem (*B. J.*, VI, 416, cf. 419). Clearly Liternius Fronto (*ib.*, 233). The reference, missed by Stein in *R.-E.*, XIII, col. 746, was duly cited in *Die Präfekten von Ägypten* (1950), p. 39. Note that his governorship of Egypt belongs, not in 69/70, but in 78 or 79, cf. the revision of *A. E.*, 1937, 236 produced by H. G. Pflaum, *Latomus*, X (1951), p. 473.

**M. MAENIUS AGRIPPA L. TUSIDIUS CAMPESTER.** Roman knight with military service (including an *expeditio Britannica*), described as *hospiti divi Hadriani, patri senatoris* (*I. L. S.*, 2735: Camerinum). His son is clearly the "js Campester," suffect consul under Pius or Marcus (*A. E.*, 1945, 37 = *Inscr. It.*, XIII, 1, p. 210), perhaps in 165, cf. A. Degrassi, *I Fasti Consolari* (1952), 46.

**P. MEMMIUS REGULUS** (*suff.* 31). The consul who helped to suppress Sejanus. Not attested among the counsellors of Claudius or Nero. But observe the testimony rendered by Nero. If Nero died, *habere subsidium rem publicam*, and in elucidation Nero mentioned the name of Regulus (*Ann.*, XIV, 47, 1).

**P. PETRONIUS TURPILIANUS** (*cos.* 61). Honoured by Nero for loyal services (of what nature it is not specified) after the conspiracy of C. Piso was detected and crushed: his reward, the *ornamenta triumphalia*, likewise conferred on the praetor-designate M. Cocceius Nerva and on Ofonius Tigellinus, the Prefect of the Guard (Tacitus, *Ann.*, XV, 72, 1). Three years later Petronius was Nero's general in Italy in the last days, faithful perhaps to the end. (*Hist.*, I, 6, 1, cf. 37, 3; Plutarch, *Galba*, 15 and 17; Dio, LXIII, 27, 1a.)

**P. POMPONIUS SECUNDUS** (*suff.* 44). The tragic poet. According to Pliny, who wrote his biography, Pomponius entertained Caligula to a banquet, with costly and historic wine (*N. H.*, XIV, 56). He was half-brother of the ruler's consort Milonia Caesonia, as were also Cn. Domitius Corbulo, the great general, and P. Suillius Rufus (*suff.* ca. 44). For these, some of the children of the much-married Vistilia (*N. H.*, VII, 39), see C. Cichorius, *Römische Studien* (1922), pp. 429 ff.

**SEPTIMIUS.** A mutual friend of Augustus and of Horace, cf. *ex Septimio quoque nostro* (Suetonius, ed. Roth, p. 227). Clearly (cf. *P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, S 306) the person to whom *Odes*, II, 6 is dedicated, and who is commended to Tiberius in *Epp.*, I, 19).

**C. STERTINIUS XENOPHON.** Claudius' chief doctor, with him in the invasion of Britain, and the recipient of military decorations (*S. I. G.*<sup>3</sup>, 804: Cos). It was in response to his entreaty

that the Emperor, so he affirmed in an oration to the Senate, proposed *immunitas* for Cos (*Ann.*, XII, 61). The court physician presumably commanded great influence with Claudius M. Artorius Asclepiades (*P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, A 1183) cannot have played a comparable rôle with Augustus: he was lost at sea not long after the Battle of Actium (Jerome, *Chron.*, p. 187H).

P. SULPICIUS QUIRINIUS (*cos.* 12 B. C.). The obituary, from Tiberius' speech in the Senate requesting a public funeral (*Ann.*, III, 48), recapitulates his services, among them the post of guide and mentor to C. Caesar in the East. Quirinius had been careful to cultivate Tiberius in the period of his reclusion at Rhodes; and later, as an ex-governor of both Galatia-Pamphylia and of Syria, he must have had a place in the councils of both rulers.

THRASYLLUS. The great astrologer (*P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, T 137). He passed the ordeal at Rhodes contrived by Tiberius who *incolumem fore gratatur, quaeque dixerat oracli vice accipiens inter intimos amicorum tenet* (*Ann.*, VI, 21, 3). Perhaps the parent of Ti. Claudius Balbillus (*P. I. R.*<sup>2</sup>, C 813 and B 38), cf. C. Cichorius, *Römische Studien* (1922), pp. 370 ff. In any case, highly influential on Capreae: Cichorius further suggested that Ennia Thrasylla, wife of Sertorius Macro, the Prefect of the Guard, was the grand-daughter of Thrasyllus.

VALERIUS LIGUR. The Augustan precedent invoked by Claudius Caesar when he asked that his Prefect of the Guard, Rufrius Pollio, should be allowed a seat in the Senate whenever he was present himself (Dio, LX, 23, 3). Perhaps an Augustan *praefectus praetorio*, cf. *P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, V 68, where it is suggested that he may be identical with Varius Ligur (V 189).

VALERIUS PAULINUS. Procurator of Narbonensis in 69. Himself a citizen of Forum Iulium, he caused the region to revolt from Vitellius, *strenuus militiae et Vespasiano ante fortunam amicus* (Tacitus, *Hist.*, III, 43, 1). Hence the prospect of a brilliant career, and it was reasonable to identify him with Paulinus, Prefect of Egypt early in the reign of Vespasian (Josephus, *B. J.*, VII, 434). So *P. I. R.*<sup>1</sup>, V 105. However, *P. Oxy.*, 1266, line 25 (of 72/73), discloses a different *gentilicium*, probably "Caunius," cf. R. Syme, *J. R. S.*, XLIV (1954), p. 116, adducing the reading of C. H. Roberts.

Q. VERANIUS (*cos.* 49). Legate of Britain in 58, *supremis testamenti verbis ambitionis manifestus: quippe multa in Neronem adulatione addidit subiecturum ei provinciam fuisse, si triennio proximo vixisset* (*Ann.*, XIV, 29, 1). His advancement had been rapid—quaestor in 37 (*I. G. R.*, III, 703: Cyaneae in Lycia), and tribune of the plebs in 41, when he carried

negotiations for Claudius between the Guard and the Senate (Josephus, *A. J.*, XIX, 229 ff.), to become (after the governorship of the new province of Lycia—Pamphylia) *ordinarius* in 49 at about thirty-seven. A loyal friend of the dynasty—the father, who had served under Germanicus Caesar in the East, was active in the prosecution of Cn. Piso (*Ann.*, III, 10, 1, etc.). For further particulars, see the new inscription, edited by A. E. Gordon, *Univ. of Cal. Publ. in Class. Arch.*, II (1952), p. 234, whence *A. E.*, 1953, 251.

RONALD SYME.

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## NOTES ON DIODORUS.

### I. Adherbal and the Relief of Lilybaeum (XXIV, 1, 2)

In 250 B. C. the Romans, in a supreme effort to end the war, sailed to Lilybaeum with a large fleet, joined forces with their land army, and placed that key city under strict siege, by land and by sea. On their side the Carthaginians were determined to reinforce the city. According to Polybius (I, 44) they sent a relief expedition, 10,000 men and 50 ships, commanded by the trierarch Hannibal "son of Hamilcar (I) and close friend of Adherbal ('Ατάρβας)." Having successfully completed his mission and delivered the reinforcements to Himilco, the general in command at Lilybaeum, Hannibal again eluded the blockaders and sailed off to Drepana, to join his friend Adherbal, the commander-in-chief of the Carthaginian forces in Sicily (I, 46).

Zonaras' version of the story (VIII, 15, 11) differs in a number of details, not least in the names of the principals. The Carthaginian general at Lilybaeum is Hamilcar, not Himilco, and the relief expedition sent from Carthage, "a very large number of ships carrying grain and money" (soldiers are not mentioned), is headed by 'Αρδέβας (= Adherbal?). Following this successful attempt to break through the blockade many others followed suit, he says, with varying results.

The story as given by Diodorus is preserved only in the Hoeschel fragments, which, though in general far less reliable than the Constantinian excerpts, do frequently provide a summary, brief but useful, of the author's whole narrative of events, especially as it concerns Sicily. The brief statement relating to the relief expedition is as follows (XXIV, 1, 2): *πολιορκουμένων δὲ αὐτῶν, ἥλθεν αὐτοῖς βοήθεια ἀπὸ Καρχηδόνος, ἄνδρες τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ σῖτος, καὶ ἀνεθάρσησαν μετὰ τοῦ Ἀτάρβου.* Wesseling<sup>1</sup> transposed the last three words to read: *ἥλθεν . . . βοήθεια . . . ἄνδρες τετρακισχίλιοι καὶ σῖτος μετὰ τοῦ Ἀτάρβου, καὶ ἀνεθάρσησαν.* This easy "correction" brings the text of Diodorus into partial correspondence with that of Zonaras (if not of Polybius). Both Dindorf and Bekker accept it, and it has thus become the stand-

<sup>1</sup> He says: "Venit enim una cum classe . . . Adherbal, uti ex *Polybio* L. I, 44. & clarissime ex *Zonara Ann. L. VIII.* pag. 298. conficitur." As to Polybius this is one of Wesseling's rare lapses.

ard reading, accepted and used by historians as if it were, beyond question, the authentic reading of the text.

Thus, in a recent study Thiel,<sup>2</sup> apparently taking it for granted that Diodorus and Zonaras both here reflect the same tradition, which he ascribes to Philinus, argues that the record reveals two major reinforcements of Lilybaeum by the Carthaginians, first the arrival of Adherbal with 4,000 men, followed later by that of Hannibal and his 10,000. This enables him also to reconcile, after a fashion, the varying figures for the town's original garrison given by Diodorus and Polybius,<sup>3</sup> though to do so he is forced to claim that "the excerptor of Diodorus has suppressed Hannibal's mission and Polybius is silent on the reinforcements brought by Adherbal."<sup>4</sup>

Now it is true that Adherbal, who apparently succeeded Hasdrubal in 250 B. C. as the Carthaginian commander in Sicily after the latter's defeat at Panormus, is not mentioned earlier in Polybius' account. Thiel assumes that Adherbal was sent out from Carthage, and even suggests that he (with Carthalo) was responsible for the vigorous rebuilding of the Punic navy at this time.<sup>5</sup> This is possible, certainly, but the evidence for such a reconstruction of events is far less solid than Thiel would have it.

Thiel makes much of the fact that Hannibal the trierarch is introduced as an intimate friend of Adherbal (Polybius, I, 44, 1) "in spite of the fact that Adherbal is mentioned here for the first time and therefore cannot be supposed to be known to the reader. This *proves definitely* [italics mine] that he had read Philinus' account of Adherbal's mission: he suppressed the story of this mission, but a few moments afterwards he unconsciously copied a passage from Philinus which supposed that story to be known."<sup>6</sup> The fact is, of course, that Polybius, whose account of the First Punic War is an attempt to set the record straight (I, 14, 1; 15, 13), does assume that his readers are familiar with at least the general course of events. The unmotivated mention of Adherbal in I, 44, 1 is hardly more

<sup>2</sup> J. H. Thiel, *A History of Roman Sea-Power before the Second Punic War* (Amsterdam, 1954), pp. 263 ff. and *passim*.

<sup>3</sup> The 10,000 of Polybius (I, 44, 2) corresponding, he says, to the 7,700 of Diodorus (XXIV, 1, 1) plus the 4,000 men brought by Adherbal.

<sup>4</sup> *Op. cit.*, p. 264.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 259.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 264, n. 659.

surprising than, for example, the sudden appearance of Hamilcar I in I, 24, 3. But precisely because he is correcting the narratives of Philinus and Fabius Pictor, it is unlikely that he would "suppress" facts that he knew to be true. And it is clearly the implication of I, 44 that the expedition under Hannibal is the *first*, perhaps the only, relief to reach the beleaguered city. To the unbiassed reader the story would certainly seem to correspond to the single sentence in the much abbreviated account of Diodorus.

Zonaras apart, we know nothing of Adherbal's whereabouts or activities before we find him in 250 B. C. at Drepana as commander of the Carthaginian forces. Possibly he had been sent out from Carthage. It is equally possible that he had been in Sicily all along. Zonaras' account is so garbled that little trust can be put in it even if his *'Αρδέβας* is correctly identified with *'Ατάρβας*—Adherbal.<sup>7</sup> In a comparison of the three accounts (Polybius: Hannibal, 50 ships, 10,000 soldiers; Diodorus: commander unnamed (?), 4,000 soldiers and supplies of food; Zonaras: *'Αρδέβας*, food and money) it is at least as easy to reconcile Diodorus with Polybius as with Zonaras, especially as numerals are easily confused and miscopied, and a number of those elsewhere in the Hoeschel fragments of Diodorus are patently corrupt.

What, however, are we to make of the dangling phrase *μετὰ τοῦ Ατάρβου* in the Diodorus passage? Were it not for the dubious and possibly misleading evidence of Zonaras a simpler solution than Wesseling's transposition might long since have been considered and adopted. By adding the definite article, to read *οἱ μετὰ τοῦ Ατάρβου*, the phrase becomes the subject of *ἀνεθάρσησαν*, its position in the sentence is justified, and the statement (except for the numeral) is brought into essential harmony with the Polybian account: "In the course of the siege relief arrived from Carthage, 4,000 men and supplies of food, and Adherbal and his men took heart again." In a narrative as bare as that of the Hoeschel excerptor, which never identifies the commander at Lilybaeum by name, *οἱ μετὰ τοῦ*

<sup>7</sup> As already noted he confuses *'Αμιλκας* and *'Ιμιλκων*. Just below, it is hard to tell if his story of the capture of Hanno is to be referred to Hannibal the Rhodian (Polybius, I, 47, 7-10) or to the incident in Polybius, I, 20, 15.

'Ατάρβον seems a quite natural expression to use for the combined Carthaginian forces in Sicily, who being now limited to Lilybaeum and Drepana were one and all vitally concerned with the fate of Lilybaeum. If this emendation is correct, the statement in Zonaras stands alone, and must be judged on its own merits, without the seeming corroboration that it has hitherto enjoyed from the transposed text of Diodorus.<sup>8</sup>

## II. Hamilcar Barca's Spanish Command (XXV, 8)

According to Diodorus, XXV, 8, Hamilcar Barca, after gaining high acclaim for his services to Carthage in both the First Punic War and the Libyan (or Mercenary) War, turned to demagoguery and finally induced the populace to place in his hands for an indefinite period<sup>9</sup> the military command of all Libya. Polybius knows nothing of this. Indeed he twice (II, 1, 5; III, 10, 5) underscores the fact that *immediately* on the conclusion of the Libyan War Hamilcar left for Spain. There is no hint that his conduct at any time fell short of his former high standards or that he is acting for his own ends or without the full support and backing of the government.

Appian, however, in his two brief accounts of Hamilcar (*Hisp.*, 4-5; *Hann.*, 2) depicts him as a discredited man, who to avoid disgrace went off to Spain, seeking booty wherewith to win back his popularity. The two accounts by Appian do not altogether agree as to the exact occasion: both speak of his holding a command against the Numidians, but in *Hisp.* this event is subsequent to the Libyan War, whereas in *Hann.* that war is not mentioned and the time would seem to be immediately after the Carthaginian defeat in Sicily.

<sup>8</sup> Thiel is also concerned (*op. cit.*, p. 264, n. 659, *ad fin.*) by the fact that in Diod., XXIV, 1, 6 Hannibal the trierarch, though not mentioned earlier, turns up at Drepana. But Polybius tells us (I, 46, 1) that he went from Lilybaeum to Drepana, and with my reading of the Diodorus text we are now free to assume that for Diodorus as for Polybius it was Hannibal who brought the relief forces to Lilybaeum, and even perhaps that it was he who conveyed the 700 cavalry from Lilybaeum to Drepana (Diod., XXIV, 1, 3). The fact that the epitomizer of Diodorus does not mention him by name until XXIV, 1, 6 involves no conflict with the Polybian account, and might even be considered to support the suggestion that in the original text of Diodorus he had been introduced earlier as head of the relief expedition.

<sup>9</sup> So Herwerden, reading *eis χρόνον δόριστον* for the obviously corrupt *eis χρόνον ἀλόγιστον* of the sole MS (P).

Obviously Appian is none too reliable here, and is following, moreover, a strongly anti-Barcid tradition. Even so there is nothing comparable to Diodorus' statement that Hamilcar "induced the people to grant him unlimited military command over all Libya." In the fuller account, that in *Hisp.*, Appian expressly states that Hamilcar shared the command against the Numidians with Hanno the Great, and that it was only when Hanno was recalled to Carthage to face charges that Hamilcar was left in sole command—whereupon he at once put himself out of reach by crossing over to Spain!

As it stands, then, the statement of Diodorus is suspect, since it goes beyond even what the anti-Barcid tradition related. Now up to this point, especially in the account of the Libyan War, Diodorus has been following Polybius closely, at times even slavishly. It is true that the latter part of XXV, 8 reflects non-Polybian material of the anti-Barcid sort. However, in XXV, 10, 3 Diodorus says that on the occasion of the Numidian revolt Hamilcar, then in Spain, sent his son-in-law Hasdrubal back to Carthage, and it is thus clear that on this point the account of Diodorus cannot possibly be reconciled with that of Appian.<sup>10</sup> For Diodorus, as for Polybius, Hamilcar was dispatched to Spain immediately after the close of the Libyan War and took no personal part in the Numidian revolt. Since no room is thus left for a Libyan command subsequent to the Libyan War, the text is wrong and must be emended. By reading Ιβηρίας for Λιβύης we can bring the passage into conformity both with the facts of history and with the account of Polybius; above all we can thus reconcile it with our other evidence for the original narrative of Diodorus himself.

### III. Book XXV, 19: Two Corrections

For some parts of the lost books of Diodorus our only guide to the original narrative is the fantastic "poetic" production of Johannes Tzetzes. Though its historical value is negligible, a few obvious errors may be corrected.

In line 18 of the present passage (= *Hist.*, I, 717), Tzetzes has Hamilcar perish in the river Iber. The surprise attack in which he died was, however, in the vicinity of Helice (XXV, 10,

<sup>10</sup> The vague στρατηγήσας κατὰ Καρχηδόνα at the opening of XXV, 10 need refer to nothing more than Hamilcar's part in the Libyan War.

3-4), by which is probably meant Ilici, the modern Elche, a few miles south-west of Alicante. The river Iber (the Ebro) is in this context a geographical absurdity. For *Ίβηρος* we should therefore perhaps read *Tάβερος* or *Τέρεψος*, the Taber or Tereps river (Ptolemy, *Geog.*, II, 6, 14), which is either the modern Segura or its tributary the Tarafa, near Elche. But it is not unlikely that the mistake goes back to Tzetzes himself. He was, after all, capable of designating the Carthaginians throughout his work as "Sicels"!

In line 60 (= *Hist.*, I, 759) there is an obvious dittography, the final word, *Ἀργυρίππας* being derived from *Ἀργυρίππαν*, the last word of the following line. The sense demands that we restore the line to read: *ai Κάνναι πεδίαδες δέ εἰσι τῆς Ἀπουλίας*.

#### IV. Aemilius *patronus* (XXIX, 27)

According to Justin the Alexandrians, after the accession of the boy-king Ptolemy V Epiphanes and the overthrow of Agathocles, sent an embassy to Rome *orantes ut tutelam pupilli susciperent, tuerenturque regnum Aegypti* (XXX, 2, 8). The Romans were receptive to the plea: *mittuntur itaque legati qui Antiocho et Philippo denuntient regno Aegypti abstineant; mittitur et M. Lepidus in Aegyptum qui tutorio nomine regnum pupilli administret* (XXX, 3, 3-4). In particular, the Romans warned Antiochus: *abstineret regno pupilli, postremis patris precibus fidei suae traditi* (XXXI, 1, 2).

Though the account as a whole is both confused and confusing, the Roman embassy referred to is clearly the one appointed late in the consular year 201 B. C., which consisted of C. Claudius Nero, M. Aemilius Lepidus, and P. Sempronius Tuditanus.

Neither Polybius, however, nor Livy knows anything of Lepidus' alleged administration of Egypt as guardian of the Senate's royal ward, and the only other references to this or a similar circumstance are much less specific. The earliest is a denarius of *ca.* 69 B. C., which shows Lepidus placing the diadem on a youthful figure and bears the legend *TVTOR REG./ M. LEPIDVS/ PONT. MAX.* Tacitus says only: . . . *maiores M. Lepidum Ptolemaei liberis tutorem in Aegyptum miserant* (*Ann.*, II, 67), but gives no clue to the precise occasion. Valerius Maximus is apparently more specific (VI, 6, 1): *cum Ptolemaeus rex tutorem populum Romanum filio reliquisset,*

*senatus M. Aemilium Lepidum, pontificem maximum, bis consulem, ad pueri tutelam gerendam Alexandriam misit, amplissimique et integerrimi viri sanctitatem, reipublicae usibus et sacris operatam, externae procurationi vacare voluit.* But his words provide a *terminus post quem* (175 B.C.) only if we assume that the rehearsal of honors<sup>11</sup> held by Lepidus belongs to the narrative proper and is not a retrospective embellishment.

Mahaffy,<sup>12</sup> assuming that some truth underlay the account given by Justin, suggested that the Egyptian court may have wanted a formal protector of Egyptian interests at Rome and that Lepidus, having received hospitality at Alexandria in 200 B.C., undertook the task: "He could not, of course, be called the king's *Patronus*, so the title *Tutor* may have been used in familiar conversation at Rome." In the course of time this was misunderstood and reinterpreted, and hence arose the family legend, piously recorded on the coin and reflected in the later historical writings.

The most searching criticism of the legend has been made by W. Otto.<sup>13</sup> While admitting that the visit to Alexandria in 200 B.C. probably stimulated in Lepidus a lifelong interest in Egypt, Otto denies that the event commemorated on the coin could have occurred at that time, and he would refer it to the creation of Ptolemy Eupator, the oldest son of Philometor, as King of Cyprus in 152, just before the death of Lepidus.

In this discussion one piece of evidence, though slight, has apparently been overlooked entirely. A brief fragment of Diodorus (XXIX, 27), preserved in the Constantinian collection *De Virtutibus et Vitiis*, singles out for praise a man who is identified only as ὁ Αἰμίλιος ὁ ἕπατος ὁ καὶ πάτρων γεγονώς. The preceding fragment (XXIX, 26) in this collection can be dated to 180 or 179 B.C., the one that follows (XXIX, 32) to 175. The passage therefore relates to the period 180-175. Who, however, is the Aemilius under discussion?

The two possibilities are M. Aemilius Lepidus, consul in 187

<sup>11</sup> Lepidus was consul in 187 and 175, and *pontifex maximus* from 180 to his death in 152.

<sup>12</sup> *The Empire of the Ptolemies* (1895), p. 298, n. 1; cf. E. Bevan, *A History of Egypt under the Ptolemaic Dynasty*, 2nd ed. (London, 1914), pp. 256-7.

<sup>13</sup> *Zur Geschichte des Zeit des 6. Ptolemaiers, Abh. Münch., Phil.-hist. Kl.*, XI (1934), pp. 27-9, 122-3.

and 175, and L. Aemilius Paullus, consul in 182 and again in 168 B.C. Dindorf apparently assumed that it was the latter.<sup>14</sup> But for the period 180-175 a much stronger case can be made for Lepidus, who became *pontifex maximus* in 180, censor and *princeps senatus* in 179, served as a *III vir coloniae deducendae* in 177, and held his second consulship in 175. Paullus, on the other hand, after the consulship of 182 and the proconsulship of 181 was apparently in political eclipse for the decade following. To be sure, he acted as *patronus* for the plaintiffs from Further Spain in the trials for peculation in 171, but there seems to be no reason why this should be mentioned in a notice of 180-175. Further, the Aemilius of Diodorus, XXIX, 27 is spoken of as "handsome in appearance," a point which again suggests Lepidus (cf. Polybius, XVI, 34, 6).

Assuming, then, that the identification with Lepidus is correct, the designation *πάτρων* will almost certainly refer to the family legend recorded by Justin, and the Diodorus passage thus provides our earliest *literary* allusion to that legend. Translated literally, the phrase means: "Aemilius the consul, who had also become (or been) *patronus*,"<sup>15</sup> and on the face of it this would seem to look backward from 180-175 rather than forward. While this does not necessarily rule out Otto's interpretation of the coin, it at least suggests that to Diodorus Lepidus was already the recognized champion of Egyptian interests as early as 175, and that the historical basis for the legend is to be sought in the events of 200-175, rather than at the very close of Lepidus' life. To that extent the passage accords well with Mahaffy's interpretation.

(to be continued)

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<sup>14</sup> "xxix, 22" in his Index (s.v. "L. Aemilius Paullus") seems to be a misprint for "xxix, 27."

<sup>15</sup> The excerptor seems to have omitted the defining genitive after *πάτρων*, unless the larger context of the passage made such a genitive unnecessary.

## NOTES ON CORINNA.

A readable portion of the Berlin papyrus, col. i, 12-34, is presented by D. L. Page in his recent and masterly edition (London, 1953). I reproduce it from p. 19, but omit all lectional signs except those said (pp. 10 f.) to be visible in the papyrus.

### Κώρει-

- τες εθρε]ψαν δάθιο[ν θι]ας  
βρεφο]ς αντροι λαθρά[δα]ν ἀγ-  
15 κο]υλομειταο Κρόνω τα-  
νίκα νιν κλεψε μακηρα Ρεια  
  
μεγάλαν τ' [α]θανατων εσ-  
ς] ελε τιμαν· ταδ' ἐμελψεμ  
μακαρας δ' αντικα Μώση  
20 φ]ερεμεν ψαφον ἐ[τ]αττον  
κρ]ουνφιαν καλπιδας εν χρον-  
σοφαις· τὸ δ' ὅμα παντε[ς] ὠρθεν·  
  
πλιονας δ' ἵλε Κιθήρων  
ταχα δ' Ερμᾶς ανέφαν[εν  
25 νι]ν ἄονσᾶς εραταν ὡς  
ἴ]λε νίκαν στεφ[α]νῆσιν  
. . . . . (.) ατώ. ανεκόσμιον  
μακα]ρες· τω δε νοος γεγάθι  
  
ο δε λό]υπησι κά[θ]εκτος  
30 χαλεπ]ῆσιν φελι[κ]ων ε-  
. . . . . λιττάδα [π]ετραν  
. . . . . κεν δ' ο[ρο]ς· ὑκτρῶς  
. . . . . ων ὁνψ[ο]θεν εἴρι-  
σε νιν ε]μ μον[ρι]αδεσσι λάνς.

Errors of the scribe occur in lines 14, 22, 23 and at the junction of lines 15/16, 33/34. All but the last are self-corrected. The last is revealed by the metre.

Thus we have a *codex unicus*, admittedly not a letter-perfect copy of the *autographon*, though separated from it by only some 300 years. Our problems are: (1) to restore the damaged codex as completely as possible—it may have contained errors, diffi-

cult or impossible to divine; and (2) to reach the autographon that lies behind it. I may quote Maas, *Textkritik*, p. 10: "Erweist sich die Überlieferung als verdorben, so muss versucht werden, sie durch *divinatio* zu heilen."

This readable portion comprises four stanzas each of which tells of one step in the story. The first is incomplete, but must have given the substance of Cithaeron's<sup>1</sup> song. I should put a period at its close.

The second stanza tells the events that followed on the close of the *ἀγών*: loud applause for Cithaeron; a secret vote ordered.

The third stanza gives the result as it affects Cithaeron; his victory, its proclamation, his prize, his joy.

The fourth stanza tells the effect upon Helicon: his misery, his taking the one vote he had got, going off to his mountain, and casting it away among the thousands of stones on the mountainside.

In line 13 I should restore δαθιο[ι] not δάθιο[ν]. The question is whether to sacrifice the usual meaning of the word, or a belief in the inerrancy of the scribe. As for the latter I sympathize with the conclusion expressed by Bechtel, *G. D.*, I, p. 270: "dass man also keiner auffälligen Betonung trauen darf, die durch ein einziges Beispiel vertreten ist," even though I recognize the possibility of avoiding the example from which he started by a different restoration. In the present case the scribe may have been tempted to accent δάθιοι as he would a word ending in -οι of his native speech, ἀθεοι for instance.

I should render the opening of the second stanza: "Great was the honor he (Cithaeron) won from the Immortals. For that was what he sang of." All that is traditional in the second sentence is the graph: ΤΑΔΕΜΕΛΨΕΜ. Each modern (cf. Leumann, *Homerische Wörter*, p. 38) does, and must, analyze such graphs for himself. Whether one here starts with ΤΑ or ΤΑΔΕ he will run into a usage or a form, which (cf. Page, pp. 54-5) he will have to explain as borrowed from epic. I understand the sentence to be an explanation of Cithaeron's success—the clever-

<sup>1</sup> I follow Wilamowitz; not because of his prestige, but because of the probability that in a literary report of an *ἀγών* the last contestant will be the victor. Aristophanes counted on his audience viewing with a smile the privilege of speaking first: cf. *Clouds*, 940-1, *Wasps*, 548 f., *Frogs*, 860-1.

ness of his choice of a subject that would appeal to all the gods, the founding of their dynasty. For this reason I separate  $\Delta E$  from TA, taking it to be used in a context that "even appears to demand  $\gamma\acute{a}p$ " (Denniston, *The Greek Particles*,<sup>2</sup> p. 169). **ΔΕΜΕΛΨΕΜ** is clearly two words; but how Corinna intended their division I do not undertake to decide, for the difference between the two possibilities is by no means clear. The scribe chose  $\Delta'$  **ΕΜΕΛΨΕΜ**.

In line 25 *εροταν* seems preferable to *ερατὰν*. On p. 60 Page shows the uncertainty of what is in the papyrus, citing *ερ[...]αν* (Wilamowitz) and *εραταν* (Croenert). He feels that -po- is to be expected because of inscriptional evidence. For this compare Bechtel I, pp. 242-3, Buck, *The Greek Dialects* (1955), p. 20.

Of the first half of line 27 all but three letters are gone; Page, p. 47, abandons the situation. Wilamowitz, Croenert, and Lobel, *Hermes*, LXV (1930), p. 361, saw that a connective was needed, and restored [δε]. That is all the good I can find in the previous tries as reported by Page. We are thus confronted by: [δ...] ..*ατω.ανεκοσμιον*. At first it seemed probable that the missing word was a genitive telling of what stuff the wreaths were made. But Pindar does not use such a phrase, and Bacchylides offers only (13, 69 f. Snell): *πανθαλέων στεφάνοισιν| [ἀνθ]έ[ων]*. However, poets dealing with the great festivals may well have had no wish to tell known facts to their hearers; while Corinna, whether following a local custom or inventing freely, might judge it advisable to be more explicit. At all events phrases of that type are cited in LSJ from Attic. I suggest that Corinna wrote: *στεφαννοιν|δ' ελατων*. To show the appropriateness of this word, I quote E. R. Dodds' comment on Eur., *Bacch.*, 32-3: "Cithaeron . . . It is still thickly wooded with silver firs (the *ελάται* of 38), whence its modern name 'Ελατί.' " The reading suggested was not in the papyrus, but its scribe may have varied only by the dittography of a single letter. The spaces indicated could be filled by δ ελ]*ατων*.<sup>2</sup>

The mutilation of the fourth stanza is much greater. I suggest a complete restoration in which all supplements, except those at the beginnings of lines 31, 32, 33, are to be found in Page:

<sup>2</sup> Another possibility would be: δελ]*αατων*, a blundering correction of an Attic *ελατῶν*.

ο δε λο]υπησι κα[θ]εκτος  
χαλεπ]ησιν φελι[κ]ων ε<σ>-  
σελ' ιαν] λιττάδα [π]ετραν·  
εβεβα]κεν δ' ο[ρο]ς· υκτρως  
δε μακ]ων ουψ[ο]θεν ειρι-  
σε νιν ε]μ μουν[ρι]αδεσσι λαν·

It will be noticed that this suggestion differs fundamentally from the translation given by Page, p. 20. That leads to a broader question.

It is one of the many merits of Page's book that he points (pp. 76-8) to the close parallelism between the procedure at this *ἀγών* and that of Athenian practice, and compares both to the legal procedure of West Locris as seen in a bronze tablet from Galaxidi (now published with commentary by Buck,<sup>2</sup> *op. cit.*, pp. 248-53). He mentions various details by which the picture is realistically developed. One may have been overlooked, and it is one in which Athens and Corinna show an advance in democracy over Locris.

Athens perfected a method of guarding the secrecy of the voting. Each juror was given two ballots; one shaped to signify *x*, the other to signify *y*. He dropped the one he wished to register in a designated urn, the one he wished to discard in another urn provided for that purpose. Had he been allowed to keep his second ballot, he could have proved how he had voted. The shaping of the ballot was such that it was easy to conceal, and difficult to reveal, which went into which urn.

The provision in the Galaxidi inscription is simply *ἐν ὑδρίαιν ψάφιξιν εἰμεν* calling for one urn. That may be more secret than a show of hands, but the secrecy is not well guarded. Indeed the purpose may be merely to prevent miscounting by the presiding officer. There is nothing in the inscription to show that secrecy was desired.

Now in stanza 2 Corinna orders explicitly a secret vote *ψαφον . . . κροιφιαν* and urns (*καλπιδας*) are set for the ballots. On my understanding of stanza 4 a smooth pebble *λιττάδα πέτραν* would signify a vote for Helicon, and by implication a rough stone one for Cithaeron. Except for this primitive marking of her ballots Corinna is in perfect harmony with Athenian procedure. The exception is no difficulty. Chronology would de-

mand such a change, and it would free the poet from some stylistic difficulties. Imagine the troubles of the modern maker of a border ballad, who decided to ignore an anachronism and to have the "rescue's lingering aid" brought up in motorized trucks.

It seems to me clear that Corinna is imitating Athens, not Locris; and that is strong reason for dating her *ca.* 200 B. C., the date suggested first by Lobel, and the one to which Page (cf. his last words) seems inclined.

To speak of my supplements in detail:

The opening of stanza 3 *πλίονας δ' ἵλε Κιθηρών* is balanced by the statement at the opening of stanza 4 that Helicon got one vote. It might seem better to emend the close of the second line to *-ι-λέν*, but I think it simpler to supply the compound *ἐσσ-ελε* "took out (of the urn)." Space in the next line appears to suit *-σελ' ιαν* better than *-λέν ιαν*.<sup>3</sup>

The tense of *εβεβᾶ]κεν* causes no trouble. In the ending *-κεν* (however spelled) might be expected, but there seems, cf. Schwyzer, *Gr. Gram.*, I, p. 777, to be no need of emendation.

In line 33 *δε βο]ῶν*, *δε γο[ῶν* are rejected by Page, p. 18, as not filling the space. I feel grateful for their suggestiveness.

The first longer word to suggest itself was *μυκών*; but the graph to be expected in this papyrus *δε μονκ]ων* is too long. There may be ways of avoiding this difficulty, but it is unnecessary to consider them. The word best suited to the noise made by Helicon in his crushing defeat is *μακών*. The dictionaries (Cunliffe and LSJ) start from 'bleating' as the basic meaning. I think a better description of the usage of the word may start from 'cry of an animal in great pain.' The pain may be caused by a deadly blow as in *κὰδ δ' ἔπεος κονίγσι μακών*, II 469 (of a horse), *κ* 163 (of a stag), *σ* 98 (of Irus), *τ* 454 (of a boar). It may also be due to an emotion: to fear, as in *ώς δ' ὅτε . . . κύνε . . . ἦ κεμάδ' ἥτε λαγωὸν ἐπείγετον . . .* *ό δέ τε προθέγσι μεμηκώς*, K

<sup>3</sup> According to Bechtel, *G. D.*, I, p. 257, and Buck, *op. cit.*, pp. 83-4, the most usual equivalent of *ἐξ-* in Boeotian is *ἐσσ-*, less frequently *ἐσ-*. Corinna probably used *εσσελε*, and the scribe may have found it already varied to *εσελε*. If he took the two forms as metrically equivalent (the *ε|σελε* of Wilamowitz and Croenert implies a similar view) he may have written *ε|σελ' ιαν*. Merkelbach (by letter) points out that this may be not too long for the space available, since the iota would require little room. I agree that this was probably the text of the papyrus.

362, and *οἵ τέ σε πεφρίκασι λεόνθῳ ὡς μηκάδες αἴγες*, Λ 383; or to maternal instincts as in *ὅτες . . . ἐστήκασιν ἀμελγόμεναι . . . ἀξηχὲς μεμαχῖαι ἀκούονται ὅπα ἀρνῶν*, Δ 435, *ἡμελγεν ὅτις καὶ μηκάδας αἴγας . . . καὶ ὑπ' ἔμβρυον ἥκεν ἐκάστη*, i 244 = 341, and *θήλεαι δὲ μέμηκον ἀνήμελκτοι περὶ σηκούς* (where their young were penned) *οὐθατα γὰρ σφαραγεῦντο*, i 439. Twice *μηκάδες* seems to have become a stock epithet, though even here there is an emotional background. In Ψ 31 *πολλοὶ δ' ὅτες καὶ μηκάδες αἴγες* are waiting to be butchered; and in i 124, *βόσκει δέ τε μηκάδας αἴγας*, the nannies and kids are separated according to Cyclopean habits.

I am not troubled by *λάντ* f. in line 34. The synonym *λίθος* is at times feminine under the influence of *πέτρα*, no doubt; and the same may have happened to *λᾶος* in Boeotian, or in Corinna's idiolect.

Line 27 ends with *ἀνεκόσμιον* which at first blush looks like a compound. The meaning 'adorn anew' does not suit the context, and attestation of *ἀνακοσμέω* is (cf. LSJ) extremely slight. I seemed to remember that Page had drawn attention to this, but can find only his citation (p. 63) of *εκοσμίον* as a probable example of synizesis. I notice also the lack of an object for the verb. I suggest therefore that *av* is a slight scribal error, and would read the sentence:

*στεφαννοῖν  
δ' ελαταων νν εκόσμιον  
μακαρες.*

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## NOTES ON PRIMITIVISM IN VERGIL.

I have just read with great interest Professor Margaret E. Taylor's admirable article on "Primitivism in Virgil" (*A. J. P.*, LXXVI, pp. 261-78), and should like to make three little observations suggested by it.

(1) Miss Taylor points out justly that Vergil has little to say with regard to the theme of "eternal Rome" (p. 267). Indeed, I believe there is even a suggestion that this concept must not be taken for granted in the admonitory tone of the imperative in the famous line *tu regere imperio populos, Romane, memento* (*Aen.*, VI, 851); if Rome is to have *imperium sine fine*, the Romans must do their part in bringing this about. However, I think there is perhaps a hint of *aeterna Roma* in the poet's tribute to Nisus and Euryalus (*IX*, 447-9):

nulla dies umquam memori vos eximet aevo,  
dum domus Aeneae Capitoli immobile saxum  
accolet imperiumque pater Romanus habebit.

Here Vergil, like Horace in *Carm.*, III, 30, 8-9, made a promise which has been far more than fulfilled; the fame of the glorious pair, like that of Horace himself, has long outlasted the imperial grandeurs of the Capitoline. But to the two Augustan poets, I feel sure their *dum* clauses signified "forever," just like the *dum* clauses in *Ecl.*, 5, 76-8 or in *Aen.*, I, 607-9.

(2) While the words *Saturnia regna* in *Ecl.*, 4, 6 (like *aureus . . . Saturnus* in *Georg.*, II, 538 and *aurea . . . saecula* in *Aen.*, VI, 792-3) certainly refer to a glorious golden age, I question whether the same is true of the phrase in its occurrence in *Ecl.*, 6, 41. Miss Taylor says (pp. 261-2): "the phrase *Saturnia regna* (41) suggests a golden age, presumably preceding the arts conferred by Prometheus as indicated by the next line." But the next line, *Caucasiasque refert volucris furtumque Promethei*, stresses not "the arts conferred by Prometheus" but the horrible punishment inflicted upon him by the king of the gods as a penalty for conferring these arts. In this *Eclogue* I think Vergil is wholly Epicurean, though I believe that in the *Aeneid* he is fundamentally and almost consistently Stoic (Dido and Anna

are the Epicureans there, and perhaps it is significant that the Epicurean theme is sounded in poetry there by a singer at Dido's court). Following up the illuminating suggestion made by Tenney Frank, *Vergil* (New York, 1922), pp. 96-9, that Silenus is Siro and *Ecl. 6* represents an Epicurean lecture, I have proposed elsewhere (*T. A. P. A.*, LXXV, p. 219) "that the particular myths were introduced for the sake of the ridiculous, repulsive, or cruel element that is prominent in each—as Lucretius chose the tragic Iphigenia story to prove his point: *tantum religio potuit suadere malorum.*" Thus *lapides Pyrrhae iactos* just before *Saturnia regna* (and significantly following the accepted Epicurean account of the first appearances of life on earth) may have led to the query on the master's part: how could stones turn into people? And our phrase *Saturnia regna* itself may have led to a discussion on the impropriety of a view of divinity imputing such unfilial and cruel behavior on the part of the great king of the gods that his poor old father had to seek a new (and inferior) kingdom on earth. This does not seem far-fetched in view of the climactic horrors of the following myths: Prometheus punished by this same king of the gods for aiding man; lustful nymphs stealing a beautiful boy from his comrades; Pasiphae, even madder than the daughters of Proetus (who had been driven into a frenzy by some divinity), torn through a god's agency by appalling desire for her bull-mate. The poem seems to grow a little gentler and milder in its references to Atalanta and the sisters of Phaethon; but perhaps the lecturer means to dwell in connection with their stories not only on the impossible metamorphoses involved but on the terrible punishment meted out to Atalanta and her lover by one goddess for an act incited by another, and on the fact that the sisters of Phaethon are lamenting a brother's death caused indirectly by the want of foresight on the part of his divine father, and directly by the thunder-bolt hurled by his divine grandfather. Then, after a somewhat puzzling reference to Gallus (creating problems which I discussed on pp. 236-8), the poem goes back to fresh horrors in two more tales of transformations, the story of Scylla who betrayed her father, and the still more terrible one of Philomela and Tereus and the ghastly meal that she prepared and he consumed. All these abominations as depicted by the lecturer are transformed and concealed

by the poet; as I said before (p. 219), "Vergil's natural grace and tenderness lead him to beautify the ugly, soften the harsh, and refine the savage, so that we get a sympathetic and poetic picture rather than the unpleasant impression which a hostile Epicurean critic might have desired to convey." But still I do not think we can cite *Saturnia regna* in this catalogue as standing for an idyllic golden age.

(3) I feel highly gratified by Miss Taylor's friendly reference (p. 273, n. 21) to my article "*Pietas vs. Violentia* in the *Aeneid*" (*C. W.*, XXV, pp. 9-13 and 17-21), but I think this, as she herself realizes, is hardly relevant. My thesis there was not "that the *violentia* of Turnus and his followers is barbarism or even savagery which must give way to the civilized *pietas* of Aeneas" (pp. 272-3), for I was dealing with *violentia* from the standpoint of morality rather than of anthropology. To be sure, I did think as Miss Taylor does that some of the Italians opposed to Aeneas are savage in the sense of being uncivilized; see especially p. 19, which she quotes, and also the reference to the contempt felt by a savage race for the refinements of a higher civilization (p. 21), also touched upon by Miss Taylor (p. 272). But in general I was treating Turnus' *violentia* as on a par with Dido's *furor*; it represents the quality of opposition to the divine will and the true morality; it is *nefas* vs. *fas*, it is the Latin equivalent of the Greek *hybris*; and it is displayed by all types of the opponents of Aeneas, by Greeks and Carthaginians as well as Italians, and by divine beings (notably Juno) as well as humans. So far as Turnus' *violentia* goes, Miss Taylor herself shares this view, for she points out that *violentia* "is not presented as the product of a primitive way of life" (p. 273) but is "more akin to the excess of the Greek tragic hero" (p. 274). Hence we are in fundamental agreement—except that I was not touching on primitivism as such at all. This has become Miss Taylor's own domain; she has already given us a fine study of primitivism—or the lack of it—in Lucretius (*A. J. P.*, LXVIII, pp. 180-94), and I hope she will go on to one of primitivism in Horace and then perhaps in Tacitus.

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## HORACE, C., I, 33.

Markland, the most sagacious of eighteenth century critics and the most learned after Bentley, admitted that with a lifetime of effort he could not understand a single ode of Horace. For this he was naturally and severely rebuked by less candid contemporaries (see Nichols, *Literary Anecdotes*, IV, pp. 289 f.). It was only the advent of Peerlkamp's first edition that enabled Gottfried Hermann to observe that Horace's readers were beginning to be roused from their comfortable slumbers.

Certainly there is much to admire in *C.*, I, 33, even on the surface. But without venturing to suppose that we can understand what Markland could not, we may try to dig a little deeper than is usually done. The poet seems to be developing his familiar formula of parataxis: as A is to B, so is B to C. This is specifically stated in the second strophe: Lycoris—Cyrus : Cyrus—Pholoe. It is, no doubt, to be inferred in the first and fourth: 1) Albius—Glycera : Glycera—X; melior Venus<sup>1</sup>—Horace : Horace—Myrtale.<sup>2</sup> It is not certain that all three groups are to be taken in the same way, but it is a rather likely inference from the structure and from the third stanza. As often, what is not stated is the important thing.

Horace's humor is not always appreciated. In line 4 he seems to be making a splendid pun: *laesa fide*. (So also, perhaps, at II, 18, 9.) On the surface this means "she has broken her word and left you," or "she insults your lyre and refuses to be won by your poetry"; but combined with the preceding lines *miserabiles decantes elegos*, it may mean "your lute is off key," "your poetry is defective," "you have no further power to win her with your verse, this sweet-sour grape of yours" (on the play involved in *immitis Glycerae* see Verrall, *Stud. Hor.*, p. 156, n. 2 and many others, following Jahn's *πικρὸν Γλυκέριον*). *Miserabiles* may also have a double meaning: "dreadful" or "calculated to inspire pity" (and was so interpreted in an-

<sup>1</sup> It is not absolutely impossible that *melior Venus* = *Glycera*, thus squaring the circle: see I, 19; 30 and III, 19.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Willi, *Horaz und die Augusteische Kultur*, pp. 178 ff. on the "Liebeskette" motif.

tiquity: see pseudo-Acro). Since the equations and the pun, if it is that, bring nearly every verse of the little poem to a double sense, we cannot doubt that Horace was writing in his most playful mood and with the same verbal adroitness which produced the wonderful *quale portentum* of I, 22, 13, turning  $\tau\ddot{o}\lambda\alpha\lambda\gamma\epsilon\nu$  into Lalage<sup>3</sup> and the poet's refrain into a pleasant way of routing wild beasts: as it were a prudent and poetic form of life-insurance. "I have only to raise my inspired voice (since my character is beyond reproach) to achieve a universal safe-conduct. And (bless me) wherever I may be I shall keep on yodelling" (which is the same as loving).<sup>4</sup> This is, one may imagine, funny and admirable fooling, in spite of Hendrickson, *C.J.*, V, pp. 250 ff.; and I, 33 seems to be of the same humor. A vigorous pun ties us down to the quality of Tibullus' productions (*miserabiles*). But it is fun without rancor; and, of the same stamp, Albius' attachment to Glycera should be like Horace's to Myrtale. It may be significant that Miss Sour-Sweet did not survive into Tibullus' published work. Perhaps Horace's rebuke had been a trifle too vigorous: "My poor man, you're loosing even your style. With *that* one."

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<sup>3</sup> Curiously enough it is Lalage who is the *immitis uva* in II, 5, 10.

<sup>4</sup> That is, my love is vocal: it expresses itself in verse which, being poetry of the highest quality, has a magical influence on Nature and Nature's denizens.

## REVIEWS.

J. A. O. LARSEN. Representative Government in Greek and Roman History. Berkeley and Los Angeles, University of California Press, 1955. Pp. viii + 249. (*Sather Classical Lectures*, 28.)

This is a book which badly needed to be written, and few, if any, scholars were more qualified to write it than Professor Larsen. For over thirty years one of his chief interests has been the governmental problems faced by the Greeks and Romans. In writing these lectures, therefore, he was able to rely heavily on his previous researches. The result is a judicious and learned book which will be of service to ancient historians for many years to come.

The scope of the book is illustrated by the titles of the eight lectures: I, The Problem; II, Early Greek Tribal and Federal States; III, Representation in Greek Permanent Alliances; IV, The Adoption of Direct Government in Federal States; V, The Introduction of Representative Government in Hellenistic Federal States; VI, Federal States and Commonalities in the Hellenistic Provinces of the Roman Empire; VII, Provincial Assemblies in the Western Provinces of the Roman Empire; VIII, The Transformed Assemblies of the Late Roman Empire—Conclusion. In addition there is a useful appendix in which are listed, with appropriate discussion, the various meetings of the Achaean Confederacy from 229 B.C., the first year for which information is preserved, until the sack of Corinth in 146 B.C.

Larsen (p. 1) defines representative government "as government in which the ultimate decisions on important questions are made by representatives acting for their constituents and having authority to make such decisions according to their own best judgment." The antithesis of this type of government is direct government which the Greek and Roman city-state secured by means of primary assemblies. Within the direct government system, however, there could be strong elements of representation. After a full discussion (pp. 5-13) of the system of representation in the Athenian *boule* of five hundred, Larsen asks why Athens, although possessing such excellent representative machinery, rejected representative government by insisting that final authority must rest with the primary assembly. The answer, according to Larsen, lies not only in the smallness of the Greek city-states, but specifically in the belief which developed "that the collective judgment of the masses was superior to that of experts" (p. 14). This democratic theory did not take definite shape until relatively late—Larsen argues for the year 501/0 B.C. His chief evidence is a fragmentary inscription (*I.G.*, I<sup>2</sup>, 114) containing a decree or law which transferred many powers from the council of five hundred to the *δῆμος πληθύων*, a term for which he prefers the translation "entire *demos*" ("in opposition to the small part of it present in the *boule*") to the more usual "full assembly." This bill, although probably passed in 410 after the restoration of the democracy, is clearly a partial or total republication of a much

earlier document. If Larsen is correct that δῆμος πληθύων is not a reference to the necessity of having a quorum of 6,000, but signifies that previously the council in important matters such as imposing the death penalty and declaring war did not have to consult the people, the conclusion seems inescapable that at one time—presumably shortly after the reforms of Cleisthenes—the representative *boule* had been so powerful "that it can almost be said that Athens for a few years possessed a representative government" (p. 18). This would have been a natural stage in the development from aristocracy to democracy—there is evidence for similar representative government in Chios *ca.* 600 B. C. (Tod, no. 1). Too little is known about Solon's council of four hundred to say whether it also provided an example of representative government.

Lectures II, IV, and V deal with Greek federal states—*sym-politeiai*, to use Polybius' term. The earliest such state for which there are reasonably adequate data, thanks chiefly to *Hellenica Oxyrhynchia*, XI, is the Boeotian Confederacy, established probably in 447 and dissolved after the King's Peace of 386. In a masterly discussion (pp. 31-40) Larsen emphasizes the representative nature of the government—no primary assembly, control in the hands of eleven Boeotarchs and 660 councillors supplied by eleven "representational districts or units." A property qualification gave an oligarchic character to the confederacy. It is interesting to note that oligarchic theory was developing representative government in Boeotia at exactly the same time that democratic theory was strengthening the primary assembly at Athens. Larsen also believes that the Chalcidic Confederacy had a representative government of an oligarchic type, although the evidence is not as satisfactory as it is for Boeotia. He thinks the confederacy was organized around 432 B. C. and he shows clearly that a confederacy was formed and not, as has often been maintained, a unitary state through the synoecism of various neighboring communities with Olynthus (pp. 42-3).

The examples of the Boeotian and Chalcidic confederacies, not to mention other federal states discussed briefly by Larsen, show that representative government was well known in fifth century Greece. In the two following centuries, however, representative government, but not representative machinery within a government, apparently disappeared. This trend started with the King's Peace of 386 by the terms of which federal states in Greece were to be dissolved. Sparta, the agent of the peace, was conscientious in enforcing its terms only in the case of those federal states which were hostile to her—especially the Boeotian and Chalcidic confederacies. The setback to federalism, as is well known, was only temporary, but the setback to representative government was much more drastic. Larsen explains this phenomenon very lucidly (pp. 66-8) by showing that the dissolution of existing federal states made it possible for new federal governments to be organized on different lines. Thus the prevalent democratic theory "with its emphasis on the primary assembly and the collective judgment of the masses" was able to come into play. Also in federal states where one city was considerably stronger than the others—e. g., Thebes—, politicians found that a primary assembly was an excellent means for assuring control of the confederacy to the capital city. All the chief confederacies of the period—the Aetolian, Arcadian, and Achaean (down to about

217 B. C.)—had primary assemblies, for which the most important decisions were reserved, but the idea of representation was retained in the councils which were organized on the principle of representation in proportion to population. The Boeotian Confederacy, however, when it was reorganized after the liberation of Thebes in 379, apparently dispensed entirely with the earlier representative Council. We hear only of a primary assembly and the seven Boeotarchs of whom Thebes probably furnished four. Since the meetings of the primary assembly were held in Thebes and since the probouleutic power lay with the Boeotarchs, it is no wonder that the sources, when referring to the Confederacy, often speak of Thebans rather than Boeotians.

The discussion of the Achaean Confederacy is superb. Although owing much to André Aymard's learned book, *Les Assemblées de la Confédération Achéenne* (Bordeaux and Paris, 1938), Larsen wisely rejects two of the French scholar's conclusions, namely, that a *synodos* was always a primary assembly and that in Polybius the term *boule* could be applied to such an assembly. This last assumption, highly improbable in itself, he disproves by referring to the language of Polybius, II, 37, 10, where the word *bouleutai* clearly "denotes a body of men which is not identical with the citizen body but which serves it or acts for it" (p. 77). The hoary problem as to whether *synodos* signifies a primary assembly or a representative body, Larsen, I believe, definitively settles by the simple observation that the term can mean a meeting rather than a council or assembly. "Hence a *synodos* can be a meeting either of a *boule* or of an *ekklesia* or of both" (p. 78). This solution is amply corroborated by his discussion in the text and by the evidence presented in the appendix, *The Meetings of the Assemblies of the Achaean Confederacy*. The picture presented of the organization and development of the Achaean Confederacy is briefly as follows. After its refounding in 280 B. C. the confederacy, following the democratic theory of the city-state, had both a *boule* with representation in proportion to population and a primary assembly in which votes were counted by heads. By the end of the third century—Larsen argues for the year 217—the meetings of the primary assembly had proved themselves unsatisfactory for the more complex business of the expanding confederacy. Consequently, legislation was passed which placed practically all the powers of government in the hands of the magistrates and the *boule*. The primary assembly was to be convoked only for extraordinary meetings—*synkletoi*—to pass on matters of war and alliance and, by a later amendment, whenever someone brought a letter from the Roman senate. "Hence it can be said that the Achaean League essentially adopted a representative government with a proviso for referendum on a few vital questions" (p. 86).

The Achaean Confederacy apparently was the first Hellenistic federal state in Greece proper to adopt representative government. In Asia Minor, however, the Lycian Confederacy was also of the representative type. It had both a representative *boule* and a representative *ekklesia*. The fact that the larger body was called *ekklesia* suggests that it had originally been a primary body and that thus there was a change in Lycia from direct to representative govern-

ment. Larsen believes that the Achaean reform antedated the Lycian transformation. These two confederacies adopted representative government while they were still completely independent. After the interference of Rome in Greek affairs, representative government was adopted in Thessaly in 194 and in the four Macedonian republics in 167. Each of these federal states had a representative *synedrion* as the chief organ of government. The Greek term for representative government, to judge from Polybius, XXXI, 2, 12, seemingly was *synedriake politeia*, government by a *synedrion*. Although Polybius clearly admired this type of government, best exemplified in his view by the Achaean Confederacy, he nowhere presents a theory of representative government. Larsen (p. 104) suggests as a reason for this silence the fact that Greek political theory was so completely dominated by the idea of the city-state that even praise of a federal state was couched in terms of its similarity to a *polis* (cf. Polyb., II, 37, 7-11).

In the Hellenistic provinces of the Roman Empire, federal states and commonalities—associations of cities or other political organisms too loose to rank as federal states—continued to exist or were newly created. Larsen thinks it is a mistake to accept too literally Pausanias' statement, VII, 16, 9-10, that in 146 Rome dissolved all federal states in Greece only to reconstitute them shortly afterwards. The Achaean confederacy, which had antagonized the Romans, was temporarily broken up, but many federal states apparently continued to function with only minor interference from Rome. Under the Empire they served as important instruments for local government. In the course of time whatever primary assemblies may have survived in late Hellenistic confederacies disappeared, with the result that all these organizations were based on representative councils or assemblies. Larsen (p. 121) believes that in the composition of these bodies some system of representation in proportion to population was usual. Their two chief duties apparently were to maintain the imperial cult and, when appropriate, to initiate prosecution of governors. In the western provinces the assemblies (*concilia*) "were representative assemblies in the sense that primary assemblies did not exist" (p. 126). In this lecture, in which the discussion centers largely around the assemblies of the Three Gauls and of Narbonensis, Larsen deals with a mass of problems which cannot even be mentioned here. These assemblies did little governing, but they made a real contribution to the development of that part of the empire which they represented. The delegates were probably chosen by the various municipal councils according to the principle of representation in proportion to population. Each assembly elected a high priest who after his year of office became a permanent member of the body. Thus, as Larsen says (p. 139), "a western provincial assembly, with a group of former high priests superimposed upon the elected delegates, became a hybrid organization, partly a Hellenistic representative assembly and partly a council of dignitaries of the Roman type."

In the last lecture Larsen emphasizes the great difference between the assemblies of the Late Roman Empire and those of earlier times. In the late period, except for a few diocesan assemblies, the assemblies represented the great number of smaller provinces into which the old provinces had been subdivided. Thus it is almost impossible

to consider any single one of the late assemblies, for which the first evidence is the year 315 A. D., as a continuation of a particular earlier assembly. The late assemblies consisted entirely of dignitaries—the *honorati*, former imperial office holders living in the provinces, and the municipal *curiales*. Since both these classes were landholders, it is clear that in the assemblies there was no representation of urban and commercial interests. These assemblies sometimes served as organs for the publication of imperial edicts and also were encouraged, like the earlier ones, to bring charges against governors. The emperors evidently tried to use them to improve administration, but, since the members were of the same class as the governors and since they were primarily interested in bettering their own position, the emperors may often, while encouraging the assemblies, "have helped to strengthen an element which was fully as disruptive as corrupt administration" (p. 157).

Many subjects discussed by Professor Larsen have not even been mentioned in this review, in particular his excellent treatment of the Hellenic League of Philip II, Alexander, and Demetrius Poliorcetes in Lecture III; but enough has been said, I hope, to reveal the wide scope of the work. Needless to say, all Larsen's views, whether one finally agrees with them or not, deserve respectful attention. His erudition is profound and his ability to compress so much matter in such comparatively small compass is amazing and at times somewhat bewildering. Because of this compression the book is a difficult one to read, but this does not prevent it from being a worthy addition to the distinguished series of the Sather Classical Lectures.

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KURT VON FRITZ. *The Theory of the Mixed Constitution in Antiquity. A Critical Analysis of Polybius' Political Ideas*. New York, Columbia University Press, 1954. Pp. xii + 490. \$7.50.

Professor von Fritz presents a study important not merely for students of Polybius but for historians and for political theorists. His aim is to consider Polybius' theory of the Roman constitution in the light of the actual growth and nature of that constitution, so far as this can be recovered, and to test the validity of Polybius' theory against the touchstones of the failure of the Roman republican constitution and of a criticism, derived from Hobbes, that Polybius provided no adequate theory of sovereignty. Thus the bulk of the book concerns itself with Polybius' background, the composition of his *History*, his interpretation of the Roman constitution, the actual growth and nature of that constitution, and the causes of its failure. Before describing in detail this discussion, note may be made of various supplementary matters.

Von Fritz adds three appendices. The first is a useful translation of those passages in Polybius concerned with his political theory. The second analyzes his concept of *Tyche* or Fortune. Polybius was not consistent in the degree of historical influence which he

attributed to arbitrary occurrence either because he held different views at different times in his life or because, not being a philosopher, he was not always consciously theorizing. Many apparent discrepancies may, however, be explained by regarding as the work of Fortune the occurrence in conjunction of elements or causes which, so conjoined, then provide a rational explanation of later developments. In a third appendix, von Fritz considers Polybius' criticism of the view held by Ephorus that Cretan political institutions were older than, and the model for, the Spartan. Seventy pages of notes contain many significant elaborations of matters of detail. There are finally a brief bibliography of works frequently cited and a considerable index.

Von Fritz opens his main discussion by considering Polybius' life and background. Although Polybius did not include the Achaean League in his critique of the constitutions of various Greek states, probably because it was not a true "city-state," he was obviously profoundly influenced by his practical political experience in connection with the League. This prevented him from being blindly pro-Roman, however much he respected their character and their constitution. In addition, Polybius was a politician, not a philosopher, and was therefore more concerned with the facts than with the theory of government.

Von Fritz is conservative in his treatment of the actual composition of the *History*. Polybius probably originally stopped with Pydna (168 B. C.) and later carried the account down to 146 B. C. He undoubtedly made changes in the earlier portions but these seem to have been in matters of detail rather than in any fundamental revision, or series of revisions such as Laqueur proposed to find. Many inconsistencies should be regarded not as signs of revision but as the result of Polybius' practical, untheoretic approach. His basic historiographic aim was to describe the facts accurately and to seek for their causal connection. He was a realistic historian, not a philosopher interpreting history after the manner of Plato or Aristotle. When he used philosophic language, especially that of Stoicism, he did so not as a professional but in the current, non-technical sense. He thought in political, not in moral terms.

Polybius' two main political theories, that of the cyclical succession of constitutions and that of the stability and excellence of the mixed constitution, derived from a line of thought reaching back to Plato and Aristotle. Von Fritz believes that Polybius confused the absolute stability of an ideal mixed constitution with the relative stability which in the Roman constitution resulted from growth. This confusion explains why Polybius admitted that in the Roman constitution, as in any living organism, growth would ultimately be followed by decay. Moreover, in his later years, Polybius saw that the corruption of the Roman oligarchy by wealth and power had undermined the moral basis for the stability of Roman institutions.

In his four opening chapters, therefore, von Fritz gives a reasonable and conservative interpretation of Polybius the man and of his thought. The fifth chapter treats Polybius' analysis of Greek constitutions. Von Fritz feels that a more thorough study of the Spartan constitution would have shown Polybius more clearly the sources of weakness in the Roman, and also that Polybius failed

to realize that in the Carthaginian constitution, real shifts of power were not adequately represented in overt constitutional changes.

These two themes are pursued more thoroughly in the four chapters on Polybius' account of the Roman constitution. Von Fritz gives in great detail his own account of the development of the Roman constitution. He concludes that Polybius' interpretation of the constitution as truly "mixed" prevented him from understanding how much real power rested with the senate and how much political influence was exercised by such social and economic factors as the admission of the plebeians into the senate and the widening gulf between rich and poor. Von Fritz regards the Roman constitution as fundamentally aristocratic, or perhaps rather oligarchic since the "noble" families tried to monopolize both political power and wealth. Only ostensibly did the magistrates represent a "monarchical" element since they were in fact members of the senatorial aristocracy. Equally, the assemblies passed increasingly under senatorial control as the poor became dependent on the rich and as the actual voters came to represent an ever smaller proportion of the total citizen body.

The tenth and eleventh chapters seek the causes of the downfall of the republic in the Gracchan movement and contrast the lack of specific sovereignty in Polybius' theory with the doctrine of monarchical sovereignty propounded by Hobbes. According to von Fritz, the too great emphasis which the Gracchi placed on the tribunician veto ultimately immobilized the constitution and prevented it from adjusting itself, as it had in the past, to new circumstances. In consequence, its system of balances broke down. It was not the lack of a well-defined sovereign which weakened the constitution, since Polybius was justified, against Hobbes, in assuming that stability is possible without specific sovereignty, especially when law is recognized as superior both to organs of government and to powerful individuals.

Von Fritz's conclusions are ambivalent. On the one hand he regards the Polybian mixed constitution, kept in balance by the checks exercised by the various elements on one another, as feasible. The failure of the Roman republic should not be held to prove the contrary. On the other hand, he hesitates to draw any general conclusions from his analysis of a particular form of government and of its failure, since political history cannot predict that what is found to have been true in one set of circumstances will prove to be so under others. Earlier in his discussion (p. 243), von Fritz accuses the present reviewer of blaming Polybius because he had not saved the republic by inventing a system of representative government. I had not meant to blame Polybius but only to show how the limitations of classical political thought made him blind to what appeared to me to have been the major problem faced by the later Roman republic, that of governing an empire under a "city-state" form of constitution in which participation in self-government required direct personal exercise of such rights of citizenship as voting. Von Fritz seems content to explain the downfall of the republic by such generally accepted weaknesses as the corruption of the ruling class by wealth and power and to find its immediate cause in the inflexible use of the tribunician veto by the Gracchi. For him, apparently, the republic would have endured had the

Polybian constitution not been first corrupted and then thrown out of balance. He never really copes with the more fundamental question to which I have just alluded. Can a city-state rule an empire? The experience of Athens and Rome, not to mention on a different scale the experiences of such modern "imperial" powers as England, France, and the Netherlands, would appear to deny that rule of large areas by a privileged section can long endure. If not, can means be found for the exercise of self-government by people spread over a wide area or is the only feasible government for such an imperial state some form of administration from the top? The history of the ancient world suggests the latter; the modern world is groping towards the former, with what success only the future can tell.

If the political historian is to confine himself to the narrow analytical function described by von Fritz on p. 351, he will have no contribution to make towards answering so broad a question. He will be balked by those possibly different conditions, those historical "ifs." But perhaps the political historian can try to find the general in the particular and to show how certain basic attitudes of mind or patterns of behavior lay behind the particular causes for the success or failure of any given constitution. If these basic attitudes or patterns can be recognized despite their different expressions in various societies, then perhaps steps can be taken to circumvent them. I suggested as a possible illustration that the part played in the ancient world by blind devotion to the city-state may be played today by blind devotion to nationalism and that though the expression has changed, the same attitude of blind devotion to a given credo may prevent modern society from solving its problem of creating a peaceful coexistence among nations except by the dominance of one over the rest, just as it prevented the classical world of separate city-states from peaceful coexistence except under monarchical rule.

Despite such general doubts about von Fritz's conclusion, and despite the many points of detail which scholars may want to debate, this study casts much light both on Polybius and more generally on the Roman constitution and on classical political thought. The reader with some knowledge of classical history and politics will be fully rewarded by pondering its arguments. For students it is likely to seem either too long or too short; too long because it extends its reach beyond Polybius into areas in which the non-specialist will have to provide himself with background from other books and thus find this book repetitive of much that he reads elsewhere. It is too short for the student who wants a complete presentation of the history and theory of the Roman constitution because it does not give fully either the general historical setting or the thought of such other figures as Cicero. Thus it will appeal not so much to the student who seeks to read on the run, as to the teacher and scholar whose insight into constitutional history and theory it will greatly enrich.

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JOHN HOWARD YOUNG and SUZANNE HALSTEAD YOUNG. *Terracotta Figurines from Kourion in Cyprus*. Philadelphia, 1955. Pp. x + 260 + 74 pls. \$5.50. (*University Museum Monographs*.)

This modest-looking monograph is the first systematic study of run-of-the-mill Cypriote figurines from an excavation. These are not the elegant aristocrats that greeted the Swedish scholars at Ayia Irini, but "little people," uncouth villagers, such as those who packed the sanctuaries of Cyprus at every festival. The stoutest hearts shrink before solid phalanxes of these horsemen, lowering at us from their tiny ponies. But John and Suzanne Young did not call in the military to cope with these barbaric hordes. Patiently, affectionately, they have corralled their charges within the soothing confines of a museum and subjected them to docketing for a museum catalogue. Now they present them to us, a strange company, to tell us of primitive beliefs and rituals, and to give us a glimpse into the way of life of a most ancient community.

This catalogue deals with some three thousand pieces, selected from 10,000 fragments which were discovered by the University Museum of Philadelphia between 1934 and 1948. They range in date from the sixth century B. C. to the first century A. D. These overwhelming numbers of specimens offer the archaeologist the unique opportunity to study such material statistically. He can dare to make generalizations without the nagging doubts that haunt the less fortunate excavator of a few bits and pieces.

The authors of this study, on the other hand, might well have been choked by the sheer volume of material. Luckily for the reader, the authors have kept their sense of proportion and have somehow effected an admirably simple condensation. Not only in the catalogue, but also in the introductory remarks, they have treated the excavations, the neighboring sites, and all the essential masses of detail in a close-packed but clear style that might well serve as a model to other editors of comparable material. The figures are well-ordered on the plates and access from plates to text is easy. Sufficient, but not overloaded details are recorded in the catalogue. The types are logically arranged: first, the general and miscellaneous categories; secondly, the largest class, the Horsemen, divided into hand-made groups and those that are dependent in varying degrees upon the use of molds.

The results of the study are pulled together into most interesting conclusions at the end. Here the reader finds details regarding clays and techniques, not only at Kourion, but all over Cyprus. It is strange that the analysis made by a chemist (p. 189) of the white slip that usually covers figurines for the application of color is reported as "essentially of calcium carbonate," whereas R. A. Higgins, *Catalogue of Terracottas in the British Museum*, p. viii, gives an exactly opposite analysis. This matter should be studied to see if the material varies with locality. Sections on manufacturing methods, on costume and equipment, on cults and dedications will be most valuable to the specialist and even to the historian. The summary on stylistic development gives us for the first time a reliable account of the ordinary coroplast's art in one Cypriote site. Thoroughly masters of their material, the authors rise well above the under-

brush of their intricate subject to show how the types gradually degenerate from careful rendition to the "extremes of abbreviation." They demonstrate how the Kouriates, though they show little disposition to change for centuries on end, yield to the influences set in action by the campaigns of Alexander and their after-effects. The authors also most ingeniously detect the imported types that were used by the coroplasts, no matter how unsuitable,—heads of women or of Eros or of a satyr,—to grace the awkward bodies of their horsemen. Finally, with a fine sense of values, the Youngs have the perspicacity to appreciate the significance of their material, not only to the historian of Cyprus, but on a larger front, to the historian of art. On page 233, they point out that the ancient Near Eastern tradition that underlay the creation of these provincial figurines is fundamentally that which underlay the creation of Early Christian art. But here, for the first time, by the excavations of Kourion, it is possible to trace the roots of that tradition back to the sixth century B. C. This observation should be of considerable value to those who interest themselves in the composition of Christian iconography.

For the archaeologist, the material also holds more than casual interest. Here he finds the application of a new method of inquiry that has just begun to be exploited, namely, the analysis of types by a study of mold-sequence. The bodies of these figurines were modelled free-hand, but the heads were taken from molds. Since few molds were at hand and creative imagination even rarer, the coroplasts often made new molds from old figures. Because baking the clay shrank the mold and, again, the figure made from it, the next generation of figurines was smaller than the first. Though the study of mold-sequence, like that of die-sequence, has already been made, the number of available examples from many molds is so much greater at Kourion than has hitherto been discovered elsewhere that the method can now be used to determine chronology. The mind can easily follow the logic of this method, but it probably cannot conceive of the amount of labor and the fund of patience required for its competent undertaking. The results are startling. Chariots of a type that would date in the seventh century B. C. in Athens were still made in Kourion in the second century B. C. Horses of the "Geometric" style are little different from those of the latest Hellenistic period on the island. In coroplastics, the local situation is of paramount importance and should never be forgotten. But, as the authors point out (p. 195), only "long and intimate knowledge of the figurines themselves" can prepare one for the proper interpretation of the material from any one site. The reader must therefore be cautioned against applying the results offered in this volume to any other site, even on Cyprus itself.

Bowing, therefore, to the superior knowledge of the authors, we find it difficult to comment in detail on their chronology. But we might express a feeling that though the dating by mold-sequence may well be correct for the cruder types, it is not sufficient for the few more sophisticated specimens. The book would have been enriched by more comparative material. For example, Mold 12 A, though ultimately derived from fourth century prototypes, certainly shows the most characteristic features of an Egyptianizing work of the early third century. The upper eyelid, extending far beyond

the eye, the markedly triangular nose, the dimple in the chin—all these appear on Greek works from Alexandria. (Cf. *J.E.A.*, 1925, p. 184; *A.J.A.*, LIV [1950], p. 384; Breccia, *Monuments de l'Egypte gréco-romaine*, II, 2 [1934], pl. LXIII, 323.) It seems unlikely that a face so characteristic of Alexandria in the third century should have existed in the fourth century in Cyprus. We might venture to predict that the dating of the Hellenistic figurines in this book would, by more comparative study, be found to be rather too early.

The piece that will be most interesting to the general reader is one of a horseman (Pl. 49) mounted on a prancing steed and in a style that certainly does not look local. The authors suggest the bold interpretation that he is Alexander himself. The careful style makes it possible for us to compare the features with others of the late fourth century B.C. The long face with pointed nose, long jaw, and jutting chin find parallels on sculpture (cf. *Brit. Mus. Cat. Sculpt.*, I, 2, C 179) and on coins (cf. Head, *Guide to the Principal Coins of the Greeks*, pl. 28, Nos. 19, 20, 30; pl. 30, No. 20) and indeed for the equestrian type itself (*ibid.*, pl. 28, 28) at just the very period. Though the authors feel the danger of referring to copies of portraits of Alexander, they could have used contemporary types of no particular personality to underscore and support their identification. Conversely, nothing from the first century B.C. confirms the authors' suggestion that the figurine is a product of the copying phase of Alexander portraits. Likewise the technique cannot be paralleled at that period. We see how a wider range of knowledge might have strengthened the intuition upon which the Youngs so often rightly depend.

The historian could also go more into detail regarding the fascinating subject of trade and interrelations between the cosmopolitan centers and the provincial villages. The archaeologist notes several instances of Alexandrian influence. On one Alexandrian identification, however, one cannot feel too happy. No. 1013, pl. 17, is called "Arsinoe II." The comparison with the coin of Ptolemy which is cited scarcely seems so convincing as that with certain Trajanic terracotta heads. On Sieveking, *Sammlung Loeb: Terrakotten*, II, pl. 108, 1; on Breccia, *Monuments*, II, 2, pl. LX, 302; on Vagn Poulsen, *Cat. des terres cuites grecques et romaines* (Glyptothèque Ny Carlsberg), pl. XLIII, No. 74, we see the same long narrow face, the same tilt to the head, the same coiffure of curls pulled up to a loop of hair over the forehead. This all seems so typically Trajanic that it is difficult for me to see any connection with Arsinoe. It is not impossible that this bust was inspired by certain Alexandrian types, such as are shown in Breccia, *Monuments*, II, 1, pl. XXIV, Nos. 2 and 9.

The authors of this book, then, win thanks and praise. The publishers, however, cannot be offered any commendation, save that they have kept the price within the purse of scholars. The excessive cost of such beautiful books as Higgins' *Catalogue of Terracottas in the British Museum* has driven publishers to try cheap techniques. But there are more acceptable forms of the offset process that should have been used for this study of source-material that will be consulted for many years to come. The paper cover curls, the pages dog-ear, the small, dense print blinds the most

devoted eyes. Worse, one cannot follow all the arguments because the plates are so dull (e.g. Molds 14, 18, 42). We cannot see "Arsinoe" plain; had I not handled the piece, I could not have spoken of the style. This is not a question of editing; the editor, indeed, must be warmly commended for the remarkable accuracy of the proof-reading of an intricate text. She has made the best possible job of a difficult manuscript with the antiquated and amateurish equipment at her disposal. The University Museum Press must bear the onus of this disgrace to American scholarship. How can we expect the devotion of young scholars to research if an ambitious excavation, well financed for many years, is accorded as its publication in final form a book so shabby as to be unworthy of the labor of its authors and the honor of sponsors?

DOROTHY BURR THOMPSON.

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MICHAEL GRANT. Roman Literature. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1954. Pp. viii + 297. \$3.00.

Of making histories of Latin literature there appears to be no end. In English alone there have appeared, during the past six years, a second edition of H. J. Rose's comprehensive and accurate *Handbook of Latin Literature* (London, 1949); W. A. Laidlaw's brief but interesting *Latin Literature* (New York, 1951); Moses Hadas' useful but uneven *History of Latin Literature* (New York, 1952); Andrew Oliver's naïve, college-outline-like *History of Latin Literature in Graphic Form* (Boston, 1952); a third edition of J. W. Duff's monumental and tasteful *Literary History of Rome from the Origins to the Close of the Golden Age* (London, 1953); and now Grant's little volume. The Italians have been equally prolific: there are Ettore Bignone's lively *Storia della letteratura latina*, 3 vols., the first in a second edition (Firenze, 1945-50); Augusto Rostagni's unusually careful *Storia della letteratura latina*, I: *La Repubblica* (Torino, 1949); the second edition of Vincenzo Ussani's learned, yet Duff-like *Storia della letteratura latina nell' età repubblicana e augusta* (Milano, 1950); the eighth edition of the first of the two volumes of Concetto Marchesi's dry, Sehanz-Hosius-like *Storia della letteratura latina* (Milano, 1950); and Ettore Paratore's long and uneven *Storia della letteratura latina* (Firenze, 1950, reprinted in 1951). The French and Germans have produced fewer works: the fourth edition of Eduard Norden's excellent little *Römische Literatur* (Leipzig, 1952) is the sole German effort; the French have produced no systematic account since Georges Cagnac's dull, annalistic *Petite Histoire de la Littérature latine* (Paris, 1948) and Philippe Poullain's *La Littérature latine* (Paris, 1948).

Certain of these—most notably Rose, Norden, Cagnac, Poullain, and Marchesi—are mere handbooks of reference in the Sehanz-Hosius *multum in parvo* tradition, bulging with facts and summaries of the scholarly literature, though they may include (especially in Rose) critical comment. Others—most notably Laidlaw and the present work—offer brief syntheses for the general reader. Hadas, the

majority of the Italians, and, to a most successful degree, Duff, occupy an intermediate position.

Perhaps there is no further need for factual histories, but there is room for fresh interpretations. Grant, who is Professor of Humanity in the University of Edinburgh and a distinguished authority on Roman coinage, had previously shown his ability in discussing a large subject for a general audience in his recent *Ancient History* (London, 1952) in the Home Study Books Series. Similarly, this book, though clearly addressed to the general reader who knows no Latin, does not talk down to him: it challenges him to consider such vital questions as the reasons for the shift from the Augustan to the Silver Age (p. 11 and *passim*), the conditions of production of a comedy in Republican Rome (pp. 25-9), the reasons why comedy declined in Rome after Terence (p. 31), and the differences between ancient and modern poetry (p. 145). Grant is to be commended for his broad outlook on literature: thus, for example, he gives (pp. 73-6) an excellent account of Roman legal literature. Finally, the author tries, so far as possible, to present Roman literature through the words of those who created it: his quotations are numerous, lively, and typical, and he is not afraid to present long passages (e.g., the ghost story in Petronius, p. 124) where necessary to impart the flavor of the original work.

The translations of the poetic selections that are quoted are unusual in that they are for the most part by poets famous in their own right and are successful in conveying the mood, in contrast to the literal meaning of the Latin. The anonymous Scotch version of Catullus' *Lugete* (pp. 163-4), Housman's *Difugere nives* (p. 214), and Tennyson's version of Lucretius, III, 17-22 (pp. 154-5) are perhaps best. There are other translations or adaptations by Lord Dunsany (Horace), Ezra Pound (Catullus and Propertius), Byron (Horace), Matthew Arnold (Lucretius), Landor (Catullus), Ben Jonson (Catullus), Swift (Catullus), Shelley (Virgil), Andrew Marvell (Horace), Christopher Marlowe (Ovid), Dryden (Ovid and Juvenal), Samuel Johnson (Juvenal), Tom Brown (Martial), and many others who are somewhat lesser known. No other history of Latin (or, for that matter, Greek) literature, of whatever scope, can offer as many famous names among its translators; in fact, Grant's book serves almost as an anthology of translations by famous English poets from Latin literature. This alone might serve as the book's *raison d'être*, though its dangers are obvious: Ezra Pound's "large-mouthed product," with such a line as "Virgil is Phoebus' chief of police" (p. 172), was composed, it would appear, *per intervalla insaniae*; Swinburne's adaptation of Lucretius (p. 155) is very far from the stately hexameter: its style is more suitable for Gilbert Murray's romantic versions of Euripides' choruses; and Day Lewis' translation (p. 199) of *proice tela manu* as "You be the first to bury the hatchet!" is hardly appropriate when we consider that these words were spoken by Aeneas in the awesome circumstances of the Lower World. And it is hard for the novice who is trying to form a unified conception of, e.g., Lucretius *qua* poet to "shift gears" from Tennyson to Swinburne to Gray to Matthew Arnold within two pages (pp. 155-6). On the other hand, Grant's occasional practice (e.g., pp. 127-8) of giving two different translations of the same passage helps the reader to appreciate

divergences in interpretations of classical authors during the various periods of English literature.

An outstanding feature of this book is that far more than other popular histories of Latin literature it is concerned with the *fortleben* of the various authors considered. In this respect it shows the profound influence of such a work as Gilbert Highet's *The Classical Tradition*. Grant is especially good on the influence of Cicero (pp. 48-50, 67-8), Virgil (pp. 181-3, 190, 202), and Horace (pp. 215-16, 222). He helps to explain the modern vogue of Propertius, whom he aptly describes (p. 171) as "the first young neurotic of European poetry." The only accounts that are too vague or skimpy are those of Plautus (pp. 23-4), Terence (p. 31), Livy (p. 107), and Suetonius (p. 120). Moreover, Grant is to be commended for indicating, as he does, e. g., on p. 147, what the classical virtues generally can mean to our contemporary society. Indeed, it is to be hoped and expected that future histories of classical literature will follow Grant's lead in discussing the influence of the various authors.

Most histories, especially the brief ones, stop with the Age of Hadrian. Grant has an excellent epilogue in which he shows the continuity of Latin literature through the Middle Ages and even the Renaissance. He also appends (pp. 269-73) a brief history of classical scholarship down to our own day, though it is perhaps questionable whether such a survey has a place in a book on Latin literature. Its justification lies, it would seem, in the fact that it will explain to the general reader what classical scholarship, as epitomized by a Bentley or a Wolf, is trying to do.

Histories of literature must adopt either a chronological arrangement or one by genre, or, and this is almost always the case, a compromise between the two. Grant has adhered more radically to the classification by genre than any of his predecessors. After his introduction on earliest extant Latin literature (comedy) he divides Latin literature into prose and poetry. Grant can consequently consider the development of the genre in a unified discussion. Thus, in considering Roman philosophy, he does not have to interrupt his account of Cicero to describe the *Philippics* which Cicero was delivering or the letters which he was writing at the same time that he was discussing philosophy so prolifically. And he does not have to stop to discuss Seneca's *Apocolocyntosis*, *Naturales Quaestiones*, and tragedies. Of course, this has its drawbacks: it is sometimes hard to see the Latin writers as integrated personalities when discussions of their works are scattered throughout the book. If Seneca indeed suffered from paranoiae abnormality, as E. P. Barker in *O. C. D.*, s. v. "Seneca," p. 828, indicates, there is an even further fragmentation in Grant. For we read of his philosophical essays on pp. 68-71, of his moral letters on p. 80, of his tragedies on pp. 237-9; there is no discussion of the *Apocolocyntosis* or the *Naturales Quaestiones*. In some cases, Grant has departed from his practice of treating literature by genre: satire is found on pp. 217-22 (Lucilius, Horace), again on pp. 239-40 (Persius), and finally on pp. 246-51 (Juvenal). Epic is found on pp. 190-204 (Naevius, Ennius, Virgil), and on pp. 240-3 (Lucan, Silius Italicus, Valerius Flaccus, Statius, the last three being dismissed in two sentences). (Grant rightly argues [p. 229] that Ovid's *Metamorphoses* is not a true epic.) Again, we have a discussion of Tacitus' *Dialogus* on pp. 59-60, but we do not meet Tacitus the historian until pp. 108-16. In

general, the section on post-Augustan poetry (pp. 235-51) is a *farrago* of names, with all the genres being mixed. And from Grant's arrangement one would have difficulty realizing that Cicero and Catullus, Livy and Virgil, Petronius and Lucan, Tacitus and Juvenal are, as it were, complementary pairs. Grant was prevented by his method from discussing the Ciceronian or Augustan or Silver Ages as periods: he is interested only in the literature *qua* literature and devotes little attention to the political, social, and economic conditions which helped mould that literature. Moreover, especially for the modern reader, the omission (except for a mere footnote, p. 81, n. 1) of a discussion of Roman science and scientific writings is unfortunate.

Grant has included four helpful appendices: a discussion of the tenets of the major schools of Greek philosophy, an explanation of the chief metres employed by the Roman poets (unfortunately lacking in examples except for Horace's lyric metres), a list of Roman emperors through Alexander Severus, and a "Who's Who" of Latin literature. The inside front cover has a map of the Roman Empire, and the inside back cover contains a chart listing the principal surviving Latin writers by genre.

A careful check of this book against the handbooks, Pauly-Wissowa, the *Oxford Classical Dictionary*, etc., reveals that Grant is definitely independent in his judgments and that where he has borrowed he follows what Housman calls the "superstitious" practice of making acknowledgments. Here and there is a phrase redolent of *O. C. D.* (e.g., with p. 102 cf. A. Momigliano, *s. v.* "Monumentum Aneyranum"; and with p. 168 cf. H. E. Butler, *s. v.* "Elegiac Poetry") or of H. J. Rose's *Handbook of Latin Literature* (cf. "an epic poet in prose" on p. 104 with Rose, p. 296) or of Hightet's *Classical Tradition* (with p. 239 cf. Hightet, p. 198). Appendix IV ("Who's Who") seems to be dependent largely on *O. C. D.*, but this is all right in such a catalogue, except that it has led Grant into several minor errors.

Unfortunately, the book, in its attempt at brevity, is marred by a number of generalizations that, without added provisos, are misleading. Here are a few of the many examples which I have noted:

P. 5, lines 19-23: "They [i. e. the Romans] possessed the capacity . . . of putting the Greek ideas . . . into effect over vast areas of the globe—an opportunity of which the Greeks had deprived themselves by constant warfare." But the Romans likewise engaged in almost incessant warfare: the difference may be, in part, that the Greeks fought among themselves and did not, as did the Romans in the case of the *socii*, bestow privileges on those whom they conquered.

P. 5, lines 24-5: "It is only because of the Romans, and through them, that Greek thought has survived at all." But some Greek thought survived independently of the Romans in the East and in Egypt among the Jews, for example. Cf., e. g., Saul Liberman's *Greek in Jewish Palestine* and *Hellenism in Jewish Palestine*.

P. 6, lines 5-9: "Many of the most characteristic aspects of Roman thought and genius are embodied in the actual Latin language. It is extremely forcible and expressive, very precise and at the same time very compact; capable of saying much and of saying it well in a brief space." This is, I believe, a common fallacy. The same

might be said of Greek and Hebrew. And these qualities may be found in Roman inscriptions and in Cato and Caesar but not always in Cicero. In fact, the Atticist-Asiatic controversy in Cicero's day was concerned with just such questions of style.

P. 89, lines 16-19: In concluding his consideration of the famous letter to Luceius (*Fam.*, V, 12) Grant says that this reflects the general ancient tendency not to place truth as the foremost aim of history. I have discussed this point at length in my Ph. D. dissertation, *Cicero's Conception of Historiography* (Harvard Univ., 1951), pp. 180-94, and have concluded that the standards set forth in this letter apply only to a *monograph*, not to a full-length historical work.

A few samples of the many actual errors of fact which I have noticed are the following:

P. 12, lines 27-8: To say that Apuleius is the only ancient novelist of whom we have a complete work is to ignore the complete Greek novels by Achilles Tatius, Chariton, Heliodorus, Longus, and Xenophon of Ephesus.

P. 21, lines 24-5: Grant says that Plautus' poetical successors never scanned by stress-accent. But Terence sometimes did, though he is more observant than Plautus is of quantity.

P. 74, lines 5-7: "This [i. e. the Law of Citations] stipulated that, if ever there was a difference of opinion between lawyers on a committee and neither side obtained a majority, then the view of Papinian should be decisive." Actually, this law stated that failing a majority of *jurists* cited on one side or the other, Papinian's view should be decisive.

P. 121, lines 22-3: It is not correct to assert that Roman adaptations of Milesian tales are not extant. Specimens do exist in Petronius' story of the Widow of Ephesus, as Grant himself notes on p. 122, lines 29-30, and Apuleius' *Metamorphoses*, which Apuleius himself calls a Milesian composition.

P. 157, line 14: Cicero was an older, not a younger contemporary of Lucretius.

P. 234, lines 8-10: Shakespeare's Cleopatra shows the influence of the Dido who appears in Ovid's *Heroides*, not the *Metamorphoses*.

P. 244, line 23: The total number of poems in the twelve books of Martial's epigrams is 1172, not 1561. We must add the *Liber Spectaculorum*, the *Xenia* (now Book 13), and the *Apophoreta* (now Book 14) to make a total of 1561.

P. 259, line 20: Augustine was not born of pagan parents: his mother Monica was a Christian.

P. 280, lines 7-8: A syllable is long by position before, not necessarily after, a double consonant.

Even in a book of such narrow compass there are a number of obvious omissions, of which the following are representative:

P. 51, lines 8 ff.: In discussing the history of Greek rhetoric Grant should make mention of the Sophists, particularly of such figures as Protagoras and Gorgias.

P. 53, lines 16 ff.: In citing the influence of the Rhodian school on

Cicero, Grant mentions Apollonius Molon but omits the more famous Posidonius.

P. 57, lines 24-7: In listing the great literary critics of the early Principate, Grant omits Horace and Persius.

P. 81, note 1: In listing Roman scientists Grant has omitted Seneca the Younger, author of the *Naturales Quaestiones*. Similarly on p. 237, lines 22-3, he has omitted this work from the list of those by Seneca.

P. 87, lines 1 ff.: In mentioning the treatment of speeches by Greek and Roman historians, Grant should make note of indirect discourse. On the whole subject, cf. A. S. Pease, "Indirect Discourse in Caesar," *Classical Studies in Honor of William Abbott Oldfather* (Urbana, 1943), pp. 154-6.

P. 291: Tibullus, who is given somewhat extended treatment in the text, is here omitted from a list of Roman writers that includes many figures of far less importance.

Table of "Some Principal Surviving Latin Writers" (inside back cover): Lucretius deserves to be included among the writers on philosophy; Seneca the Younger is omitted from the list of poets despite the fact that Grant himself in the text fully recognizes the importance of his tragedies; Ammianus Marcellinus ought not to be omitted from the canon of historians.

Occasionally Grant's language is misleading. A few examples may be cited:

P. 10, line 30: The general reader, who thinks of Rome as being in Italy, may have difficulty understanding the statement: "They [i. e. Virgil, Horace, Ovid, Livy] were also not Romans, but Italians." The same criticism can be made of the statement on p. 193, line 22 with respect to Naevius and Ennius.

P. 13, lines 32-3: In its context "This was the age . . ." seems to imply that Jerome and Augustine belonged to the Age of Constantine, who is mentioned in the preceding sentence.

P. 51, lines 32-3: "They [i. e. Cicero's rhetorical treatises] also give us insight into the Middle Ages." Rather, it is the fact that these treatises were popular in the Middle Ages that gives us insight into that period.

P. 147, lines 21-2: "Balance is one of the classical virtues; and balance between the classical and romantic is also good." This sentence contains a verbal fallacy, for it says, in effect, that balance between balance and lack of balance is good.

There is a definite need for books of this sort in presenting to a wider audience the values and importance of classical literature. Though there is hardly a page in my copy that is unmarred by corrections or suggestions for improvement, these are usually of minor significance. A thorough revision of the book, when completed, would make it an excellent *vademecum* for the general student of literature.

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R. S. BLUCK. *Plato's Phaedo*. London, Routledge & Kegan Paul Limited, 1955. Pp. x + 208. 21s. (*The International Library of Psychology, Philosophy and Scientific Method*.)

The present work contains a general introduction; a translation broken up into the natural phases of the argument, each preceded by a brief résumé offering some commentary; nine critical appendices on special problems; a number of supplementary notes; and four indexes. This arrangement—a proliferation of Cornford's method—is not without its disadvantages. However, many students will welcome the thoroughness of the treatment.

The introduction is reasonable, succinct, and well-proportioned. Though it anticipates many findings argued at greater length in the subsequent discussion, it presents a lucid and generally sound exposition of the thought of the *Phaedo*, with useful references to the *Republic* and the *Symposium*. It may come as a surprise to some that even in the introduction some knowledge of Greek is required of the reader. Actually, this is not just another rendering of the dialogue for the Greekless. It amounts to a fresh interpretation, based on much learning and ingenuity. That is not to say that novices may not gather the necessary information from the introduction; but the bulk of the book will appeal largely to specialists.

The translation aims at literalness rather than smoothness, but it often succeeds in communicating the ring and the cadences of the original. This is the more gratifying because Bluck tells us (p. vii) that he is interested in the *Phaedo* more as philosophy than as literature; he feels that Plato the artist has been sufficiently dealt with by others. This may be true of works in French, Italian, and German, but not of English language publications on the *Phaedo*. In any case, his distinction is unfortunate, and un-Platonic. By choosing not to notice the "poetry" of the work, he deprives himself of a substantial tool in the uncovering of Plato's purposes. Still, with this important reservation, Bluck's *Phaedo* is an eminently successful volume. If in what follows I shall take exception to some details, my criticism should help to stress the fresh and venturesome quality of the book.

As a philosopher, Bluck is prone to use such terms as "theory" and "doctrine" in characterizing Plato's thought. Often, what he calls a "doctrine of" is more likely to be a "concern with." Actually, his own treatment of Plato is rather more elastic than these terms would warrant. However, there are some unfortunate results: p. 67, note 3, e.g., Bluck argues that because we do not hear much in the *Phaedo* about mathematical, therefore Plato had as yet no theory of them. Similarly Bluck operates too readily with the concept of schools. He seems to feel that he must associate as many statements as possible with Orphics, Pythagoreans, Philolaus, Socrates, etc. As for Socrates, Bluck's picture of the difference between the philosophical positions of Plato and his teacher is both too simple and not quite clear. On the one hand, Socrates is for him the dialectical manipulator of  $\lambda\circ\gamma\circ\iota$ , i.e. universals and definitions; on the other, he has "faith in ideals." Apart from the inadmissibility of the term "ideal" in this context, which is the true account? Or are ideals and universals coextensive? Of one thing Bluck is sure: Socrates did not subscribe to Plato's substantial

Forms. Nor was he a scientist: in suppl. 10, Bluck is at pains to demonstrate that 96 A ff. need not indicate a scientific period in the life of Socrates or, for that matter, of Plato.

Given his tendency to affix labels, it is natural that Bluck makes much of the Orphics. Even the three lives of *Phaedrus* 248 E ff. are understood as part of an Orphic eschatology (p. 47). In Bluck's view, all popular notions concerning the soul are to be regarded as Orphic. Similar credit is extended to the later Pythagoreans. Philolaus here functions as a Pythagorean philosopher with a recognizable system of thought, in spite of the uncertain nature of our tradition about him. As for Simmias and Cebes, Bluck seems to know precisely what their relationship to "orthodox" Pythagoreanism is. Following Burnet, he claims that Simmias' comparison of the soul with attunement is inconsistent with Pythagorean transmigration theories. All this is bound to suggest too firm a picture of what the Pythagoreans represented.<sup>1</sup>

Moreover, this thinking in terms of schools and movements may distort the proper understanding of the argument. Bluck assumes that Simmias started out a conventional Pythagorean and then formulated a "theory" concerning soul-harmony in deliberate opposition to his teachers; cf. Bluck's "having come to believe," p. 88, note 1, which is nowhere warranted by the text. Actually, Simmias' suggestion is part of the dialectics of the argument, and grows from the discussion itself. It is really—falsely—based on what Socrates had said concerning the influence of the body on the soul, 83 D. Nor is it an objection, much less a heresy, but a hypothesis, something that Simmias proposes to further the argument. The *āei* and *προνδέδοκτο* of Echecrates, 88 D, are dramatic devices to emphasize the force of the proposition, and not, *pace* Aristoxenus, the confessions of a historical character. It follows that 92 D *ὅθεν καὶ . . .* should be understood along the lines proposed by Lorimer (*C.R.*, 1938, pp. 165-6), in spite of Tate (*C.R.*, 1939, pp. 2-3); read: "which is what prompts most people to have their beliefs." It further follows that *ἱπολαμβάνομεν*, 86 B, refers to the participants in the discussion, primarily Simmias and Socrates. Hence Bluck's suppl. 8 carries little conviction.

"The *Phaedo*, as I have interpreted it, is concerned with the Forms as metaphysical 'causes' and as objects of moral inspiration that are 'real,' and hardly touches upon logic at all" (p. 184). Regarding the Forms, Bluck follows Cornford (cf. note on *Timaeus* 50 D) and distinguishes between Form-causes and Form-copies; to these two he adds, as a third, our notions of Form-causes. He emphasizes the substantiality of the Form-causes (app. 7), and is sceptical of the view that to begin with the Forms were restricted

<sup>1</sup> It is perhaps worth mentioning that Aristotle in his discussion of the theory of soul-harmony (*De Anima* A, 3, 407 b 27 ff.) does not refer to the Pythagoreans, though he had mentioned them earlier (407 b 22) in connexion with the relation between body and soul. The only authority cited in the passage on soul-harmony is Empedocles (408 a 19). Nor do the ancient commentators, in their paraphrases and analyses of this passage, refer explicitly to the Pythagoreans, except for Simplicius who mentions them only to state that the Pythagorean theory of harmony is not relevant to the discussion: ed. Hayduck (Berlin, 1882), p. 53, line 30.

to the spheres of ethies and mathematises (p. 185). On various occasions he remarks, more emphatically perhaps than we find it stated in the *Phaedo*, that Plato places the Forms "in another realm" (cf. app. 8 on *χωρισμός*). As for the last part of the statement cited above, Bluck performs a curious *volte face* when, on the question of the indestructibility of the soul, he complains that scholars have not taken Plato's arguments seriously enough as logic. On the one hand he objects on R. Robinson for looking for too much logic in Plato, on the other hand he argues that Plato is logically right to find that the indestructibility of the soul must be proved for the argument for immortality to be complete (app. 9).

In any case, Bluck's vindication of Plato's logic is not convincing. He rightly sees that for Plato, the statement "soul does not admit death" means that soul must either withdraw or perish at the approach of death. He fails to see, however, that the statement "soul does not admit destruction" permits the same disjunctive conclusion. Evidently, Plato here uses the term δέχεσθαι ambiguously—1) logically, and 2) ontologically—without perhaps becoming fully aware of the ambiguity. Bluck's interpretation would leave little enough justification for the apories of the *Parmenides* and the *Sophist*. Thus app. 9 fails to upset the conventional view that the demonstration of indestructibility is not a logically argued proof; and, ironically, it confirms Bluck's own perception that the *Phaedo* "hardly touches upon logic at all."

Undoubtedly the most important section of the whole book is app. 6 in which Bluck states his reasons for a new interpretation of the hypothesis passage 99 D ff. advanced in the translation. As W. F. R. Hardie (*A Study in Plato*, pp. 66 ff.) has said, the account of method "does not seem to be free from obscurity and confusion." First, concerning the δεύτερος πλοῦς of 99 D, Bluck's "second line of approach" is not a happy translation. Burnet's note (his edition, p. 108) had explained the origin of the term; Burnet thinks that the phrase is ironical and that Socrates does not believe for a moment that the method he is about to describe is a *pis aller* or makeshift. Bluck, pp. 112-13, differs: the δεύτερος πλοῦς is precisely that because it is not teleological, i. e. takes no account of the Form of the Good. In app. 6, p. 167, this view is further modified: the procedure sketched 99 D-100 A, i. e. the recourse to λόγοι, really constitutes a δεύτερος πλοῦς as far as Plato is concerned, but what follows, 100 B ff., the hypothesis passage, is made to look like one for dramatic and formal reasons only. What Bluck wants us to understand is that in 100 B Plato is trying to indicate to his readers that his Socrates is progressing from Socrate thought (λόγοι) to Platonic thought (Forms). The transition is toned down to minimize the difference between the historical Socrates and the Socrates of the dialogue; but actually the hypothesis passage implies a reference to the Forms, hence ultimately to the Form of the Good, and thus by no means involves a δεύτερος πλοῦς.

This is a rather daring attempt to reject Burnet's pan-Socratism, and yet preserve a clear-cut image of the historical Socrates, distinct from the Socrates of the dialogue. The *double entendre* which Bluck discovers in the passage surely exists only for modern ears. For one thing, we should have to assume that Plato would wish, at one and the same time, to distinguish between the thought of Socrates

and his own contributions, and to hide this distinction from his readers. The reason for such a procedure is not apparent. To separate the *λόγοι* from the *ἰπόθεσις*-phase of this passage raises the further question in what sense *λόγοι* could be considered causes. Bluck, pp. 167-8, answers that a definition may stamp a thing as *ἀληθής* in relation to cause; and further, that the definition itself is a cause of things conforming with it!

It remains to consider Bluck's chief suggestion, that the hypothesis passage refers, not to a logical process, but to the "theory of Forms" itself. According to Bluck, a hypothesis in this context is not an existential or any other kind of proposition but "a provisional conception of a Form-cause"; and *τὰ ἀπ' ἔκεινης ὄρμηέντα* are not deductions from a proposition, but effects, i. e. our notions of things to be explained as caused by Forms (pp. 162 ff.). Thus, where Taylor (*Plato*, p. 201) speaks of postulate and implications, Bluck speaks of notion of Form and phenomena. In this manner, Bluck hopes to eliminate the difficulties which R. Robinson had recently brought into sharp focus. The hypothesis passage, we are told, deals not with logic but with ontology. I am not sure that I fully understand everything about this suggestion, but certain doubts will present themselves. Bluck does not take account of 92 C where Socrates uses *συνάσται* and *συνωδῶι* in what cannot be anything but a propositional context. Once more, I am not entirely convinced that it is possible, in this dialogue, to distinguish between metaphysics and logic, between descriptive and existential statements (surely for Plato these are always ultimately identical), between notions and propositions, as clearly as Bluck proposes. His account of what he has in mind is at times obscure (notably p. 116, note 3). How do we test the validity of a provisional conception of a Form-cause, with respect to the explanation of lower Forms or phenomena? How can manifestations of a Form be said to be consistent, i. e. how can phenomena or the notions of phenomena be said to stand in a measurable relationship to each other? Bluck himself seems to sense that the hypothesis passage involves neither metaphysics nor logic but a more complex science; his translation of *ἀληθής* (100 A) shifts back and forth between "true" and "real" and "genuine": pp. 114, 164, 168. There is a further argument against Bluck's narrow conception of the hypothesis passage: his rendering of *ὄρμηέντα*. In view of Plato's avowed difficulty how to describe the relation between Forms and things, whether absolutely or conceptually, it is unlikely that he would use *ὄρμάω* without further explanation. Usually the verb denotes a traceable movement, real or psychological, and it is more apt to refer to the progression of an argument than to the dependence of things on their causes. *ὁ λόγος ὄρμᾶι* is a common enough figure in Plato (cf. *Statesman* 264 E, 274 B; *Republic* II, 366 D), and even *ὁ λόγος ὄρμηται* is found (*Theaetetus* 184 A).

For the rest, here are some *μικρολογίαι* concerning individual passages. P. 34, line 6 (cf. also p. viii, line 9): Robin first published his edition, including his suggestion concerning the age of Phaedo, in 1926.—P. 37, 58 A and p. 38, 58 C: for "prow" read: "stern."—P. 43, 61 C: "deserves" is a misunderstanding of *ἀξίως*.—P. 43, 61 D: "sat up" is wrong for *καθεζόμενος*.—P. 44, 62 A: "Goodness knows" is far too pretty for a Boeotian oath.—P. 54, 68 D: the sentence beginning *καίτοι ἀλογόν γε* is omitted.—P. 61: the

reference to Keats is out of place in this severely non-literary treatment; why not cite an ancient variant, such as Cicero, *Tusculans*, I, 92?—Pp. 78-9: Bluck's long note on 80 C is unnecessary. R. G. Bury gave the right interpretation in *Ph. W.*, 1936, col. 1134. This also serves to support G. F. Forsey (*C. Q.*, 1926, pp. 177-8), against Burnet, in his rendering of ὥρα = age.—P. 86, 84 C: σμικρόν means: "a little while."—Pp. 91 f., 87 D ff.: I am not convinced by the juggling of quotes. Bluck is to be commended for paying detailed attention to this difficult passage (cf. app. 5, pp. 157-9). But he expects a degree of syntactical logic which is not to be asked of Plato in this conversational piece. We have here, I suspect, a case of Platonic looseness of grammar, in which Cebes identifies himself with the imagined objector, and the grammar veers between direct and indirect statement. The δέ, 88 B—εἰ δὲ τοῦτο οὐτως ἔχει—is resumptive; cf. Denniston, *Particles*, 182. Hence eliminate the "and," p. 92, line 13.—Regarding the σύ, 88 A, Bluck (p. 92, note 1 and p. 158), following Burnet, thinks it must refer to Cebes. In view of what I have said above about the nature of Simmias' harmony-hypothesis, I believe there is nothing to prevent the σύ from referring to Simmias; at 77 A ff. he had already expressed his conviction that soul exists before birth. Thus Heindorf, Stallbaum, Geddes are right.—P. 94, 89 C: "not to grow my hair again" is awkward.—P. 101, 93 D "that no attunement" is a misleading translation if not checked against the footnote which subscribes to Miss Hicken's view (*C. Q.*, 1954, pp. 16-22) that in the *Phaedo* Plato never states whether attunements can vary in degree or not.—App. 1, concerning the date of the *Phaedo*, is too speculative (as admitted by Bluck, p. 145) to be of much service.—App. 3, concerning the translation of 62 A, is not convincing; the translations of Bonitz and Burnet still account better for the text. Bluck inserts an "only" before "on some occasions," thus distorting the sense, on the mistaken assumption that the company is already agreed on death being preferable to life.—P. 166, line 16: "no mention" is too strong; see 99 C: ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸ ἀγαθόν. Cf. p. 199, line 8.—P. 172, note: read "such works as our Δίστοι Λόγου."—Pp. 175-6: there should be a reference to Snell, *Discovery of the Mind*, ch. 10.—P. 202, suppl. 17: the examples given are erratically chosen.

Bluck uses the text of Burnet, with some modifications. This encourages me to make some textual suggestions which should affect the translation in a few cases. P. 50, 66 B: with Viljoen (*Mnemosyne*, 1938, p. 320) change μετά into μέγα and read: "it looks as if something like a side-lane is taking us far from our goal in the search of our argument." Thus Christ's deletion of μετά . . . σκέψει is not needed.—P. 51, 66 E: Wilamowitz, *Platon*, II, p. 348 has shown that φρονήσεως is a gloss. Hence omit: "even wisdom."—P. 58, 70 A: Schanz' deletion of οἴχηται . . . ἦ should be adopted in the translation.—With Jachmann, largely taking his cue from the papyrus Arsinoensis, I should also suggest these changes: p. 79, 80 E omit ραδίως; p. 80, 81 B omit ἵπ' αὐτοῦ; p. 82, 82 D bracket ἐκείνη; p. 83, 83 E delete φασιν (this changes the sense of the passage; cf. 82 C).

Misprints: p. 5, line 6 read: asceticism; p. 23, note 2 read: 611 B; p. 161, note 2 read: Suppl. No. 16.

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R. LORIAUX. *L'être et la forme selon Platon: Essai sur la dialectique platonicienne*. Bruges, Les Presses Saint-Augustin, 1955. Pp. 227. 145 francs belges. (*Museum Lessianum—Section Philosophique*, No. 39.)

Apparently on the provocation of *L'être et l'essence* by É. Gilson (Paris, 1948) the author wrote the present paper-bound volume, reprinting essentially in the first three chapters his previous article, "L'être et l'idée selon Platon" (*Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, February 1952, pp. 5-55). Dividing his study into two parts of four chapters each, entitled *la dialectique ascendante* and *la dialectique descendante* respectively, Loriaux discusses in the first part the *Phaedo*, *Symposium*, and *Republic*, in the second part the *Republic*, *Phaedrus*, *Parmenides*, *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Statesman*, *Philebus*, *Timaeus*, and *Laws*, attempting to show that the two methods, which he terms ascending and descending dialectic, are complements to each other.

What the author treats under descending dialectic scholars usually refer to as the method of "collection and division," the relation of the Ideas to one another, and the question of immanence or transcendence between the sensible world and the world of Ideas. These are challenging problems to a Platonist and, in the opinion of the reviewer, are treated more clearly and adequately in other books, especially in *Plato's Theory of Ideas* by David Ross (Oxford, 1953). It is surprising that no mention is made either in the text or in the two-page bibliography of the pertinent volumes by F. M. Cornford, *Plato and Parmenides* (London, 1939), *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937), *Plato's Theory of Knowledge* (London, 1935); R. Robinson, *Plato's Earlier Dialectic* (Oxford, 1953); and N. R. Murphy, *The Interpretation of Plato's Republic* (Oxford, 1951), particularly chapter seven.

The author discusses at length the phrase ὁ ἔστι in its various contexts, claiming that Shorey (*Loeb Classical Library*), Chambry (*Les Belles Lettres*) and Robin (*La Pléiade*) mistranslated the term in *Republic*, 532 A "par des expressions purement essentielles" (p. 78); Shorey renders the phrase ἐπ' αὐτῷ ὁ ἔστιν ἔκαστον "the very essence of each thing." It is noteworthy that no reference is made to the phraseology either of the third edition of Jowett ("the absolute") or of the fourth edition ("the real"). Loriaux is unduly concerned with the grammatical construction in such expressions as . . . οὐκ αὐτοῦ δεσπότου δίπον, ὁ ἔστι δεσπότης . . . and . . . οὐδὲ αὐτοῦ δούλον, ὁ ἔστι δούλος . . . (*Parmenides*, 133 D-E). He states: "Les deux antécédents étant masculins, les relatifs devraient l'être également" (p. 122). To mitigate the unnecessary concern, one needs only to refer to Goodwin and Gulick, *Greek Grammar*, paragraphs 1022 and 921, and to Gildersleeve, *Syntax of Classical Greek*, paragraphs 501, 126, and 130-1; additional examples of "disagreement" of the relative with its antecedent in both Greek and Latin literature are noted and explained in an article by the undersigned, "This Is My Body" (*Concordia Theological Monthly*, XX [1949], pp. 367-73). Plato's use of the neuter relative pronoun (as well as adjectives and demonstrative pronouns) to refer to masculine and feminine nouns is so frequent in his dialogues that its occurrence in

the passages cited should cause no concern to an interpreter; one wonders whether Loriaux would regard the opening sentence of the *Meno*, for example, as ungrammatical: . . . ἀρα διδάκτον ή ἀρετή;

In general, although the volume is provocative of some thought, it should not be listed as "required reading."

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WILLIAM L. WESTERMANN. *The Slave Systems of Greek and Roman Antiquity*. Philadelphia, The American Philosophical Society, 1955. Pp. xii + 180. \$3.00.

Next to paganism, the institution of slavery is probably the most difficult feature of ancient life for a modern student to understand, and it engaged the attention of Professor Westermann for years. His monumental article "Sklaverei" in the *Real-Enzyklopädie*, appearing in 1935 and extending over almost 200 columns, was the first comprehensive treatment of the subject in this century, and it was followed by a long series of special studies, expanding and enriching his conception. It was only natural that there should have been a demand for a book on the subject, and that goal has now been reached, after his death, through the generosity of various foundations and societies and the devoted skill of John Day, who saw the manuscript through the press. It is a fine accomplishment, one of which all of the author's friends and pupils may be proud. It will remain a standard work of reference for many years. There is a touch of pathos in the dedication "To the Memory of Michael Ivanovich Rostovtzeff," for this review must be dedicated to the memory of William Linn Westermann, a great scholar, teacher, and friend.

The relation to "Sklaverei" is explained in the preface. That had the relatively simple and strictly chronological form of an encyclopaedia article, and the compactness of long paragraphs with the incorporation of bibliographical references in the text. It was relatively easy to find things in, if you looked over the part devoted to the period that interested you. For book purposes, it was necessary to introduce footnotes and chapters, and categories other than chronological. The result was an arrangement of 24 chapters, as follows: 1) From Homer to the Persian Wars; 2-4) To Alexander, treating in turn supply and numbers, employment and legality, and social setting. Here the text of "Sklaverei" is reproduced with only minor additions, except in 2, where there is an extended treatment of the Aramaic documents from Elephantine recently published by Emil Kraeling. 5-8) The East to Augustus, including recruitment, economic and legal problems, and a comparison of Greek and Oriental practices. Westermann called this section "recast." It is really augmented, by virtue of his extensive study of the manumission documents of Hellenistic times with their bearing on slave origins, the "four freedoms" which distinguish a slave from a free man, and the problem of *paramone*, a restriction

on freedom which he has elsewhere described as a form of service relationship. 9-12) The West, from the Republic to Augustus. This is very little changed from "Sklaverei." 13-19) The Empire of the first three centuries. This section is very close to "Sklaverei" except that the order of topics has been changed to correspond to that above: origins and numbers, prices, and living conditions. The "amelioration" of slavery is discussed in connection with the importance of the "Caesaris servi," "vernae," and "Liberti" of the imperial service, and the attitude toward it by the philosophers, especially the Stoics. The possible contribution of slavery to the "decline" of ancient civilization is discussed and, as in "Sklaverei," rejected. 20-24) These chapters treat of slavery from Constantine to Justinian, and are almost completely new, replacing a mere two pages in "Sklaverei." The treatment is parallel to that of the other periods, and the relation of slavery to the colonate and to Christianity is handled at length, with concluding speculation on the nature and continued toleration of slavery in antiquity, referring particularly to the views of Professor A. N. Whitehead. The volume is completed with a bibliography and index.

Where so much is given, it would be ungrateful to ask for more. A conscientious reviewer, however, must point out that this is not the definitive book on slavery which it, in some way, purports to be. It is not very readable, and retains much of the encyclopaedia manner. It is rather analysis than synthesis, a collection of ancient testimonia than a narrative. The index is not adequate; such important topics as "Education" and "Prices" do not appear, and the topical arrangement of the text is insufficiently clear and systematic to make them unnecessary. The Jewish slavery of Elephantine is discussed at length, but nothing is said about Babylonian or Jewish slavery, and very little about the slavery of Pharaonic Egypt, all of which is not irrelevant, but necessary as the background of the Greek institution, as the author himself clearly states. The Dura material has shown how early customs of the Near East survived in the Seleucid and Parthian kingdoms. Taubenschlag has found such survivals in Egypt, and I myself found a curious continuation or recreation of Babylonian slave adoption in Roman Asia Minor. The legal aspects of slavery come short in general, and the problems raised by Koschaker and Schönbauer about the status of various kinds of bondsmen are not mentioned.

For the problem of slavery is not an easy one. The Romans handled it best, naturally, with their sharp categories, but in Roman law we meet the anomaly that a slave might own other slaves as his peculium, and so, through their manumission, become a patronus to liberti. In the Greek world, there was constant doubt as to what was a slave—although it was normally possible to decide who was a slave. Plato and Aristotle argued that slavery could exist only when an individual was a slave by nature, and Dio devoted two tracts to the proposition that slavery was a matter of the mind: if A owned B by capture or purchase, circumstances might easily reverse the situation so that B owned A, and thus neither could properly be called a slave. In view of the economic necessity of slavery in a civilized but machineless society, no one, not even the Christians, opposed slavery as an institution, although the Stoics regraded it as *ἀδιάφορον* and the Christians held that it did not

affect the soul or a man's position before God. It flourished in antiquity when there were wars and piracy, lapsed in the end with the rise of feudalism, for the slave populations never reproduced themselves. Under the empire, such anomalies as Tiberius' slave Musieus in Gaul with his household of secretaries, cooks, valets, butlers, and attendants defy definition.

The Greeks lacked even an exact terminology. A slave was δοῦλος, but so was a minister of the Great King, and Westermann thinks that ἱερόδοντοι were not slaves (few, however, will follow him in regarding the ἱερούς of *S. I. G.*, 742, 45 as priests). Barlaas of Dura Parchment X was to perform δουλικὰς χρέias, but he was an indentured servant or squire, not a slave. The term ἀνδράποδον is fairly definite but also a little formal. A σῶμα may be slave or free; it is the "body" of Scottish poetry. The usual term for slave is παιδίον, but it may mean free servants, "boys," as well, or even children; no one has suggested that the παιδία of Mark 10:14 were slaves, although it is perhaps not an impossibility.

Actually, of course, ancient slavery was several things, and not one; so Westermann writes of "The Slave Systems of Antiquity." In the Near East, as in Greece and Rome, slaves were used in the household as companions and servants of various kinds, where they shared place with children, relatives, retainers, and hirelings. They were used for agricultural work or for making cloth and clothing, like wives, hirelings, and serfs. They were used as skilled technicians of various sorts: doctors, philosophers, scribes, artists and artisans, cooks and mechanics, playing the same role as freemen. They could marry among themselves or with freemen, though this right was often restricted, and posed certain problems in regard to children born of such unions. They might be under the obligation of παραμονή, to stay with the master by day and night, but so had apprentices and other persons, including slaves who had been manumitted on such a condition, or they might be free to live where they pleased. Probably the only common element in their status was that they might be bought and sold, or punished as free men could not, but even these considerations were neither unlimited nor unique; persons often bought and sold children, for example, especially children who had been abandoned by their parents, and such became slaves only by that act, and sometimes could revert to a free status if the parents changed their minds.

A careful reader will find things to criticize in detail inevitably, and there are points on which opinions will differ, but it is a careful book, and the difficulties are those inherent in the subject. It contains much that is new and good. When, if ever, the definitive book is written on this subject, it will draw heavily on Westermann's judgment and insight, and not only on his material.

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ARTHUR E. R. BOAK. *Manpower Shortage and the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West*. Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, 1955. Pp. viii + 169. \$4.50.

The effects of population decline in the Roman Empire have not been properly assessed. Perhaps one reason for this is that the phenomenon is so contrary to our experience. Our problem is over-population, and we can hardly imagine a time when the situation was exactly the opposite. Another stumbling block has been the belief that scientific study of population was impossible without exact statistics. These are seldom obtainable; for the Greeks and Romans were notoriously lax in such matters and such statistics as we can piece together from archaeology are based on such inadequate sampling that they are inconclusive without supporting evidence from other sources. Some scholars have tried to calculate the population of the Roman Empire or to work out the life expectancy of its inhabitants by studying tomb inscriptions. Most historians treated their conclusions with the greatest reserve, even if they did not neglect them entirely.

This attitude, Boak believes, is no longer justifiable. It is, he admits (p. 20), "quite impossible to make any even approximately accurate estimates of the population of the Roman Empire as a whole or of the western part of it in particular, at any specific period." There is, however, for certain regions "incontrovertible archaeological evidence of a rise or decline in population, and for other regions, dependable historical evidence of a nonstatistical nature" (p. 8). Demographers have recently devoted much attention to population trends in the Roman Empire; and from the evidence of funerary inscriptions, mummy labels, and even skeletal remains in cemeteries, have begun to develop population patterns, not only for special areas, but for the Empire as a whole. The evidence is still scanty and not wholly reliable;<sup>1</sup> but demographers can control it to some extent by checking it against literary sources and comparing it with population statistics from pre-industrial modern countries. We may still believe that their conclusions should be accepted with caution, but we must agree with Boak that historians can often use them with profit.

Boak finds a downward trend in population in the western part of the Empire from about the time of Marcus Aurelius, which became more rapid during the half century of anarchy following the death of Alexander Severus. The restoration of order in the 4th century might have been expected to reverse this trend, but, except temporarily and in some areas, it failed to do so. Instead, the situation grew steadily worse. Boak describes the problems which this presented to the government and its attempts to solve them; and it is interesting to note that, as so often is the case when a historical trend has begun, the efforts of men to arrest it served only to make it stronger. The Roman Empire suffered from a shortage of farmers, artisans, doctors, teachers, soldiers; above all, it suffered from a

<sup>1</sup> On some difficulties in the use of funerary inscriptions, see the judicious remarks of A. R. Burn, "Hic Breve Vivitur: a Study of the Expectation of Life in the Roman Empire," *Past and Present*, Nov. 1953, pp. 3-5.

shortage of taxpayers. To keep up production and maintain a civilized society, to administer, police, and defend the Empire became harder with each generation. Striving to accomplish its task, the government fixed everyone in his job, collected the taxes ruthlessly, and imposed harsh penalties for evasions; but it only made life harder for the people. They abandoned their farms, fled from their jobs, ran away to become robbers or to join the barbarians. Those who stuck it out simply did not have enough children to balance the death rate. In desperation, the authorities brought barbarians into the Empire to meet the need for manpower; but this remedy only hastened final disaster.

"Did Christianity," asks Boak (p. 129), "with its higher standard of morality and greater stress on family life have any influence upon the downward trend of population?" If so, he says, its effects were small. In fact, Christianity, by glorifying celibacy and the monastic life, may even have helped to decrease population. This indictment is surely far too mild. Christianity not only cast an aura of sanctity upon the ascetic's evasion of social responsibility and made childlessness a positive virtue, but it drew into the Church many of the best men, whose intelligence and moral integrity the struggling Empire could ill spare. Had the Church made any organized effort to reform society, the talents of these men would not have been wholly wasted; but it is all too plain that it made no such effort. The Church must bear a large share in the responsibility for the ruin of the Empire, and the more so if population decline was a significant factor. In its defense it may be said that the Church was itself a victim of an almost universal cultural trend, and that some pagan or heretical sects would probably have done worse.

Boak's study gives no support to the contention of André Piganiol that "Roman civilization did not die a natural death. It was murdered."<sup>2</sup> The basic cause of the decline of population cannot have been barbarian invasions, internal wars, plagues, or any such catastrophes; for these were always operating. There must have been some new factor; and even without statistics it is not hard to see that this must have been the failure of the people to breed enough children to counteract the checks on population. This reflects a lack of zest for life, a "loss of nerve," an emotional illness among much of the population. Both halves of the Empire were affected, the East, indeed, more than the West; but the East, with its larger population, was better able to resist the disease.

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<sup>2</sup> I. e., by the barbarians; see his discussion of the causes of the fall of the Empire, *Histoire romaine*, Vol. IV, Pt. 2: *L'Empire chrétien* (Paris, 1947), pp. 411-22. Piganiol seems to think that the population losses of the 3rd century were made up later; but Boak contradicts this.

GILBERT HIGHET. Juvenal the Satirist, A Study. Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1954. Pp. xviii + 373. \$4.80.

This book is intended for both the classical scholar and the student in other literary and historical fields. As one would expect of Professor Highet, it is very well written and is a pleasure to read. Only indefatigable industry could produce such a mastery of the technical literature on Juvenal. The book, of course, reveals the extensive knowledge of modern literature that one has come to associate with the author of *The Classical Tradition*. Chaucer, Algernon, Roger Bacon, Moravia, Dante, Dickens, Diderot, Dolce, Donne, Dostoevski, Voltaire, Strindberg, Spengler, Shakespeare, Aldous Huxley, Kafka, Kipling, succeed one another in a brilliant display of celestial fireworks, so to speak, to the amazement of the reader. But Highet lets us down by admitting that he cannot read Magyar!

The book is divided into three parts: the life of Juvenal, the individual satires, and the survival of Juvenal's work. The first part covers the same ground as an article of Highet's (*T. A. P. A.*, LXVIII [1937], p. 480) but has been reworked. The third part is a greatly expanded version of some remarks in *The Classical Tradition*.

The life of Juvenal as portrayed in the book does not differ much from that in the earlier article. Formerly Juvenal was "probably born of free parents," "possibly in Aquinum"; now he is definitely born free at Aquinum. The four emperors derided by Juvenal now become five. The reconstruction of the life of Juvenal is plausible, if not new. The emphasis is on dating Juvenal's exile to the reign of Domitian, about 93, before the satires were written, and on explaining Juvenal's gloomy outlook by that exile and the consequent loss of his equestrian fortune.

Juvenal fares better in this book than he has fared in many a long year, and by that token Latin literature, so often openly or covertly sneered at, fares better. That is all to the good. Let us grant that Juvenal's sensational material is the stuff of which headlines are made today and no more depicts ordinary Roman life than headlines portray our culture. Yet, properly interpreted, it does give us an insight. Highet's main concern is literary and cultural, to bring out the vividness of Juvenal's portrayals and his other literary virtues, and to call attention to Roman attitudes and *mores*. All this is done in a rich tapestried style. Here is a sample of Highet's discussion of the first satire (p. 50):

It is a splendid tirade. In two pages it puts us in the streets of the rich, busy, corrupt city, energetic, ruthless, cruel, the stony-hearted stepmother. Juvenal does not make us watch it from a distance. He places us in the crowded thoroughfare where we are shoved to the wall by the dependants of a crooked politician, where we the ordinary public are ignored and dominated by barbers, gigolos, and poisoners; and the thick closely packed sentences, filled with drastic and shocking words, themselves carry us along as though we were being pushed and buffeted by the crowds of Rome.

No writer should be criticized for what he chooses not to cover in a book. Yet I regret that Highet did not include two matters in his

discussion. One is that of reinterpreting a number of passages, or at least presenting the various points of view. Not to mention others, he accepts in passing the "summer-weight" gold ring of 1, 28. The other interpretation seems to me much more satisfactory: "he fans the [heavy] gold ring in summer with his perspiring fingers." The juxtaposition of *ventilet* and *aestivum* favors this view, and the humor is heightened by assuming a heavy ring and by the *para-prosdokian* produced by postponing *aurum* to the end of the line. Hightet is carried away by modern parallels to accept the first interpretation. The constant use of apposite modern parallels is, to me, one of the fascinating qualities of this book, but such parallels should not project themselves into the interpretation.

The other matter not covered in detail by Hightet is Juvenal's rhetorical development of his theme. Thus at the beginning of the first satire, it is interesting to see the grouping of the four types of literature listed by Juvenal. The second and third (*togatae* and *elegies*) are Roman, short, and light. The first and fourth are Greek, long (cf. *rauci* and *ingens*), and heavy. For the first and fourth the titles of the works are given; in the second and third they are omitted but *ille* and *hic* are contrasted. The second and fourth items are linked by the word *impune*. The fourth and last item is amplified by the use of two examples. Such rhetorical devices are found by the hundreds in Cicero's Orations and Pliny's Letters.

Hightet outlines the several satires and discusses the analyses of other scholars. Yet he does not point out that in the first satire the examples of depravities are divided into six sections, the first ending with *dificile est saturam non scribere* and each of the succeeding ones beginning or ending with a similar, though not always so trenchant, statement. The best, of course, is the last: *si natura negat, facit indignatio versum*.

I cannot agree that Juvenal was the first satirist to blend the past with the present. Horace at times uses examples from earlier generations, not to mention mythological stories. To call this a new invention is contradicted by Hightet's own footnote (p. 56 and note 15 on p. 249).

An interesting summary of the first book (p. 89) groups the first, third, and fifth satires as dealing with wealth and poverty in conflict and as written from the point of view of the poor man looking up. The other two present the view of the rich man. Hightet's explanation is that Juvenal could speak authoritatively in both guises, as he started out as a rich man and later lost his wealth.

Hightet takes up the theories of wholesale interpolation, omission, dislocation, etc., from Ribbeck's day to the present (p. 94). Calmly and sensibly he decides that what we have is essentially what Juvenal wrote. "Juvenal is a poet," Hightet well says, "and the arrangement of a poet's ideas is not always governed by logic, but often by emotion."

Hightet finds it strange for a Roman like Juvenal to advise another Roman on governing a province (8, 87 ff.), but Pliny the Younger did just that (VIII, 24). I have some reservations about the argument for Juvenal's love of children (p. 145), as far as that argument rests on Virro's gifts to children (5, 141). This is a matter of interpretation which I cannot go into here.

Hightet has an interesting theory that the last poem was originally

some five hundred lines long and that a quire or two were lost from the single codex that survived antiquity. But the Winstedt fragments are left unexplained by this view.

The end of Part II consists of an eighteen-page Survey, an eloquent and masterly defense of Juvenal which every student of Latin literature must read. We badly need books of this sort on other notable literary figures of ancient Rome.

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BERTRAND HEMMERDINGER. *Essai sur l'histoire du texte de Thucydide*. Paris, Société d'édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1955. Pp. 74. (*Collection d'études anciennes publiée sous le patronage de l'association Guillaume Budé*.)

"Le présent essai n'est pas un inventaire codicologique: c'est une histoire du texte" (p. 12). Hemmerdinger shows, in his "Introduction," how the canon of the *codices meliores* developed, somewhat haphazardly, from Gail (1807) to Hude (1901). He emphasizes that the archetype itself contained variants, that the whole tradition is contaminated, that *codices recentiores* (*non deteriores*) preserve good readings, and that, in consequence, it is impossible to construct a detailed and accurate *stemma codicum*.

The book undertakes to prove these statements by dwelling, in seven chapters, on significant periods in the history of the text's transmission. The reader will find comprehension easier if he keeps open the *stemma* folded into the back of the book.

Hemmerdinger begins ("L'édition d'Aristophane de Byzance") at Alexandria, where Thucydides was edited and divided into the eight books that we know by Aristophanes. Book I, he argues, constitutes the *Προοίμιον*, written in the first instance in a single roll; each of Books II-IV encompasses three years of the war. To each year one roll of papyrus was originally devoted, concluding with the words *καὶ . . . οὐ ἔτος τῷ πολέμῳ ἐτελεύτα τῷδε δὲ Θουκυδίδης ξννέγραψεν* (v) (except that the second clause is missing after the first and eighth years). Now the first book of Herodotus, which was also edited at Alexandria, consists of three *λόγοι*. Therefore the book-division of Thucydides is Alexandrian. This is neat and simple, perhaps too simple; and it does raise questions. Did the rolls vary so considerably? How does Hemmerdinger explain the exceptions? How does he handle Books V-VIII (he says nothing of them)?

In Book VIII B reports, as readings or variants, the Attic - *ττ-* (where C has - *σσ-*), as does *Π<sup>2</sup>* (*saecl. I*), which suggests that these are early; here and there the textual tradition reflects the dialect of Laconia. We know that Aristophanes compiled *Ἄττικαὶ λέξεις* and *Λακωνικὰ γλῶσσαι*; therefore it was Aristophanes who edited and corrected Thucydides, whose text, with its new variants, thus assumed (as the "préarchétype") its definitive character. Again, this may be so. Thucydides was surely edited at Alexandria;

and papyrus-fragments do yield variants and corrections that are accordingly proved to be early. Yet the step to Aristophanes seems a broad one, for the dialectical features and possibilities of Thucydides' work might have appealed to any philologist.

In Chapter II, "L'exemplaire athénien," Hemmerdinger cites cases, especially in Thucydides, in which δέκατος or δέκα has been mistakenly written for τέταρτος or τέσσαρες. The error stems from confusion between Attic Δ (= 10) and Ionic Δ (= 4). So a manuscript with Ionic figures was transcribed at Athens by a careless Athenian scribe; this, says Hemmerdinger, could not have occurred before the founding of the library at Alexandria. The mediaeval manuscripts, which repeat the blunders, descend from this Athenian copy, the exemplar, in fact, of Aristophanes. It follows that Diodorus, who in I, 103, 1 writes δεκάτῳ instead of τετάρτῳ, did not take his text from Ephorus, but from Thucydides. This thesis assumes that an Athenian might transcribe the acrophonic numerals as ordinals (Hemmerdinger makes no distinction between cardinals and ordinals), that he was peculiarly vulnerable in the case of Δ, and that the learned Aristophanes overlooked the errors.

Hemmerdinger passes to "Les exemplaires de la basse antiquité" (Chapter III). On the basis of reconstructed dittographies he places the uncial archetype before 400 A. D. Its model, a *de luxe* edition, is set in the fourth century because of its (reconstructed) similarity to four Christian *codices* of that period.

"La Renaissance iconoclaste" (Chapter IV) concerns the gathering of classical manuscripts at Constantinople in 814 by John the Grammarian (whose identity is carefully established) and the consequent work done on Thucydides by him and others under the iconoclastic emperors; the iconoclastic renaissance is thus ascribed to an earlier date than is traditional.

Chapter V ("Métochite et Planude à Chora"), in which H, on the basis of water-marks, is moved back into the early fourteenth century, is largely an examination of the activities of Theodorus Metochites and Planudes at the monastery of Chora. Theodorus was the scribe of H and wrote a few folios of M, C, F, and A. The argument is strengthened by six excellent plates illustrating the hand of Theodorus. The second hand of *codex* S of Thucydides is identified as that of Planudes, whose calligraphy is also illustrated, in two plates.

The last two chapters, "Le Decurtatus" and "Le manuserit H," concentrate on B and H, whose peculiar value, from VI, 92, 5, was first observed by Poppe. B, for this section of the *History*, reproduces the readings of what Hemmerdinger calls the *Decurtatus*, adding variants from the main tradition. He adds a list to show the precise manner in which these variants appear. H, asserts Hemmerdinger, is a copy of a lost manuscript based on B but collated against the direct tradition of the archetype (see the *stemma*); H was the original of Valla, whose translation, therefore, after VII, 50, 1 (where H breaks off), has the value of a manuscript.

In an Appendix, "Le commentaire de Marcellus," Hemmerdinger assigns the anonymous commentary of A, F, E, and C to Marcellus, employing the testimony of Gregory of Corinth (before 1125), who specifically ascribes a note from it to this shadowy figure. Partly on this evidence and partly on the evidence of certain scholia to

Xenophon's *Anabasis*, this same Marellus, rather than Marcellinus, is given credit for the *Life* of Thucydides. On p. 62, the date 1516 is surely a *terminus post quem non*; "postérieur à 1516" is contrary to the facts.

The book has a list of references to Thucydides and a workmanlike index. On p. 7 there is a "Liste des sigles représentant des manuscrits de Thucydide dans cet ouvrage"; it includes the papyri relevant to this study. *Parisinus gr. 1637*, mentioned on p. 59, is absent; the manuscript belonging to D. S. Robertson (p. 46) is omitted from the index.

I have outlined this book, with emphasis on the first two chapters by way of example, in some detail because it teems with provocative ideas. Hemmerdinger is never reluctant to identify scribes, owners, and readers of manuscripts over the long period of the text's transmission. The lack of specific evidence does not worry him (see, for example, p. 20, on Aristophanes of Byzantium). He is clever in reconstruction (see, for example, his passage on the scribe of the archetype, pp. 28-9) and quite sure in his mind. Whether his ideas will win acceptance is a question. I do not dispute his logic; I feel that he oversimplifies, he tends not to face a problem in its entirety (e. g., Chapter II). He may be right, for example, in replacing Marcellinus with Marellus; yet his case (and he has one) is no stronger than the traditional case for Marcellinus (which is admittedly unsatisfactory), a fact of which he gives the impression of being unaware.

The many notes on readings are for the most part new and of extreme value; they supplement the apparatus of our present book-texts. There is no bibliography, although the author is evidently familiar with the recent studies on the text of Thucydides.

The book is nicely printed and the proof has been competently read. On p. 16 read "Ancient," on p. 25 (line 1) read "1836"; the first sentence on p. 43 needs surgery. The *stemma* is admirably simple and a great aid to the reader; it could be improved by the addition of dates.

Hemmerdinger writes clearly and vigorously, and this, combined with his ingenuity, makes reading a pleasure. His book will not always convince; it will always stimulate.

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LAURA OLIVIERI SANGIACOMO. *Sallustio. Firenze, La Nuova Italia, 1954.* Pp. vi + 310. (*Biblioteca di Cultura*, 53.)

For many years after Eduard Schwartz's celebrated article on the Catilinarian conspiracy in *Hermes*, XXXII (1897), pp. 554-608, it was the fashion to vilify Sallust; it has now become, apparently, the fashion to defend and extol him. Among those scholars chiefly responsible for this shift of direction in Sallustian studies was Gino Funaioli; and recent Italian works on Sallust—Paladini's unfortu-

nate<sup>1</sup> *Sallustio* (Palermo, 1948), Bolaffi's *Sallustio* (Roma, 1949), and the present *Sallustio*—show clearly the influence of Funaioli's views, as put forward in *R.-E.*, Zweite Reihe, I<sup>A</sup> (1914), cols. 1913-55,<sup>2</sup> in the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, s. v. "Sallustio" (1936) and in "Nuovi Orientamenti della Critica Sallustiana," *Studi di Letteratura Antica*, II, 1 (Bologna, 1948), pp. 45-70.<sup>3</sup>

Sangiacomo makes much of the "dato autobiografico nell' opera sallustiana," but it is hard to see how this concern has shaped her book in any especial way. She does take Sallust's personal statements in the proems very seriously, and perhaps she speculates more freely than other writers have done on Sallust's life and probable emotions; but it would be difficult, if not impossible, to write a book about Sallust that did not consider his personality. The plan of Sangiacomo's book is not unusual: an introductory chapter, a chapter on Sallust's life, successive chapters on the *Epistulae* (which she considers genuine), the *De Coniuratione Catilinae*, the *Bellum Iugurthinum*, the *Historiae*, a long, loosely organized chapter on "Sallustio storiografo," and an appendix on the *Inuestiuia*.

Since Sangiacomo belongs to the *cohors sectatorum Sallusti*, she everywhere attempts to defend Sallust as an historian and (what is more difficult) as a man. The chapter on Sallust's life depends very much on Funaioli: p. 14 seems to echo p. 55 of the "Nuovi Orientamenti." Sangiacomo grants that everything known about Sallust's life is unflattering, but she attributes this notoriety to the astute malice of his enemies. Varro recounted Sallust's scandalous affair with Fausta, the wife of Milo, but Varro was a Pompeian. Leneus wrote a *satura acerbissima* against Sallust, from which the pseudo-Ciceronian *Inuestiuia* may derive, but Leneus was a freedman of Pompey. No doubt these men had reason to hate Sallust, and perhaps they wrote nothing but lies, but is it impossible for a man's enemies to tell the hurtful truth about him? Sangiacomo treats very briefly the one episode in Sallust's career that has done his reputation most harm: apparently a man of modest means, he governed *Africa Nova* for a few months and then returned to Rome with immense wealth. To say, as Sangiacomo does on p. 33 "... forse non è necessario pensare a un eccesso di avidità da parte sua al tempo di quella sua carica" merely evades the ethical issue. Certainly, as Funaioli remarks, many Roman governors enriched themselves in the provinces; but these magistrates did not afterwards write histories in which they deplored the baleful influence of wealth and cupidity.

Sangiacomo naturally attacks Schwartz's view that Sallust chose to write about the Catilinarian conspiracy from partisan motives; that his account was, in fact, an answer to the posthumous publication of Cicero's *De consiliis suis*, a sort of secret history which inculpated Caesar. This suggestion may be right or wrong, and Schwartz's position is extreme; but after Caesar's death many Romans must have had some curiosity about his attitude toward the conspiracy, and Sallust could hardly fail to be aware of this interest. Without doubt Sallust gives Caesar more prominence in his history

<sup>1</sup> See *Maia*, II (1949), pp. 146-59.

<sup>2</sup> Actually published in 1921.

<sup>3</sup> First published in *Rendiconti della Classe di Scienze Morali e Storiche della Reale Accademia d'Italia*, Ser. VII, III (1942), pp. 1 ff.

than Caesar had at the time of the actual conspiracy: any historian's vision of the past is refracted by his own experience, and it may have been hard to remember when the *dictator perpetuo* was merely a politician among politicians. Was Caesar really one of the "due personalità dominatrici" (p. 137) in the Senate of 63? H. Last (*Mélanges . . . offerts à J. Marouzeau* [Paris, 1948], pp. 361 ff.) has analysed the odd brevity with which Sallust introduces Caesar into the senatorial debate. Probably Caesar, then praetor elect, spoke only after both consuls designate and fourteen *consulares* had been asked their opinions; but Sallust mentions only one consul designate, then he gives the speech of Caesar, and then Cato's speech in reply. Last conjectures that Sallust was concerned to show, by the sentiments which he puts in Caesar's mouth and by pairing him with the already legendary Cato, that Caesar could have had no part in the conspiracy. Sangiacomo attempts to rebut any charge of bias in Caesar's favor, not so much by examining individual passages, as by considering Sallust's "posizione spirituale" when he was writing about the conspiracy. She refers to the proems, in which Sallust speaks of his old political troubles and his renunciation of public life for good; after writing this, Sangiacomo asserts, it would have been absolutely unnatural for Sallust to revert to his earlier partisan attitudes. This judgment seems too simple, not to say naïve: even though Sallust abandoned political life, he could hardly have abandoned, so suddenly and so easily, the political passions which had animated him for many years. And this is not necessarily to say that Sallust intended to mislead, or was consciously insincere when he wrote "partibus rei publicae animus liber erat" (*De Coni. Cat.*, IV, 2).

Sangiacomo also essays the more difficult task of defending Sallust's objectivity in the *Bell. Iug.*; though she does admit "l'interpretazione alquanto forzata ed estensiva dei fatti" (p. 186). Sallust himself remarks that he chose to write about the Jugurthine War partly "quia tunc primum superbiae nobilitatis obuiam itum est" (V, 1); and even though Sallust makes some effort to be fair to Metellus and Sulla, and can see some faults in Marius, he displays a bitterness and rancor against the nobility of seventy or eighty years before which is intelligible only if one remembers Sallust's own political allegiance. An impartial historian would hardly have accused Aemilius Scaurus, the *princeps senatus*, of refusing to accept Jugurtha's bribes merely because he feared public opinion. Sallust's bias against the nobility in the *Bell. Iug.*, and especially in chaps. VII-IX, has been examined by Kurt von Fritz in a cogent article ("Sallust and the Roman Nobility," *T. A. P. A.*, LXXIV [1943], pp. 134-68), which Sangiacomo does not mention. In chap. VII Sallust begins the story of how King Mieipsa sent Jugurtha to serve under Scipio Aemilianus in the Roman army then besieging Numantia; and there, according to Sallust, corrupt Roman nobles, telling Jugurtha that everything at Rome was for sale, fired him with the ambition to become sole ruler of Numidia on Mieipsa's death; and this ambition eventually led to war. Sallust wished to show that the nobles were ultimately responsible for the war—how could he have known what a few reckless men told Jugurtha under the walls of Numantia nearly a century before?—and that they were thus predisposed to accept bribes, as Sallust

asserts, from Jugurtha. Sangiacomo here, as elsewhere, follows Sallust uncritically, and does not point out the odd compression of chronology in his account: though Numantia fell in 133 and Mieipsa did not die for another fifteen years, Sallust refers to this lapse of time as "paueos post annos" and makes Mieipsa, in his dying words, speak of Jugurtha's returning from Numantia "nouissime." Sallust distorted the chronology, whether consciously or not, because he wished to render more probable a causal connection between two events that were actually separated by fifteen years.

Sangiacomo's *Sallustio* is not altogether unsuccessful: she discusses many individual problems with care and learning, and she obviously controls the large and difficult Sallustian bibliography. It is rather, as I have attempted to show by several examples, that her partisan attitude vitiates the book: "La presente ricerca si è studiata di dimostrare che la condizione migliore per penetrare nello spirito dell'opera sallustiana è, in ultima analisi, quella di chi, con un atto di fede più che giustificato dalla affascinante potenza dell'opera, giunga a tener per vero quanto l'autore dice o lascia intendere del proprio atteggiamento presente e passato . . ." (p. 249). If this is the new orientation of Sallustian studies, it is an orientation that has become extreme and needs correcting.

I append some sporadic criticisms and comments. P. 14: Sall., *Hist.*, II, 16 (Maur.) is incorrectly cited; correctly on p. 233. P. 20, n. 4: This punctuation and interpretation of Cie., *Ad Quint. frat.*, II, 9, 3, assigned to Malcovati, is already in Tyrrell and Purser. P. 32: Read "per l'anno 46." P. 52, n. 1: The reading of cod. Vat. 3864 is *at herculem catonem*. P. 99: The man condemned with L. Annius Bellienus was not L. Luceius but L. Luscius. P. 102: E. G. Hardy, "The Catilinarian Conspiracy in its Context," *J. R. S.*, VII (1917), pp. 168-71, has already discussed and refuted the view that the conspiracy began in 64. P. 119: The meeting of the Senate was probably on Nov. 8 rather than Nov. 7. P. 132: Tolkiehn, "Zur Behandlung Ciceros durch Sallust," *Phil. Woch.*, XLV (1925), pp. 104-5, might be mentioned. P. 132, n. 1: An essay curiously entitled "Was Sallust said to Cicero" is attributed to C. R. S. Broughton here, and to R. S. Broughton on p. 295. P. 136, n. 2: The reference should be to App., *Bell. Ciu.*, II, 1, 5-6. P. 217, n. 1: The date of cod. Vat. 3864 is incorrectly given here; correctly on p. 38. P. 286: B. Edmar, *Studien zu den Epistulae ad Caesarem senem de re publica* (Lund, 1931), pp. 106-7 gives, in a long footnote, a succinct presentation of the linguistic and stylistic evidence against the authenticity of the *Invectiua*. Pp. 293-8: This "Elenco degli Autori Moderni Citati" is occasionally misleading; for it includes some works which are not cited in the text, and omits some others which are.

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The Oxyrhynchus Papyri, Part XXII. Edited with translations and notes by E. LOBEL and C. H. ROBERTS. London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1954. Pp. xiii + 181; 11 pls. £5.

"We started work upon the town," wrote the late Bernard P. Grenfell in his 1897 report on the fabulous finds of his first season at Behneseh (ancient Oxyrhynchus), "on January 11th by setting some seventy men and boys to dig trenches through a low mound on the outside of the site. . . . The choice proved a very fortunate one, for papyrus scraps at once began to come to light in considerable quantities, varied by uncial fragments and occasional complete or nearly complete official and private documents. . . . Since this rubbish mound had proved so fruitful I proceeded to increase the number of workmen gradually up to 110, and as we moved northwards over other parts of the site, the flow of papyri soon became a torrent which it was difficult to cope with. . . . We engaged two men to make tin boxes for storing the papyri, but for the next ten weeks they could hardly keep pace with us. . . .

"The third and by far the greatest find, that of the Byzantine archives, took place on March 18th and 19th, and was, I suppose, a 'record' in point of quantity. On the first of these two days we came upon a mound which had a thick layer consisting almost entirely of papyrus rolls. There was room for six pairs of men and boys to be working simultaneously at this storehouse, and the difficulty was to find enough baskets in all Behneseh to contain the papyri. At the end of the day's work no less than thirty-six good-sized baskets were brought in from this place, several of them stuffed with fine rolls three to ten feet long, including some of the largest Greek rolls I have ever seen. As the baskets were required for the next day's work, Mr. Hunt and I started at 9 p.m. after dinner to stow away the papyri in some empty packing-cases which we fortunately had at hand. The task was only finished at three in the morning, and on the following night we had a repetition of it, for twenty-five more baskets were filled before the place was exhausted."<sup>1</sup>

More than fifty years later Grenfell and Hunt's seemingly inexhaustible finds are still unfolding their treasure. With the present twenty-second volume the number of published Oxyrhynchus papyri reaches 2353—the largest series of its kind—and the end is not even in sight. The next volume, incidentally, will contain some new pieces of Bacchylides, Corinna, and Stesichorus.

Like most of its predecessors, the twenty-second Oxyrhynchus volume contains literary and non-literary texts. Included in the former group are twenty texts of Ionic poetry (Nos. 2309-2328), edited with Mr. Lobel's special mastery of this area of Greek literature. Among these fragments, mostly from second-century manuscripts, are:

Archilochus—iambic trimeters, trochaic tetrameters, and two scraps from the fable of the fox and the eagle;  
Anacreon—pieces of one, and possibly two, manuscripts, the first

<sup>1</sup> Egypt Exploration Society, Archaeological Report 1896-1897, pp. 6-9.

appearance of this poet among the papyri (one fragment, of thirteen lines, "exhibits a form of three-lined stanza not otherwise exemplified among his remains");  
Hipponax—an exiguous fragment mentioning Bupalus;  
An anonymous eighteen-line fragment (No. 2317) of trochaic tetrameters very much in the style of, and therefore possibly attributable to, Archilochus.

The remaining texts of the volume are presented by Mr. Roberts, edited with the sureness and finish that characterize his work. He gives us, first, four new literary texts in copies dating from the second and third centuries: part of a scene of New Comedy; a complete column of text of Ctesias' *Persica*, the longest extant piece of this author's work in its original form; thirteen Phalaeanian verses (one is inadvertently dropped out in the printed transcription) from a manuscript on the labors of Hercules with colored "cartoon-strip" illustrations;<sup>2</sup> and 79 lines in three columns, constituting the best of the three known texts of the *Oracle of the Potter*, a Graeco-Egyptian "medley of legend, history, and apocalyptic fantasy." Five texts of known works complete the literary section of the volume—small fragments of Aeschylus' *Septem* and larger ones of Euripides' *Andromache*, *Helena* (the first papyrus manuscript of this play), and *Medea*, all of them with variant readings of some interest.

Among the documents the following may be singled out for notice here. No. 2338 is a list of some 70 poets, trumpeters, and heralds who enjoyed tax exemption in Oxyrhynchus as the result of (victories in) the municipal games in the years A. D. 261/2–288/9. This type of municipal generosity, abundantly attested for athletic victors, is now seen to have been extended to the arts as well. Whether this "may also suggest that Upper Egypt was relatively prosperous in this period" is, however, questionable; a recurrent factor in the chronic financial straits of Hellenistic towns under the Principate—witness Pliny's *Letters* as well as the papyri and inscriptions—was precisely their seeming unwillingness or inability to curtail public expenditures for traditional pageantry. — No. 2339 is an odd fragment, unfortunately much mutilated, of judicial proceedings in which references are made to war (or riots?), crucifixion, beheading, and flogging. Whether this is from a report of a real trial or from a piece of tendentious literature remains an open question. — No. 2340, of A. D. 192, brings the first mention of a *hypostategos* of a district of Alexandria. It shows too that this office was liturgic, and adds still another detail to the evidence on the exemption of weavers from liturgies. — Nos. 2343 (*ca.* A. D. 288) and 2349 (A. D. 70) contain the names of two hitherto unrecorded Prefects of Egypt, Iucundius(?) Peregrinus and L. Peducaeus Colonus, respectively. — No. 2344 (*ca.* A. D. 336) "is of some interest as one of the earliest documents in which a Christian bishop figures." — No. 2345, of A. D. 224, is a document of a familiar type, an

<sup>2</sup> The papyrus with its three illustrations is reproduced in black and white in Plate XI. The introduction to this text (No. 2331) includes a two-page commentary on the illustrations by Professor K. Weitzmann, who concludes that "we can without exaggeration say that the Heracles papyrus is the most important illustrated literary papyrus found so far."

application for admission to membership in the gymnasium (*epikrisis*). What is unique in this application is the mention of the applicant's literacy; since there has never been any evidence to suggest that literacy was a requisite for membership, its mention here must doubtless be regarded as an assertion of gentility and status in an age of "middle-class" decline. It is interesting to note, too, that the applicant's family can cite a record of *epikrisis* going all the way back to the reign of Vespasian. — No. 2348 contains the Greek translation made at the opening of a Latin will drawn in A.D. 224; the document acquires particular significance from its proximity to the *Constitutio Antoniniana*. — A final detail: the documents of this volume add half a dozen new words to our Greek lexicons (ἀδωσιδικεῖν, διακελεύειν, ἐλαιουργικός, εὐδωσιδικεῖν, κωμέδαφος, σταυροποία, ὑπερλαμβάνειν, φλαγέλλα), and in No. 2342 the verb ἐμβολεύειν occurs in a new, colloquial sense (literally, "to load a ship," here, "to load one's pockets with," "to embezzle").

This is the second volume of the *Oxyrhynchus* series that has been published with the aid of a subvention from UNESCO (*pace* the American Legion).

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WALTER F. OTTO. *The Homeric Gods*. Translated by Moses Hadas.  
New York, Pantheon, 1954. Pp. 310.

The real attraction of this book is that it lives up to its sub-title: *The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion*. It begins by stating some of the basic differences between the Olympian and all modern religions: the lack of moral earnestness, of holiness; and, on the other hand, the closer intimacy between the Olympians and their votaries, for all the gulf between them. None the less the author insists, and quite rightly, that the Olympian religion had a deep spiritual significance, which is too often denied, and he bravely attempts to track down this significance.

The interventions of the gods give a supernatural quality to events which yet remain completely natural and free from magic. The gods are obviously responsible, and yet the responsibility of the human agents is in no way diminished. Dr. Otto struggles to explain this paradox, and this is no easy task, as the modern terms which he must needs use have their meanings conditioned by quite different categories of thought. For the most part, he struggles successfully, and there is good reason for Professor Hadas' claim that he found this book "the single most useful help" in communicating to the student some understanding of the gods of Homer. The most useful parts of the book in this respect are the introduction and the chapters on the nature of the gods and their manifestations.

Otto claims that this Greek worship reveals one of humanity's greatest religious ideas and indeed "the religious idea of the European spirit." The first statement is, I believe, justified; if the second is true, however, then Western civilization must be suffering from acute religious schizophrenia. This religious idea is then defined as "the faculty of seeing the world in the light of the divine, not a

world yearned for, aspired to, or mystically present in rare ecstatic experiences, but the world into which we were born, part of which we are, interwoven with it through our senses, and, through our minds, obligated to it for all its abundance and vitality." This somewhat obscure sentence points to a very real difference: the Olympian religion is an imaginative representation of the world as it is, of the forces at work within it and within ourselves, and poetry is at its very core; most religions are the prophetic expression of hopes, ideals, and aspirations, with poetry at the periphery. In these terms we can understand the Homeric paradox: man is the plaything of the gods and yet, within wide limits, he is a free agent—the limits are obvious enough in actual life; the interventions of the gods clearly cause certain events for which, at the same time, man remains himself responsible.

The older Titanic powers of earth and death, here somewhat fancifully identified with the feminine concept of existence, are represented as perpetually in conflict with the Olympians; and this conflict remained unresolved even after the supremacy of the Olympians had been established, for "the new truth does not extinguish reverence for the old." This is true, but not in Homer, and this should have been made clearer, for it is admitted that he kept these older powers very much in the background. The major moral imperatives of the Olympian religion, however, such as the sanctity of the oath and the horror of shedding kindred blood were established under the older dispensation. In this connection, Poseidon and Hermes are said to have close relations with this earlier world.

Five Olympians are made the subjects of special portraits. The picture of Hermes, "the gay master of happy chance," is pleasing and convincing. He is "the god of jolly and unscrupulous profit" and only incidentally, in his capacity as guide, the guide of souls to the underworld. Aphrodite, of course, offers little difficulty, either in her charming or her more terrifying aspects. But the complex of feelings and ideas which became attached to Athena presents a more baffling problem and the author is apt to carry his search for consistency too far. Yet his remarks are enlightening, as when he contrasts the nearness of Athena with the greater detachment of the more contemplative Apollo who shoots from afar. Athena is immediately present in her "bright-eyed vigilance," but it is her good counsel and intelligence, rather than her actions, which give mastery over immediate and present circumstances. That difference is there, but not every incident in Homer or in legend can be made to conform to it. It is true that Apollo refuses to fight Poseidon in the *Theomachia*, but he can hardly be called distant or detached at the death of Patroclus; nor does Athena in the *Odyssey* live up to the nobility and serene poise here attributed to her. "The true Athena is neither a savage nor a contemplative being; she is equally remote from both dispositions," but she is at times untrue to herself; and if we can understand her virginity, the reasons for her feminine nature seem to remain obscure. Something of Apollo's remoteness is also found in Artemis: "This is the divine spirit of sublime nature, the lofty shimmering mistress, the pure one who compels delight and yet cannot love, the dancer and huntress who fondles cubs in her bosom and races the deer, who brings death when she draws her golden bow, reserved and unapproachable, like wild nature and yet, like

nature, wholly enchantment and fresh excitement and lightning beauty."

In the three chapters on the nature of the gods, their manifestations and their relations to men, Otto insists again and again on his main thesis: the identity of the natural and the divine. But, especially in discussing the gods' relations to men, he allows himself to be carried away by his moral earnestness for the cosmic gods into ignoring, indeed denying, the comic gods, and thus he makes the Olympians of Homer more divine, in our sense of the word, than Homer does. He solemnly states, for example, that in the famous love affair of Ares and Aphrodite, in the eighth book of the *Odyssey*, "There can be no question of frivolity" (p. 244 and cf. p. 105); and he also takes the Battle of the gods much too seriously. It is quite true that the gods, in a sense, remain mighty powers even when they are laughed at, but the comedy cannot be denied; it is an essential aspect of the Homeric, indeed of the Greek, attitude to the gods.

This is a serious flaw in Otto's presentation of the Olympians. The book has other faults: it is quite unnecessarily repetitive and would have been better had it been shorter; it is also quite heavily rhetorical. The translation reads very naturally, but in these respects it is perhaps too faithful to the original. Nevertheless, it was a worthwhile task to make Dr. Otto's work available to English readers; it will certainly give the general reader a deeper idea of the meaning of the Olympian gods who are so often treated with much less respect and understanding than they deserve, and for the classical scholar it should prove a useful corrective.

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